Kusto rules: 00

id: 46ac55ae-47b8-414a-8f94-89ccd1962178
name: A potentially malicious web request was executed against a web server
description: |
  'Detects unobstructed Web Application Firewall (WAF) activity in sessions where the WAF blocked incoming requests by computing the ratio between blocked requests and unobstructed WAF requests in these sessions (BlockvsSuccessRatio metric).
  A high ratio value for a given client IP and hostname calls for further investigation of the WAF data in that session, due to the significantly high number of blocked requests and a few unobstructed logs that may be malicious but have passed undetected through the WAF. The successCode variable defines what the detection thinks is a successful status code and should be altered to fit the environment.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: WAF
    dataTypes:
      - AzureDiagnostics
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1190
query: |
  let queryperiod = 1d;
  let mode = dynamic(['Blocked', 'Detected']);
  let successCode = dynamic(['200', '101','204', '400','504','304','401','500']);
  let sessionBin = 30m;
  AGWFirewallLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(queryperiod)
  | where Action  in (mode)
  | sort by Hostname asc, ClientIp asc, TimeGenerated asc
  | extend SessionBlockedStarted = row_window_session(TimeGenerated, queryperiod, 10m, ((ClientIp != prev(ClientIp)) or (Hostname != prev(Hostname))))
  | summarize SessionBlockedEnded = max(TimeGenerated), SessionBlockedCount = count() by Hostname, ClientIp, SessionBlockedStarted
  | extend TimeKey = range(bin(SessionBlockedStarted, sessionBin), bin(SessionBlockedEnded, sessionBin), sessionBin)
  | mv-expand TimeKey to typeof(datetime)
  | join kind = inner(
      AGWAccessLogs
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(queryperiod)
      | where  (isempty(HttpStatus) or HttpStatus in (successCode))
      | extend TimeKey = bin(TimeGenerated, sessionBin)
      | extend Hostname = coalesce(Host,OriginalHost)
      | extend ClientIp = tostring(ClientIp)
  ) on TimeKey, Hostname, ClientIp
  | where TimeGenerated between (SessionBlockedStarted..SessionBlockedEnded)
  | extend
      OriginalRequestUriWithArgs = column_ifexists("OriginalRequestUriWithArgs", ""),
      ServerStatus = column_ifexists("ServerStatus", "")
  | summarize
      SuccessfulAccessCount = count(),
      UserAgents = make_set(UserAgent, 250),
      RequestURIs = make_set(RequestUri, 250),
      OriginalRequestURIs = make_set(OriginalRequestUriWithArgs, 250),
      SuccessCodes = make_set(HttpStatus, 250),
      SuccessCodes_BackendServer = make_set(ServerStatus, 250),
      take_any(SessionBlockedEnded, SessionBlockedCount)
      by Hostname, ClientIp, SessionBlockedStarted 
  | where SessionBlockedCount > SuccessfulAccessCount
  | extend BlockvsSuccessRatio = SessionBlockedCount/toreal(SuccessfulAccessCount)
  | sort by BlockvsSuccessRatio desc, SessionBlockedStarted asc
  | project-reorder SessionBlockedStarted, SessionBlockedEnded, Hostname, ClientIp, SessionBlockedCount, SuccessfulAccessCount, BlockvsSuccessRatio, SuccessCodes, RequestURIs, OriginalRequestURIs, UserAgents
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ClientIp
version: 1.0.6
kind: Scheduled

id: a783ade7-bf43-416d-b809-8f5b06d87790
name: Acronis - Multiple Endpoints Infected by Ransomware
description: Detects when three or more distinct endpoints report ransomware detections within a single day.
severity: High
query: |
    CommonSecurityLog
    | where DeviceVendor == "Acronis"
    | where DeviceEventClassID == "ActiveProtectionBlocksSuspiciousActivity"
    | summarize ActiveProtectionBlocksSuspiciousActivity = count() by DeviceName
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 2
tactics:
    - Impact
relevantTechniques:
    - T1486
incidentConfiguration:
    createIncident: true
    groupingConfiguration:
        enabled: true
        reopenClosedIncident: true
        lookbackDuration: P1D
        matchingMethod: AnyAlert
eventGroupingSettings:
    aggregationKind: SingleAlert
customDetails:
  DeviceName: DeviceName
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: DeviceName
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled
requiredDataConnectors: []

