Detection rules › Elastic
Untrusted File Execution via Microsoft Office
Identifies the execution of an unsigned file written or modified by Microsoft Office processes.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule body
[rule]
description = "Identifies the execution of an unsigned file written or modified by Microsoft Office processes."
id = "bb23a662-2d75-4714-837d-4ec9c2e772a5"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Untrusted File Execution via Microsoft Office"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.34"
query = '''
sequence by user.id with maxspan=1m
[file where event.action != "deletion" and
(file.extension : ("exe", "com", "pif", "scr") or file.Ext.header_bytes : "4d5a*") and
process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
not file.path :
(
"?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*-*-*-*\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*"
)
] by file.path
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
not process.code_signature.trusted == true] by process.executable
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by file.path, process.executable, user.id.
Stage 1: file
[file where event.action != "deletion" and
(file.extension : ("exe", "com", "pif", "scr") or file.Ext.header_bytes : "4d5a*") and
process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
not file.path :
(
"?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*-*-*-*\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*"
)
] by file.path
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
not process.code_signature.trusted == true] by process.executable
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
file.path | wildcard | ?:\Users\*\Downloads\*, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*-*-*-*\*, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*, ?:\Program Files\* | excludes:file.path |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
event.action | ne |
| field:"EventType" kind:ne value:"deletion" |
file.Ext.header_bytes | wildcard |
| field:"file.Ext.header_bytes" kind:wildcard value:"4d5a*" |
file.extension | wildcard |
| field:"file.extension" kind:wildcard |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard |