Detection rules › Elastic
UAC Bypass via FodHelper Execution Hijack
Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via fodhelper.exe execution hijack. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass via fodhelper.exe execution hijack. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily
execute code with elevated permissions.
"""
id = "b5c0058e-2bca-4ed5-84b3-4e017c039c57"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "UAC Bypass via FodHelper Execution Hijack"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"]
version = "1.0.33"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=3m
[registry where registry.hive == "HKEY_USERS" and registry.data.strings != null and
registry.key : "*\\ms-settings*"]
[process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "fodhelper.exe" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: registry
[registry where registry.hive == "HKEY_USERS" and registry.data.strings != null and
registry.key : "*\\ms-settings*"]
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "fodhelper.exe" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.