id: 4b272e82-19f1-40d1-bfdf-74fbb6353e8b
name: Bitglass - Suspicious file uploads
description: |
  'Detects suspicious file upload activity.'
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Bitglass
    dataTypes:
      - Bitglass
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Exfiltration
relevantTechniques:
  - T1567
query: |
  Bitglass
  | where EventType =~ 'swgwebdlp'
  | where HttpRequestMethod =~ 'POST'
  | where isnotempty(DlpPattern)
  | summarize count() by User, bin(TimeGenerated, 15m)
  | where count_ > 1
  | extend AccountCustomEntity = User
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountCustomEntity
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled

id: af134cb3-a3e7-421c-bcef-0c6c6432a273
name: BloodHound Attack Path Finding - Large Default Group With SyncLapsPassword Privileges
description: BloodHound Attack Path Finding - Large Default Group With SyncLapsPassword
  Privileges
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: BloodHoundEnterprise
    dataTypes:
      - BHEAttackPathsData_CL
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics: []
relevantTechniques: []
query: BHEAttackPathsData_CL | where Finding == "LargeDefaultGroupsSyncLAPSPassword"
entityMappings:
  - entityType: URL
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Url
        columnName: domain_name
customDetails:
  Description: ShortDescription
  Remediation: ShortRemediation
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

id: 795edf2d-cf3e-45b5-8452-fe6c9e6a582e
name: Cisco ASA - threat detection message fired
description: |
  'Identifies when the Cisco ASA Threat Detection engine fired an alert based on malicious activity occurring on the network inicated by DeviceEventClassID 733101-733105
  Resources: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/syslog/b_syslog/syslogs9.html
  Details on how to further troubleshoot/investigate: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/security/asa-5500-x-series-next-generation-firewalls/113685-asa-threat-detection.html'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: CiscoAsaAma
    dataTypes:
      - CommonSecurityLog
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Discovery
  - Impact
relevantTechniques:
  - T1046
  - T1498
query: |
  CommonSecurityLog
  | where isempty(CommunicationDirection)
  | where DeviceEventClassID in ("733101","733102","733103","733104","733105")
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: DeviceName
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIP
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

id: 90039769-0c32-442b-bb12-5b61224a77a0
name: Configuration Backup Job Settings Updated
description: Detects when configuration backup job settings are updated in Veeam Backup
  & Replication. This might indicate configuration changes that require review.
severity: Informational
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: Syslog
  dataTypes:
  - Syslog
- connectorId: SyslogAma
  dataTypes:
  - Syslog
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
tactics: []
relevantTechniques: []
query: "Veeam_GetSecurityEvents\n| where instanceId == 31500\n| project\n    Date\
  \ = format_datetime(TimeGenerated, 'dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm'),\n    DataSource = original_host,\n\
  \    EventId = instanceId,\n    UserName = user,\n    MessageDetails = Description,\n\
  \    Severity = SeverityDescription"
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled
customDetails:
  Date: Date
  VbrHostName: DataSource
  EventId: EventId
  MessageDetails: MessageDetails
  Severity: Severity

id: 3f4bd2a1-7c58-4a83-9c2e-6d1f0a8b5c31
name: ContraForce - Privileged access change
description: |
  'Identifies administrative access changes made in the ContraForce workspace: workspace role
  assignments, changes and removals, organization role changes, member additions and removals,
  and service provider (MSP) access grants or revocations. Review each change to confirm it was
  expected and authorized. The affected member and the old and new roles are carried in the
  event metadata.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: ContraForceEvents
    dataTypes:
      - ContraForceEvents_CL
queryFrequency: 5m
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
  - T1098
query: |
  ContraForceEvents_CL
  | where ingestion_time() > ago(5m)
  | where ActivityType in ("WorkspaceRoleAssigned", "WorkspaceRoleChanged", "WorkspaceRoleRemoved", "OrganizationalRoleChanged", "MemberAdded", "MemberRemoved", "ServiceProviderAdded", "ServiceProviderRemoved")
  | extend Meta = parse_json(Metadata)
  | extend MemberEmail = tostring(Meta.MemberEmail),
           MemberType = tostring(Meta.MemberType),
           FromRole = tostring(Meta.FromRole),
           ToRole = tostring(Meta.ToRole),
           Members = tostring(Meta.Members)
  | project TimeGenerated, EventId, CfWorkspaceId, ActivityType, ActivityAction,
            ActorName, ActorEmail, TargetResourceType, TargetResourceId, TargetResourceName,
            MemberEmail, MemberType, FromRole, ToRole, Members
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'ContraForce access change: {{ActivityType}} on {{TargetResourceName}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: '{{ActorName}} performed {{ActivityType}} on {{TargetResourceName}}. Member email, old and new roles are in the alert custom details.'
customDetails:
  EventId: EventId
  ActorEmail: ActorEmail
  MemberEmail: MemberEmail
  FromRole: FromRole
  ToRole: ToRole
  CfWorkspaceId: CfWorkspaceId
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: PT2H
    matchingMethod: Selected
    groupByCustomDetails:
      - EventId
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

