Detection rules › Elastic
UAC Bypass via Malicious MMC Snap-In Execution
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by executing a malicious Microsoft Management Console (MMC) snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by executing a malicious Microsoft Management Console (MMC)
snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
"""
id = "ccdf56a8-697b-497c-ab90-3aa01bfc5f9f"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "UAC Bypass via Malicious MMC Snap-In Execution"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME/"]
version = "1.0.31"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=60s
[file where event.action != "deletion" and file.extension : "msc" and not user.name : "SYSTEM"]
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.name : "mmc.exe" and process.command_line : "*.msc *.msc*"]
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "mmc.exe" and process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 2
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 2
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: file
[file where event.action != "deletion" and file.extension : "msc" and not user.name : "SYSTEM"]
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.name : "mmc.exe" and process.command_line : "*.msc *.msc*"]
Stage 3: process
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "mmc.exe" and process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
user.name | eq | SYSTEM | excludes:user.name field:"user.name" value:"SYSTEM" |
process.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.