Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process
Identifies suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute
malicious embedded objects from a .one file.
"""
id = "28297d1e-c2a9-442c-9e48-98fe8ce36fab"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://blog.sevagas.com/IMG/pdf/redteam_with_onenote.pdf"]
version = "1.0.26"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "ONENOTE.EXE" and
(
process.pe.original_file_name : (
"rundll32.exe",
"regsvr32.exe",
"bitsadmin.exe",
"certutil.exe",
"installutil.exe",
"schtasks.exe",
"wmic.exe",
"cscript.exe",
"wscript.exe",
"cmstp.exe",
"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
"regasm.exe",
"regsvcs.exe",
"mshta.exe",
"msxsl.exe",
"ieexec.exe",
"cmd.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"hh.exe",
"javaw.exe",
"pcalua.exe",
"curl.exe",
"ScriptRunner.exe",
"CertOC.exe",
"Workfolders.exe",
"odbcconf.exe",
"msiexec.exe",
"msdt.exe")
or
(process.name : "explorer.exe" and
process.args : ("*.hta*", "*.vb*", "*.wsh*", "*.js*", "*.ps*", "*.scr*", "*.pif*", "*bat*", "*.cmd*")) or
process.executable : ("?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\*",
"?:\\Users\\Public\\",
"?:\\ProgramData\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Temp\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*")
) and
/* many FPs like browsers and chat desktop apps */
not (process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\*" and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.command_line : "*windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\*MonitorPrintJobStatus*") and
not (process.pe.original_file_name == "Teams.exe" and
process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft Corporation") and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\AllesTechnologyAgent\\Super Shield\\SuperShieldHookCpy32.dll,#1") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name : ("VideoLAN", "Interact Digital AG"))
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "ONENOTE.EXE" and
(
process.pe.original_file_name : (
"rundll32.exe",
"regsvr32.exe",
"bitsadmin.exe",
"certutil.exe",
"installutil.exe",
"schtasks.exe",
"wmic.exe",
"cscript.exe",
"wscript.exe",
"cmstp.exe",
"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
"regasm.exe",
"regsvcs.exe",
"mshta.exe",
"msxsl.exe",
"ieexec.exe",
"cmd.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"hh.exe",
"javaw.exe",
"pcalua.exe",
"curl.exe",
"ScriptRunner.exe",
"CertOC.exe",
"Workfolders.exe",
"odbcconf.exe",
"msiexec.exe",
"msdt.exe")
or
(process.name : "explorer.exe" and
process.args : ("*.hta*", "*.vb*", "*.wsh*", "*.js*", "*.ps*", "*.scr*", "*.pif*", "*bat*", "*.cmd*")) or
process.executable : ("?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\*",
"?:\\Users\\Public\\",
"?:\\ProgramData\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Temp\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*")
) and
not (process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\*" and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.command_line : "*windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\*MonitorPrintJobStatus*") and
not (process.pe.original_file_name == "Teams.exe" and
process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft Corporation") and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\AllesTechnologyAgent\\Super Shield\\SuperShieldHookCpy32.dll,#1") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name : ("VideoLAN", "Interact Digital AG"))
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.args" kind:wildcard |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard value:"explorer.exe" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"ONENOTE.EXE" |
process.pe.original_file_name | wildcard |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:wildcard |