id: 4c1c9aee-8e44-4bb9-bd53-f3e7d6761282
kind: Scheduled
name: Dataverse - New sign-in from an unauthorized domain
description: Identifies Dataverse sign-in activity originating from users with UPN
  suffixes that have not been seen previously in the last 14 days and are not present
  on a predefined list of authorized domains. Common internal Power Platform system
  users are excluded by default.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Dataverse
    dataTypes:
      - DataverseActivity
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
  - T1190
  - T1133
query: |
  // Allow list of UPN suffixes allowed by the organization.
  let allowed_domains = dynamic([
      'onmicrosoft.com',
      'microsoft.com'
      ]);
  // All list of users allowed by the organization
  let allowed_users = dynamic([
      'user1@mydomain.com',
      'user2@mydomain.com'
      ]);
  let query_frequency = 1h;
  let query_lookback = 14d;
  let historical_users = DataverseActivity
      | where TimeGenerated between(ago(query_lookback) .. ago(query_frequency))
      | where Message == 'UserSignIn'
      | summarize by UserId;
  DataverseActivity
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago (query_frequency)
  | where Message == 'UserSignIn'
  | join kind=leftanti (historical_users) on UserId
  | summarize FirstEvent = min(TimeGenerated), LastEvent = max(TimeGenerated) by UserId, ClientIp, InstanceUrl
  | where isnotempty(ClientIp)
  | extend CloudAppId = int(32780)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserId, '@')[0])
  | extend UPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserId, '@')[1])
  | where UPNSuffix !in (allowed_domains) and UserId !in (allowed_users)
  | project
      FirstEvent,
      LastEvent,
      UserId,
      ClientIp,
      InstanceUrl,
      AccountName,
      UPNSuffix,
      CloudAppId
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ClientIp
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: AppId
        columnName: CloudAppId
      - identifier: InstanceName
        columnName: InstanceUrl
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Dataverse - Unauthorized sign-in activity
  alertDescriptionFormat: New user sign-in activity was detected in {{InstanceUrl}}
    originating from user {{UserId}}. This user's UPN suffix is not on the authorized
    list of domains.
version: 3.2.0

id: f6b0c254-8f7d-4a1b-d5c2-0e4a6b9f2d8a
name: Google SecOps - Detection Alerts
description: |
  Creates one incident per active Google Security Operations detection alert in Microsoft Sentinel. Covers all rule types and severity levels with no additional filtering, providing broad visibility across all Google SecOps alerts. Use alongside focused rules for complete detection coverage.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: GSDetectionAlerts
    dataTypes:
      - DetectionAlerts_CL
queryFrequency: 10m
queryPeriod: 10m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
  - DefenseEvasion
  - LateralMovement
  - PrivilegeEscalation
  - CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
  - T1021
  - T1566
query: |
  GoogleSecOpsDetectionAlerts
  | where alertState == "ALERTING"
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: varPrincipalIp
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: varTargetIp
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: varSourceIp
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: varCorrelationIp
  - entityType: URL
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Url
        columnName: urlBackToProduct
customDetails:
  alert_identifier: id
  RuleName: ruleName
  RuleId: ruleId
  RuleType: ruleType
  Severity: severity
  RiskScore: riskScore
  AlertState: alertState
  DetectionType: detectionType
  DetectionTime: detectionTime
  PrincipalIP: varPrincipalIp
  TargetIP: varTargetIp
  SourceIP: varSourceIp
  CorrelationIP: varCorrelationIp
  PrincipalHostname: varPrincipalHostname
  TargetHostname: varTargetHostname
  SourceHostname: varSourceHostname
  PrincipalUser: varPrincipalUserUserid
  SourceUser: varSourceUserUserid
  TargetUser: varTargetUserUserid
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "Google SecOps Alert: {{ruleName}} : {{id}}"
  alertDescriptionFormat: "Google SecOps detection alert. Rule: {{ruleName}}. Severity: {{severity}}. Type: {{ruleType}}."
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: P1D
    matchingMethod: Selected
    groupByCustomDetails:
      - alert_identifier
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

