Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Windows Service Execution
Identifies the execution of a Windows service from suspicious path such as mounted localhost admin share. This may indicate an attempt to elevate privileges via windows services.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a Windows service from suspicious path such as mounted localhost admin share. This may
indicate an attempt to elevate privileges via windows services.
"""
id = "cd25c529-73b4-4a9d-84a9-e24c4a3540d1"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Windows Service Execution"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/twice-around-the-dance-floor-with-pipedance"]
version = "1.0.31"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "services.exe" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and
(
process.executable : ("\\\\127.0.0.1\\*", "\\Device\\Mup\\*\\c$\\*", "\\Device\\Mup\\*\\ADMIN$\\*") or
/* Silver psexec default pattern */
(process.command_line : "?:\\windows\\Temp\\*.exe \"\"" and process.args_count == 2)
) and
not process.executable : ("\\\\ENT*\\admin$\\smstsvc_passive_*.exe", "\\Device\\Mup\\*\\c$\\Program Files\\SIXPaymentServicesLtd\\*\\eftdvs.exe")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1543"
name = "Create or Modify System Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1543.003"
name = "Windows Service"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "services.exe" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and
(
process.executable : ("\\\\127.0.0.1\\*", "\\Device\\Mup\\*\\c$\\*", "\\Device\\Mup\\*\\ADMIN$\\*") or
(process.command_line : "?:\\windows\\Temp\\*.exe \"\"" and process.args_count == 2)
) and
not process.executable : ("\\\\ENT*\\admin$\\smstsvc_passive_*.exe", "\\Device\\Mup\\*\\c$\\Program Files\\SIXPaymentServicesLtd\\*\\eftdvs.exe")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | wildcard | \\ENT*\admin$\smstsvc_passive_*.exe, \Device\Mup\*\c$\Program Files\SIXPaymentServicesLtd\*\eftdvs.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"\\ENT*\admin$\smstsvc_passive_*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"\Device\Mup\*\c$\Program Files\SIXPaymentServicesLtd\*\eftdvs.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name | eq |
| field:"process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name" kind:eq value:"system" |
process.args_count | eq |
| field:"process.args_count" kind:eq value:"2" |
process.command_line | wildcard |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"services.exe" |