Detection rules › Elastic

Untrusted File Execution via Microsoft Office

Time window
1m
Sequence by
file.path, process.executable, user.id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the execution of an unsigned file written or modified by Microsoft Office processes.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Rule body

[rule]
description = "Identifies the execution of an unsigned file written or modified by Microsoft Office processes."
id = "bb23a662-2d75-4714-837d-4ec9c2e772a5"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Untrusted File Execution via Microsoft Office"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.34"

query = '''
sequence by user.id with maxspan=1m
  [file where event.action != "deletion" and
    (file.extension : ("exe", "com", "pif", "scr") or file.Ext.header_bytes : "4d5a*") and
    process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
    not file.path :
            (
              "?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*",
              "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*-*-*-*\\*",
              "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
              "?:\\Program Files\\*"
            )
    ] by file.path
  [process where event.action == "start" and
    process.parent.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
    not process.code_signature.trusted == true] by process.executable
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by file.path, process.executable, user.id.

Stage 1: file

[file where event.action != "deletion" and
    (file.extension : ("exe", "com", "pif", "scr") or file.Ext.header_bytes : "4d5a*") and
    process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
    not file.path :
            (
              "?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*",
              "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*-*-*-*\\*",
              "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
              "?:\\Program Files\\*"
            )
    ] by file.path

Stage 2: process

[process where event.action == "start" and
    process.parent.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
    not process.code_signature.trusted == true] by process.executable

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
file.pathwildcard?:\Users\*\Downloads\*, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*-*-*-*\*, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*, ?:\Program Files\*excludes:file.path
process.code_signature.trustedeqtrueexcludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
event.actionne
  • deletion corpus 86 (elastic 86)
field:"EventType" kind:ne value:"deletion"
file.Ext.header_byteswildcard
  • 4d5a* corpus 46 (elastic 46)
field:"file.Ext.header_bytes" kind:wildcard value:"4d5a*"
file.extensionwildcard
  • com corpus 16 (elastic 16)
  • exe corpus 32 (elastic 32)
  • pif corpus 18 (elastic 18)
  • scr corpus 17 (elastic 17)
field:"file.extension" kind:wildcard
process.namewildcard
  • EXCEL.EXE corpus 34 (elastic 34)
  • MSACCESS.EXE corpus 19 (elastic 19)
  • POWERPNT.EXE corpus 31 (elastic 31)
  • WINWORD.EXE corpus 35 (elastic 35)
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard
process.parent.namewildcard
  • EXCEL.EXE corpus 28 (elastic 27, splunk 1)
  • MSACCESS.EXE corpus 12 (elastic 12)
  • POWERPNT.EXE corpus 23 (elastic 23)
  • WINWORD.EXE corpus 26 (elastic 26)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard