Detection rules › Elastic

UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt
to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
"""
id = "13fab475-06e4-4ac9-87fc-2105c7441244"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dissecting-remcos-rat-part-four",
]
version = "1.0.32"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and
 process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
 process.parent.command_line : ("*3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7*", "*D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937*") and
 not process.executable :
             ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wermgr.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dccw.exe") and
 /* Issue #364 */
 not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "WireGuard LLC" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and
 process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
 process.parent.command_line : ("*3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7*", "*D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937*") and
 not process.executable :
             ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wermgr.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dccw.exe") and
 not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "WireGuard LLC" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.code_signature.subject_nameeqWireGuard LLCexcludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"WireGuard LLC"
process.code_signature.trustedeqtrueexcludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true"
process.executableeq?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\wermgr.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\wermgr.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\dccw.exeexcludes:process.executable

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_nameeq
  • high corpus 22 (elastic 22)
field:"process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name" kind:eq value:"high"
process.parent.command_linewildcard
  • *3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7* corpus 2 (elastic 1, kusto 1)
  • *D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937* corpus 2 (elastic 1, kusto 1)
field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:wildcard
process.parent.namewildcard
  • dllhost.exe corpus 9 (elastic 6, kusto 2, splunk 1)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"dllhost.exe"