Detection rules › Elastic
Unusual Desktop Window Manager Child Process
Identifies the start of an unusual child processes of the Window Desktop Manager process. This may indicate a successful vulnerability exploitation for privilege escalation.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the start of an unusual child processes of the Window Desktop Manager process. This may indicate a successful
vulnerability exploitation for privilege escalation.
"""
id = "30a6a73c-fd61-4328-ac42-ef94b5bbaa38"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unusual Desktop Window Manager Child Process"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2023/CVE-2023-36033.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/itw-windows-lpe-0days-insights-and-detection-strategies",
]
version = "1.0.4"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\system32\\dwm.exe" and user.id : ("S-1-5-90-0-*", "S-1-5-18") and process.executable : "?:\\*" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\ISM.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\system32\\dwm.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\dgcvideo.exe")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1068"
name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\system32\\dwm.exe" and user.id : ("S-1-5-90-0-*", "S-1-5-18") and process.executable : "?:\\*" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\ISM.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\system32\\dwm.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\dgcvideo.exe")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\ISM.exe, ?:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\dgcvideo.exe | excludes:process.executable |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?:\*" |
process.parent.executable | wildcard |
| field:"ParentImage" kind:wildcard value:"?:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe" |
user.id | wildcard |
| field:"user.id" kind:wildcard |