Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious SUID Binary Execution
Detects execution of SUID binaries that may be used for privilege escalation under the root effective user when the real user and parent user are not root, combined with minimal argument counts and suspicious parent context (interpreters, short shell -c invocations, or parents running from user-writable paths) to indicate potential misuse of SUID binaries for privilege escalation.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1548.001 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid, T1548.003 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching |
Rule body elastic
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/04/30"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/05/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects execution of SUID binaries that may be used for privilege escalation under the root effective user
when the real user and parent user are not root, combined with minimal argument counts and suspicious parent
context (interpreters, short shell -c invocations, or parents running from user-writable paths) to indicate
potential misuse of SUID binaries for privilege escalation.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
Some automation or break-glass tooling may invoke SUID binaries from scripts under /home; validate parent identity and
change tickets before escalating.
""",
]
from = "now-6m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious SUID Binary Execution"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating Suspicious SUID Binary Execution
Confirm whether the non-root real user should be invoking SUID binaries as root. Review the parent process tree, script path, and any preceding download or decode activity.
### Possible investigation steps
- Inspect `process.parent.command_line` and working directory for obfuscation or one-liners.
- Check authentication and sudoers policy for the user.
- Pivot on the host for additional privilege escalation or persistence in the same session.
### Response and remediation
- If unauthorized, contain the session, revoke elevated access, and review sudoers and polkit policy for tampering.
"""
references = [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "e7856173-6489-449f-80ec-c1f5fcd7b87c"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
(process.user.id == "0" and process.real_user.id != "0" and process.parent.user.id != "0") or
(process.group.id == "0" and process.real_group.id != "0" and process.parent.group.id != "0")
) and
(
(process.name in ("su", "passwd", "unix_chkpwd") and process.args_count <= 2) or
(
process.name in ("sudo", "pkexec", "fusermount", "fusermount3", "mount", "umount", "newgrp", "chsh") and
process.args_count == 1
) or
process.name in (
"sudoedit", "gpasswd", "chfn", "polkit-agent-helper-1", "dbus-daemon-launch-helper", "ssh-keysign",
"pam_extrausers_chkpwd", "expiry", "chage", "crontab", "wall", "bsd-write", "ssh-agent", "ping",
"ping6", "traceroute", "mtr", "ntfs-3g", "Xorg.wrap", "chrome-sandbox", "bwrap"
)
) and
(
process.parent.name like (".*", "python*", "perl*", "ruby*", "lua*", "php*", "node", "deno", "bun", "java") or
process.parent.executable like ("./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/user/*", "/var/run/user/*", "/home/*/*") or
(
process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "mksh") and
process.parent.args in ("-c", "-cl", "-lc", "--command", "-ic", "-ci", "-bash", "-sh", "-zsh", "-dash", "-fish", "-ksh", "-mksh") and
process.parent.args_count <= 4
)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.001"
name = "Setuid and Setgid"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.003"
name = "Sudo and Sudo Caching"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
(process.user.id == "0" and process.real_user.id != "0" and process.parent.user.id != "0") or
(process.group.id == "0" and process.real_group.id != "0" and process.parent.group.id != "0")
) and
(
(process.name in ("su", "passwd", "unix_chkpwd") and process.args_count <= 2) or
(
process.name in ("sudo", "pkexec", "fusermount", "fusermount3", "mount", "umount", "newgrp", "chsh") and
process.args_count == 1
) or
process.name in (
"sudoedit", "gpasswd", "chfn", "polkit-agent-helper-1", "dbus-daemon-launch-helper", "ssh-keysign",
"pam_extrausers_chkpwd", "expiry", "chage", "crontab", "wall", "bsd-write", "ssh-agent", "ping",
"ping6", "traceroute", "mtr", "ntfs-3g", "Xorg.wrap", "chrome-sandbox", "bwrap"
)
) and
(
process.parent.name like (".*", "python*", "perl*", "ruby*", "lua*", "php*", "node", "deno", "bun", "java") or
process.parent.executable like ("./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/user/*", "/var/run/user/*", "/home/*/*") or
(
process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "mksh") and
process.parent.args in ("-c", "-cl", "-lc", "--command", "-ic", "-ci", "-bash", "-sh", "-zsh", "-dash", "-fish", "-ksh", "-mksh") and
process.parent.args_count <= 4
)
)
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
|
event.type | eq |
|
process.args_count | eq |
|
process.args_count | le |
|
process.group.id | eq |
|
process.name | in |
|
process.parent.args | in |
|
process.parent.args_count | le |
|
process.parent.executable | wildcard |
|
process.parent.group.id | ne |
|
process.parent.name | in |
|
process.parent.name | wildcard |
|
process.parent.user.id | ne |
|
process.real_group.id | ne |
|
process.real_user.id | ne |
|
process.user.id | eq |
|