Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Registry Symbolic Link
Identifies the creation of registry symbolic link by an unusual process. This may indicate an attempt to elevate privileges via hijacking privileged registry read operations using a malicious registry symbolic link.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Stealth | |
| Defense Impairment |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the creation of registry symbolic link by an unusual process. This may indicate an attempt to elevate
privileges via hijacking privileged registry read operations using a malicious registry symbolic link.
"""
id = "0c5c8b29-9903-4a04-9ca8-20abafc9db41"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Registry Symbolic Link"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.10"
query = '''
registry where event.action == "modification" and user.id : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
registry.value : "SymbolicLinkValue" and process.executable : "?:\\*" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\Temp\\asw-*\\avg-av\\icarus.exe",
"?:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\Work\\*\\DismHost.exe") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and not process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*") and
not (process.name : "DismHost.exe" and process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft *") and
not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and registry.path : "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Nico Mak Computing\\SymbolicLinkValue")
'''
actions = []
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1112"
name = "Modify Registry"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: registry
registry where event.action == "modification" and user.id : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
registry.value : "SymbolicLinkValue" and process.executable : "?:\\*" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\Temp\\asw-*\\avg-av\\icarus.exe",
"?:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\Work\\*\\DismHost.exe") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and not process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*") and
not (process.name : "DismHost.exe" and process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft *") and
not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and registry.path : "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Nico Mak Computing\\SymbolicLinkValue")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"modification" |
process.code_signature.subject_name | wildcard |
| field:"Signature" kind:wildcard value:"Microsoft*" |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?:\*" |
registry.value | wildcard |
| field:"registry_value_name" kind:wildcard value:"SymbolicLinkValue" |
user.id | wildcard |
| field:"user.id" kind:wildcard |