Detection rules › Elastic

NetworkCleartext Logon by a Suspicious Process

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies NetworkCleartext logon attempt by an unusual process. Adversaries may leverage compromised credentials to bypass access controls.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies NetworkCleartext logon attempt by an unusual process. Adversaries may leverage compromised credentials to
bypass access controls.
"""
id = "07ca9f3f-50b9-4b2f-ae18-e500d21fe73d"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "NetworkCleartext Logon by a Suspicious Process"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"]
version = "1.0.11"

query = '''
authentication where event.action == "log_on" and
 process.Ext.session_info.logon_type == "NetworkCleartext" and process.executable : "C:\\*" and
 user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and (user.effective.id != null and user.effective.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*")) and
 not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
      process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Varonis Systems, Inc.", "Remote Access World SAS", "TSplus SAS", "Solarwinds Worldwide, LLC", "Siemens AG")) and
 not process.executable :
            ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\appcmd.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wsmprovhost.exe",
             "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
             "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\InetMgr.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\WMSvc.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\CPrepSrv.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.15.1"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1134"
name = "Access Token Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1134.001"
name = "Token Impersonation/Theft"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1134.002"
name = "Create Process with Token"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.15.1"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: authentication

authentication where event.action == "log_on" and
 process.Ext.session_info.logon_type == "NetworkCleartext" and process.executable : "C:\\*" and
 user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and (user.effective.id != null and user.effective.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*")) and
 not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
      process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Varonis Systems, Inc.", "Remote Access World SAS", "TSplus SAS", "Solarwinds Worldwide, LLC", "Siemens AG")) and
 not process.executable :
            ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\w3wp.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\appcmd.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wsmprovhost.exe",
             "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
             "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\InetMgr.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\WMSvc.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\CPrepSrv.exe",
             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.code_signature.subject_nameinRemote Access World SAS, Siemens AG, Solarwinds Worldwide, LLC, TSplus SAS, Varonis Systems, Inc.excludes:process.code_signature.subject_name
process.code_signature.trustedeqtrueexcludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true"
process.executablewildcard?:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\inetsrv\w3wp.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe, ?:\Program Files\*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\InetMgr.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\WMSvc.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\CPrepSrv.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeexcludes:process.executable

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • log_on corpus 8 (elastic 8)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"log_on"
process.Ext.session_info.logon_typeeq
  • NetworkCleartext
field:"process.Ext.session_info.logon_type" kind:eq value:"NetworkCleartext"
process.executablewildcard
  • C:\* corpus 16 (elastic 16)
field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"C:\*"
user.effective.idis_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"user.effective.id" kind:is_not_null
user.effective.idwildcard
  • S-1-12-* corpus 4 (elastic 4)
  • S-1-5-21* corpus 4 (elastic 4)
field:"user.effective.id" kind:wildcard
user.idwildcard
  • S-1-12-* corpus 46 (elastic 46)
  • S-1-5-21* corpus 47 (elastic 47)
field:"user.id" kind:wildcard