Detection rules › Elastic
Elevation via Common Log File System Exploitation
Identifies unlevated attempt to create a BLF file using the Common Log File System (CLFS) API followed by spawning a child process with System privileges. This may indicate a successful CLFS vulnerability exploitation for privilege escalation.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies unlevated attempt to create a BLF file using the Common Log File System (CLFS) API followed by spawning a
child process with System privileges. This may indicate a successful CLFS vulnerability exploitation for privilege
escalation.
"""
id = "54cff348-106e-42bf-bf94-ce8e3ed68440"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Elevation via Common Log File System Exploitation"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://securelist.com/windows-clfs-exploits-ransomware/111560/"]
version = "1.0.2"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=2m
[file where event.action != "deletion" and not user.id : "S-1-5-18" and user.id != null and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry,
$entry.symbol_info: ("*clfsw32.dll!CreateLogFile*", "*clfsw32.dll!AddLogContainerSet*"))] by process.entity_id
[process where event.action == "start" and user.id : "S-1-5-18"] by process.parent.entity_id
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1068"
name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 2m, correlated by process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id.
Stage 1: file
[file where event.action != "deletion" and not user.id : "S-1-5-18" and user.id != null and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry,
$entry.symbol_info: ("*clfsw32.dll!CreateLogFile*", "*clfsw32.dll!AddLogContainerSet*"))] by process.entity_id
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "start" and user.id : "S-1-5-18"] by process.parent.entity_id
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
user.id | eq | S-1-5-18 | excludes:user.id field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-18" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
event.action | ne |
| field:"EventType" kind:ne value:"deletion" |
user.id | is_not_null | field:"user.id" kind:is_not_null | |
user.id | wildcard |
| field:"user.id" kind:wildcard value:"S-1-5-18" |