Potential Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID

[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/05/18"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/07/17"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects potential privilege escalation under the root effective user when the real user and parent user are not
root, indicative of the execution of binaries with SUID or SGID bits set.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Some automation or break-glass tooling may invoke SUID binaries from scripts under /home; validate parent identity and
    change tickets before escalating.
    """,
]
from = "now-6m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Potential Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID

Adversaries exploit misconfigured SUID/SGID binaries to gain elevated access or persistence. This rule identifies processes running with root privileges but initiated by non-root users, flagging potential misuse of SUID/SGID permissions.

### Possible investigation steps

- Inspect `process.parent.command_line` and working directory for obfuscation or one-liners.
- Check authentication and sudoers policy for the user.
- Pivot on the host for additional privilege escalation or persistence in the same session.

### Response and remediation

- If unauthorized, contain the session, revoke elevated access, and review sudoers and polkit policy for tampering.
"""
references = [
    "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "769a2e72-11bd-437b-9503-e51e7790d273"
severity = "high"
tags = [
    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
    "Domain: Endpoint",
    "OS: Linux",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
  (process.user.id == "0" and process.real_user.id != "0" and process.parent.user.id != "0") or
  (process.group.id == "0" and process.real_group.id != "0" and process.parent.group.id != "0")
) and
(
  startsWith(process.executable, process.command_line) or
  startsWith(process.name, process.command_line)
) and
(
  process.parent.name like (".*", "python*", "perl*", "ruby*", "lua*", "php*", "node", "deno", "bun", "java") or
  process.parent.executable like ("./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/user/*", "/var/run/user/*", "/home/*/*") or
  (
    process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "mksh") and
    process.parent.args in ("-c", "-cl", "-lc", "--command", "-ic", "-ci", "-bash", "-sh", "-zsh", "-dash", "-fish", "-ksh", "-mksh") and
    process.parent.args_count <= 4
  )
) and
not (
  (process.executable == "/usr/lib/landscape/apt-update" and process.args == "/usr/lib/landscape/apt-update") or
  (process.executable == "/usr/bin/mount" and process.args in ("/usr/bin/mount", "mount")) or
  (process.executable like "/u0?/app/agent/agent_*/sbin/nmo" and process.args like "/u0?/app/agent/agent_*/sbin/nmo") or
  (process.executable == "/usr/bin/screen" and process.args == "screen") or
  (process.executable == "/usr/sbin/playpen" and process.args == "/usr/sbin/playpen") or
  process.executable == "/usr/bin/sudo"
)
'''

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.001"
name = "Setuid and Setgid"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.003"
name = "Sudo and Sudo Caching"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"