Detection rules › Elastic

UAC Bypass via ComputerDefaults Execution Hijack

Time window
1m
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via ComputerDefaults execution hijack. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via ComputerDefaults execution hijack. Attackers bypass UAC to
stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
"""
id = "7c0048d5-356d-4f69-839e-10c1e194958f"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "UAC Bypass via ComputerDefaults Execution Hijack"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"]
version = "1.0.33"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=60s
 [registry where registry.hive == "HKEY_USERS" and
   registry.key : "S-1-5-21-*Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command"]
 [process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "ComputerDefaults.exe" and
  process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
  not process.executable :
           ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: registry

[registry where registry.hive == "HKEY_USERS" and
   registry.key : "S-1-5-21-*Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command"]

Stage 2: process

[process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "ComputerDefaults.exe" and
  process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
  not process.executable :
           ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")]

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.executableeq?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeexcludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.