Detection rules › Elastic

Lateral Execution via DCOM Office Application

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies remote execution via Distributed Component Object Model service to launch a process via a Microsoft Office application.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies remote execution via Distributed Component Object Model service to launch a process via a Microsoft Office
application.
"""
id = "0e9b9019-fc99-4294-9232-8581e30cd240"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Lateral Execution via DCOM Office Application"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-abuse-the-power-of-dcom-excel-application-3c016d0d9922",
]
version = "1.0.6"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and process.Ext.session_info.logon_type : "Network*" and
 process.parent.executable : "?:\\Program Files*\\Microsoft Office\\*.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding" and 
 not process.executable : ("C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ClickToRun\\OfficeC2RClient.exe", 
                           "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Client\\AppVDllSurrogate64.exe",
                           "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Client\\AppVDllSurrogate64.exe")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.6.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1021"
name = "Remote Services"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1021.003"
name = "Distributed Component Object Model"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0008"
name = "Lateral Movement"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.6.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and process.Ext.session_info.logon_type : "Network*" and
 process.parent.executable : "?:\\Program Files*\\Microsoft Office\\*.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding" and 
 not process.executable : ("C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ClickToRun\\OfficeC2RClient.exe", 
                           "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Client\\AppVDllSurrogate64.exe",
                           "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Client\\AppVDllSurrogate64.exe")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.executableeqC:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe, C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Client\AppVDllSurrogate64.exe, C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Client\AppVDllSurrogate64.exeexcludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Client\AppVDllSurrogate64.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Client\AppVDllSurrogate64.exe"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.