Detection rules › Elastic
UAC Bypass via Sdclt
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via sdclt.exe. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) via sdclt.exe. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code
with elevated permissions.
"""
id = "e9095298-65e0-40a2-97c9-055de8685645"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "UAC Bypass via Sdclt"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"]
version = "1.0.31"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "sdclt.exe" and process.parent.command_line : "*/kickoffelev*" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\sdclt.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\sdclt.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\control.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\control.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wermgr.exe")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "sdclt.exe" and process.parent.command_line : "*/kickoffelev*" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\sdclt.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\sdclt.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\control.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\control.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wermgr.exe")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\sdclt.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\sdclt.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\control.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\control.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\wermgr.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\wermgr.exe | excludes:process.executable |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.