Detection rules › Elastic
UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated COM interface to launch a rogue Windows ClipUp program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated COM interface to launch a rogue Windows
ClipUp program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
"""
id = "f1008eeb-bc85-4d5e-91ac-e99aaba08ecf"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"]
version = "1.0.31"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
process.parent.command_line : "*BD54C901-076B-434E-B6C7-17C531F4AB41*" and
process.executable : ("?:\\*\\System32\\*.exe", "?:\\*\\SysWOW64\\*.exe") and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*.exe") and
not (process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*\\dismhost.exe" and
process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
process.parent.command_line : "*BD54C901-076B-434E-B6C7-17C531F4AB41*" and
process.executable : ("?:\\*\\System32\\*.exe", "?:\\*\\SysWOW64\\*.exe") and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*.exe") and
not (process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*\\dismhost.exe" and
process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.subject_name | starts_with | Microsoft | excludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Microsoft" |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*\dismhost.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*\dismhost.exe" |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Windows\System32\*.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\*.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\SysWOW64\*.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name | eq |
| field:"process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name" kind:eq value:"high" |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.command_line | wildcard |
| field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:wildcard value:"*BD54C901-076B-434E-B6C7-17C531F4AB41*" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"dllhost.exe" |