Detection rules › Elastic
Potential Privilege Escalation via LogonUI
Identifies attempts to force the LogonUI process to load an unsigned DLL via logoff action. The LogonUI.exe process will communicate with desktop GUI processes, a malicious one may force it to load a DLL using memory mapped shellcode via marshal/unmarshal Direct Composition objects. This may indicate a successful vulnerability exploitation for privilege escalation.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to force the LogonUI process to load an unsigned DLL via logoff action. The LogonUI.exe process will
communicate with desktop GUI processes, a malicious one may force it to load a DLL using memory mapped shellcode via
marshal/unmarshal Direct Composition objects. This may indicate a successful vulnerability exploitation for privilege
escalation.
"""
id = "b9d6cfad-4d18-49a4-a653-47d26fda4431"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Privilege Escalation via LogonUI"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2023/CVE-2023-36033.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/itw-windows-lpe-0days-insights-and-detection-strategies",
]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
library where process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
not dll.code_signature.status : "trusted" and process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary : "*combase.dll|dcomp.dll*"
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1068"
name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: library
library where process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
not dll.code_signature.status : "trusted" and process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary : "*combase.dll|dcomp.dll*"
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.code_signature.status | eq | trusted | excludes:dll.code_signature.status field:"dll.code_signature.status" value:"trusted" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe" |
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary | wildcard |
| field:"process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary" kind:wildcard value:"*combase.dll|dcomp.dll*" |
user.id | wildcard |
| field:"user.id" kind:wildcard value:"S-1-5-18" |