Detection rules › Elastic

Suspicious Execution via Script Editor

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies when the macOS Script Editor utility spawns an unusual child process, this may indicate an attempt to execute a malicious Apple Script via a malicious applescript URL handler.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies when the macOS Script Editor utility spawns an unusual child process, this may indicate an attempt to execute
a malicious Apple Script via a malicious applescript URL handler.
"""
id = "8713c19e-6167-494b-9dc9-9ad74bc9b0d7"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Execution via Script Editor"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = ["https://wojciechregula.blog/post/macos-red-teaming-initial-access-via-applescript-url/"]
version = "1.0.30"

query = '''
process where event.action == "exec" and

 (process.parent.executable == "/System/Applications/Utilities/Script Editor.app/Contents/MacOS/Script Editor" or process.Ext.effective_parent.executable == "/System/Applications/Utilities/Script Editor.app/Contents/MacOS/Script Editor") and

 // Suspicious processes spawned by the Script Editor
 (process.name like~ ("curl", "nscurl", "osascript", "python*", "perl*", "mktemp", "chmod", "php", "nohup", "openssl", "plutil", "PlistBuddy", "xattr", "mktemp", "sqlite3", "funzip", "open") or

  // Process masquerading as Apple but has an invalid signature
  (process.name like~ "com.apple.*" and not process.code_signature.signing_id like~ "com.apple.*")
 )
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.002"
name = "Spearphishing Link"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.002"
name = "AppleScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002/"


[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1204"
name = "User Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1204.001"
name = "Malicious Link"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1553"
name = "Subvert Trust Controls"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "exec" and
 (process.parent.executable == "/System/Applications/Utilities/Script Editor.app/Contents/MacOS/Script Editor" or process.Ext.effective_parent.executable == "/System/Applications/Utilities/Script Editor.app/Contents/MacOS/Script Editor") and
 (process.name like~ ("curl", "nscurl", "osascript", "python*", "perl*", "mktemp", "chmod", "php", "nohup", "openssl", "plutil", "PlistBuddy", "xattr", "mktemp", "sqlite3", "funzip", "open") or
  (process.name like~ "com.apple.*" and not process.code_signature.signing_id like~ "com.apple.*")
 )

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • exec
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec"
process.Ext.effective_parent.executableeq
  • /System/Applications/Utilities/Script Editor.app/Contents/MacOS/Script Editor
field:"process.Ext.effective_parent.executable" kind:eq value:"/System/Applications/Utilities/Script Editor.app/Contents/MacOS/Script Editor"
process.namewildcard
  • PlistBuddy
  • chmod
  • com.apple.*
  • curl
  • funzip
  • mktemp
  • nohup
  • nscurl
  • open
  • openssl
  • osascript
  • perl*
  • php
  • plutil
  • python*
  • sqlite3
  • xattr
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard
process.parent.executableeq
  • /System/Applications/Utilities/Script Editor.app/Contents/MacOS/Script Editor
field:"ParentImage" kind:eq value:"/System/Applications/Utilities/Script Editor.app/Contents/MacOS/Script Editor"