Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Kernel Mode Address Manipulation
Identifies attempt to call API to modify a kernel mode address from a user mode process. This may indicate a successful vulnerability exploitation for privilege escalation.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempt to call API to modify a kernel mode address from a user mode process. This may indicate a successful
vulnerability exploitation for privilege escalation.
"""
id = "10d1d07c-1301-4fed-b584-eb0878a74dc7"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Kernel Mode Address Manipulation"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/itw-windows-lpe-0days-insights-and-detection-strategies"]
version = "1.0.4"
query = '''
api where process.pid != 4 and process.executable != null and
/* kernel mode address range */
process.Ext.api.parameters.address > 281474976710655 and
process.Ext.api.name : ("WriteProcessMemory", "VirtualProtect*", "VirtualAlloc*", "NtQueueApcThread", "QueueUserAPC", "MapViewOfFile*") and
not (process.Ext.api.name : "VirtualProtect*" and user.id : "s-1-5-18" and
process.executable : ("?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*\\MsMpEng.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Security Client\\MsMpEng.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\MsMpEng.exe"))
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1068"
name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: api
api where process.pid != 4 and process.executable != null and
process.Ext.api.parameters.address > 281474976710655 and
process.Ext.api.name : ("WriteProcessMemory", "VirtualProtect*", "VirtualAlloc*", "NtQueueApcThread", "QueueUserAPC", "MapViewOfFile*") and
not (process.Ext.api.name : "VirtualProtect*" and user.id : "s-1-5-18" and
process.executable : ("?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*\\MsMpEng.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Security Client\\MsMpEng.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\MsMpEng.exe"))
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.Ext.api.name | starts_with | VirtualProtect | excludes:process.Ext.api.name field:"process.Ext.api.name" value:"VirtualProtect" |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\*\MsMpEng.exe, ?:\Program Files\Microsoft Security Client\MsMpEng.exe, ?:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MsMpEng.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\*\MsMpEng.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\Microsoft Security Client\MsMpEng.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MsMpEng.exe" |
user.id | eq | s-1-5-18 | excludes:user.id field:"user.id" value:"s-1-5-18" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.Ext.api.name | wildcard |
| field:"process.Ext.api.name" kind:wildcard |
process.Ext.api.parameters.address | gt |
| field:"process.Ext.api.parameters.address" kind:gt value:"281474976710655" |
process.executable | is_not_null | field:"Image" kind:is_not_null | |
process.pid | ne |
| field:"process_id" kind:ne value:"4" |