Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Process from FortiClient VPN Trace Script
Identifies LOLBAS or download utilities spawned by cmd.exe after execution of a script from the FortiClient VPN trace scripts directory. This may indicate CVE-2026-35616 exploitation against FortiClient EMS where adversaries pushed malicious on_connect scripts to managed endpoints.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies LOLBAS or download utilities spawned by cmd.exe after execution of a script from the FortiClient VPN trace
scripts directory. This may indicate CVE-2026-35616 exploitation against FortiClient EMS where adversaries pushed
malicious on_connect scripts to managed endpoints.
"""
id = "1b054bc6-d0e1-40bd-aed8-91c4b455cbc4"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Process from FortiClient VPN Trace Script"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/forticlient-ems-exploited-via-cve-2026-35616-to-deliver-ekz-infostealer-disguised-as-a-fortinet-patch/",
]
version = "1.0.1"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "cmd.exe" and
process.name : (
"rundll32.exe", "mshta.exe", "msiexec.exe", "powershell.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "curl.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
"certutil.exe", "msbuild.exe", "certreq.exe", "cmd.exe", "wmic.exe", "schtasks.exe", "sc.exe", "wscript.exe",
"cscript.exe"
) and
process.parent.command_line : "*C:\\Program Files\\Fortinet\\FortiClient\\logs\\Trace\\scripts\\*" and
not process.args :("c:\\Program Files\\Fortinet\\VPNDisconnect.ps1", "c:\\Program Files\\Fortinet\\VPNConnect.ps1", "\\\\*\\NETLOGON\\VPNConnectScript.VBS")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1190"
name = "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "cmd.exe" and
process.name : (
"rundll32.exe", "mshta.exe", "msiexec.exe", "powershell.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "curl.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
"certutil.exe", "msbuild.exe", "certreq.exe", "cmd.exe", "wmic.exe", "schtasks.exe", "sc.exe", "wscript.exe",
"cscript.exe"
) and
process.parent.command_line : "*C:\\Program Files\\Fortinet\\FortiClient\\logs\\Trace\\scripts\\*" and
not process.args :("c:\\Program Files\\Fortinet\\VPNDisconnect.ps1", "c:\\Program Files\\Fortinet\\VPNConnect.ps1", "\\\\*\\NETLOGON\\VPNConnectScript.VBS")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.args | wildcard | c:\Program Files\Fortinet\VPNDisconnect.ps1, c:\Program Files\Fortinet\VPNConnect.ps1, \\*\NETLOGON\VPNConnectScript.VBS | excludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"c:\Program Files\Fortinet\VPNDisconnect.ps1" field:"process.args" value:"c:\Program Files\Fortinet\VPNConnect.ps1" field:"process.args" value:"\\*\NETLOGON\VPNConnectScript.VBS" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.command_line | wildcard |
| field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:wildcard value:"*C:\Program Files\Fortinet\FortiClient\logs\Trace\scripts\*" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"cmd.exe" |