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Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing Event ID 4657

46 detection rules reference this event. View event page.

Sigma (5)

ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Registry severity high T1112, T1685
NetNTLM Downgrade Attack severity high T1112, T1685
Processes Accessing the Microphone and Webcam severity medium T1123
Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion severity high T1112
Windows Defender Exclusion List Modified severity medium T1685

Splunk (14)

Command Line Utility Added to Accessibility Features (Windows Event Log) T1059, T1546, T1546.008
ComputerDefaults UAC Bypass (Windows Event Log) T1548, T1548.002
ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry Value Modified (Windows Event Log) T1548, T1548.002
Defender Registry Values Modified (Windows Event Log) T1112, T1562, T1562.001
EnableLUA Registry Value Modified (Windows Event Log) T1548, T1548.002
Executable Running as NT AUTHORITY_SYSTEM Registered in BAM (Windows Event Log) T1068
Hidden User Created - Windows (Windows Event Log) T1564, T1564.002
LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Registry Value Modified (Windows Event Log) T1112, T1550, T1550.002
Modify Registry Key (Windows Event Log) T1112
Possible Credential Dumping via Windows Network Providers (Windows Event Log) T1003, T1112
Potential fodhelper UAC Bypass Attempt (Windows Event Log) T1548, T1548.002
PromptOnSecureDesktop Registry Value Modified (Windows Event Log) T1548, T1548.002
Suspicious Registry Key Created (Windows Event Log) T1546, T1546.012, T1547, T1547.001
Wow6432Node Classes Autorun Keys Modification (Windows Event Log) T1547, T1547.001

Kusto (12)

COM Registry Key Modified to Point to File in Color Profile Folder severity medium T1574
Component Object Model Hijacking - Vault7 trick severity medium T1546, T1546.015
Detect Print Processors Registry Driver Key Creation/Modification severity medium T1547
Detect Registry Run Key Creation/Modification severity medium T1112, T1547
Detect Windows Allow Firewall Rule Addition/Modification severity medium T1562
Detect Windows Update Disabled from Registry severity medium T1562
MosaicLoader severity high T1562
Potential Fodhelper UAC Bypass severity medium T1548, T1548.002
Potential Fodhelper UAC Bypass (ASIM Version) severity medium T1548, T1548.002
Registry Run Keys - Suspicious Registry Run Keys T1547, T1547.001
Scheduled Task Hide severity high T1562
Spearphishing Attachment: ISO Images (Microsoft Defender for Endpoint)

YARA-L (15)

Blackbyte Ransomware Registry severity high T1112
CurrentControlSet Autorun Keys Modification severity medium T1547, T1547.001
CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification severity medium T1547, T1547.001
Default RDP Port Changed to Non Standard Port severity high T1547, T1547.010
Disable Internal Tools or Feature in Registry severity medium T1112
MITRE ATT&CK T1090 Port Proxy Forwarding CISA Report severity low T1090
Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value severity high T1547, T1547.001
New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder severity high T1547, T1547.001
Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique severity critical T1003, T1003.001
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed severity high T1112
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed to Zero severity medium T1112
RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering severity high T1112
Session Manager Autorun Keys Modification severity medium T1547, T1547.001
Suspicious Powershell In Registry Run Keys severity medium T1547, T1547.001
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential severity high T1112

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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing Event ID 4657

Sigma (5)

Splunk (14)

Kusto (12)

YARA-L (15)

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