Detection rules › Elastic

Unusual Desktop Window Manager Child Process

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the start of an unusual child processes of the Window Desktop Manager process. This may indicate a successful vulnerability exploitation for privilege escalation.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege Escalation

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the start of an unusual child processes of the Window Desktop Manager process. This may indicate a successful
vulnerability exploitation for privilege escalation.
"""
id = "30a6a73c-fd61-4328-ac42-ef94b5bbaa38"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unusual Desktop Window Manager Child Process"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2023/CVE-2023-36033.html",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/itw-windows-lpe-0days-insights-and-detection-strategies",
]
version = "1.0.4"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\system32\\dwm.exe" and user.id : ("S-1-5-90-0-*", "S-1-5-18") and process.executable : "?:\\*" and 
 not process.executable :
              ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\ISM.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\system32\\dwm.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dgcvideo.exe")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1068"
name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\system32\\dwm.exe" and user.id : ("S-1-5-90-0-*", "S-1-5-18") and process.executable : "?:\\*" and 
 not process.executable :
              ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\ISM.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\system32\\dwm.exe",
               "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dgcvideo.exe")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.executableeq?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\ISM.exe, ?:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\dgcvideo.exeexcludes:process.executable

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.executablewildcard
  • ?:\* corpus 18 (elastic 18)
field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?:\*"
process.parent.executablewildcard
  • ?:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe
field:"ParentImage" kind:wildcard value:"?:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"
user.idwildcard
  • S-1-5-18 corpus 13 (elastic 13)
  • S-1-5-90-0-*
field:"user.id" kind:wildcard