Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Trend Micro Security Agent Child Process
Detects a suspicious child process of the Trend Micro Security Agent indicating a possible remote code execution attempt.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects a suspicious child process of the Trend Micro Security Agent indicating a possible remote code execution
attempt.
"""
id = "18a93bcb-8f7b-48f7-9f02-107e44993194"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Trend Micro Security Agent Child Process"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.4"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
(
(process.parent.name : "TmsaInstance64.exe" or process.working_directory : "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\Security Agent\\CCSF\\module\\BES\\") or
descendant of [process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "TmsaInstance64.exe"]
) and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Trend Micro, Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
not process.executable : ("C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\*", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1190"
name = "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
(
(process.parent.name : "TmsaInstance64.exe" or process.working_directory : "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\Security Agent\\CCSF\\module\\BES\\") or
descendant of [process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "TmsaInstance64.exe"]
) and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Trend Micro, Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
not process.executable : ("C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Trend Micro\\*", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | Trend Micro, Inc. | excludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Trend Micro, Inc." |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
process.executable | wildcard | C:\Program Files (x86)\Trend Micro\*, ?:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Trend Micro\*" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"TmsaInstance64.exe" |
process.working_directory | wildcard |
| field:"CurrentDirectory" kind:wildcard value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Trend Micro\Security Agent\CCSF\module\BES\" |