Detection rules › Elastic

SeDebugPrivilege Enabled by an Unusual Microsoft Binary

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies an unusual Microsoft signed process enabling the SeDebugPrivilege required to debug and adjust the memory of a process owned by another account. This could be the result of code injection or process hollowing.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege Escalation

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies an unusual Microsoft signed process enabling the SeDebugPrivilege required to debug and adjust the memory of
a process owned by another account. This could be the result of code injection or process hollowing.
"""
id = "ad3953d1-072a-4dcd-8d64-47353e2d52e6"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "SeDebugPrivilege Enabled by an Unusual Microsoft Binary"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4703",
]
version = "1.0.4"

query = '''
any where event.category == "iam" and event.action == "token_right_adjusted" and
 winlog.event_data.EnabledPrivilegeList == "SeDebugPrivilege" and user.id != "S-1-5-18" and winlog.event_data.EnabledPrivilegeList != "SeLockMemoryPrivilege" and
   process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Microsoft Windows", "Microsoft Corporation", "Microsoft Windows Publisher") and
   process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\*.exe" and endswith~(process.command_line, process.executable) and
   not (process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe") and
   not process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe" and
   not (process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\userinit.exe") and
   not (process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ServerManager.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ServerManagerLauncher.exe")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "9.0.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1134"
name = "Access Token Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "9.0.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: any

any where event.category == "iam" and event.action == "token_right_adjusted" and
 winlog.event_data.EnabledPrivilegeList == "SeDebugPrivilege" and user.id != "S-1-5-18" and winlog.event_data.EnabledPrivilegeList != "SeLockMemoryPrivilege" and
   process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Microsoft Windows", "Microsoft Corporation", "Microsoft Windows Publisher") and
   process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\*.exe" and endswith~(process.command_line, process.executable) and
   not (process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe") and
   not process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe" and
   not (process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\userinit.exe") and
   not (process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ServerManager.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ServerManagerLauncher.exe")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.