Detection rules › Elastic
Unusual Privilege Escalation to System
Identifies the execution of a process as the SYSTEM account from a parent process not running as SYSTEM. This behavior is consistent with a successful exploit to escalate privileges and create a process with SYSTEM privileges.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a process as the SYSTEM account from a parent process not running as SYSTEM. This behavior
is consistent with a successful exploit to escalate privileges and create a process with SYSTEM privileges.
"""
id = "fc371c1e-8f08-44e7-aec7-8f462afe5262"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unusual Privilege Escalation to System"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://bsodtutorials.wordpress.com/2014/07/31/windows-integrity-levels-process-explorer-and-windbg/",
]
version = "1.0.24"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=5m
[process where event.action == "start" and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*")] by process.entity_id
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and user.id == "S-1-5-18" and
process.Ext.effective_parent.name != null and
process.parent.Ext.real.pid == null and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe") and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
process.args : ("?:\\windows\\system32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie") and
process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe")) and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name : "Secure By Design Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
] by process.parent.entity_id
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1068"
name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1134"
name = "Access Token Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1134.002"
name = "Create Process with Token"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 5m, correlated by process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.action == "start" and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*")] by process.entity_id
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and user.id == "S-1-5-18" and
process.Ext.effective_parent.name != null and
process.parent.Ext.real.pid == null and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe") and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
process.args : ("?:\\windows\\system32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie") and
process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe")) and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name : "Secure By Design Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
] by process.parent.entity_id
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.