Detection rules › Elastic
UAC Bypass Attempt via WOW64 Logger DLL Side-Loading
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via WoW64 logger DLL side-loading. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via WoW64 logger DLL side-loading. Attackers may attempt to
bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
"""
id = "28a39a43-e850-4941-8605-ffa23dcfd25a"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "UAC Bypass Attempt via WOW64 Logger DLL Side-Loading"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "http://waleedassar.blogspot.com/2013/01/wow64logdll.html"]
version = "1.0.32"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=60s
[library where dll.name : "wow64log.dll" and
not (dll.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft *" and dll.code_signature.trusted == true)
] by process.entity_id
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : ("high", "system") and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\conhost.exe")] by process.parent.entity_id
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1574.001"
name = "DLL"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id.
Stage 1: library
[library where dll.name : "wow64log.dll" and
not (dll.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft *" and dll.code_signature.trusted == true)
] by process.entity_id
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : ("high", "system") and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\conhost.exe")] by process.parent.entity_id
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.code_signature.subject_name | starts_with | Microsoft | excludes:dll.code_signature.subject_name field:"dll.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Microsoft " |
dll.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:dll.code_signature.trusted field:"dll.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
process.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\wermgr.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\wermgr.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\conhost.exe | excludes:process.executable |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.name | wildcard |
| field:"dll.name" kind:wildcard value:"wow64log.dll" |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name | wildcard |
| field:"process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name" kind:wildcard |