id: 9f82a735-ae43-4c03-afb4-d5d153e1ace1
name: High-Risk Admin Activity
description: |
  The Okta risk engine auto-assigns risk levels to each login attempt. This rule identifies successful admin operations that correlate with successful high-risk Okta authentication or session start events.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: OktaSSO
    dataTypes:
      - Okta_CL
  - connectorId: OktaSSOv2
    dataTypes:
      - OktaSSO
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1098
  - T1078.004
query: |
  let AdminActivity = dynamic(["iam.role.create","iam.role.permissions.add","user.session.access_admin_app","user.mfa.factor.suspend", "user.account.privilege.grant", "group.privilege.grant", "system.api_token.create", "user.session.impersonation.grant"]);
  // Define the list of allowed admins to exclude from the alert. This can be modified to include specific admin accounts that are known to perform high-risk activities as part of their job function.
  let AllowedAdmins = dynamic([]);
  let AdminOperations = OktaSSO
  | where actor_alternateId_s !in (AllowedAdmins)
  | where eventType_s in (AdminActivity)
  | where outcome_result_s =~ 'SUCCESS' 
  | summarize  StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by  actor_alternateId_s, actor_displayName_s, client_userAgent_os_s, client_userAgent_browser_s, client_device_s, client_userAgent_rawUserAgent_s, client_ipAddress_s, client_geographicalContext_country_s, client_geographicalContext_city_s, displayMessage_s, outcome_result_s, outcome_reason_s, column_ifexists('debugContext_debugData_logOnlySecurityData_s', ""), column_ifexists('debugContext_debugData_threatSuspected_s', ""), client_geographicalContext_geolocation_lat_d, client_geographicalContext_geolocation_lon_d, authenticationContext_externalSessionId_s;
  let HighRiskEvents = OktaSSO
  | where eventType_s in ('policy.evaluate_sign_on' , 'user.session.start')
  | extend debugContext_debugData_logOnlySecurityData_s = column_ifexists('debugContext_debugData_logOnlySecurityData_s', '{}')
  | where parse_json(tostring(parse_json(debugContext_debugData_logOnlySecurityData_s).risk)).level =~ "HIGH"
  | where outcome_result_s =~ 'SUCCESS'
  | extend reasons = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(debugContext_debugData_logOnlySecurityData_s).risk)).reasons)
  | summarize  StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by  actor_alternateId_s, actor_displayName_s, client_userAgent_os_s, client_userAgent_browser_s, client_device_s, client_userAgent_rawUserAgent_s, client_ipAddress_s, client_geographicalContext_country_s, client_geographicalContext_city_s, displayMessage_s, outcome_result_s, outcome_reason_s, column_ifexists('debugContext_debugData_logOnlySecurityData_s', ""), column_ifexists('debugContext_debugData_threatSuspected_s', ""), client_geographicalContext_geolocation_lat_d, client_geographicalContext_geolocation_lon_d, authenticationContext_externalSessionId_s, reasons;
  AdminOperations
  | join kind=inner (HighRiskEvents) on actor_displayName_s, client_ipAddress_s, authenticationContext_externalSessionId_s
  | project StartTime, EndTime, actor_alternateId_s, actor_displayName_s, client_userAgent_os_s, client_userAgent_browser_s, client_device_s, client_userAgent_rawUserAgent_s, client_ipAddress_s, client_geographicalContext_country_s, client_geographicalContext_city_s, displayMessage_s, outcome_result_s, outcome_reason_s, column_ifexists('debugContext_debugData_logOnlySecurityData_s', ""), column_ifexists('debugContext_debugData_threatSuspected_s', ""), client_geographicalContext_geolocation_lat_d, client_geographicalContext_geolocation_lon_d, authenticationContext_externalSessionId_s, reasons
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(actor_alternateId_s, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(actor_alternateId_s, "@")[1])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: client_ipAddress_s
customDetails:
  SessionId: authenticationContext_externalSessionId_s
  AdminDisplayName: actor_displayName_s
  AdminDeviceOS: client_userAgent_os_s
  AdminDevice: client_device_s
  UserAgent: client_userAgent_rawUserAgent_s
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'High-Risk admin activity by {{actor_displayName_s}} from IP {{client_ipAddress_s}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: 'High-risk Okta activity by {{actor_displayName_s}} from IP {{client_ipAddress_s}} correlated with admin action during session {{authenticationContext_externalSessionId_s}}'
version: 1.1.3
kind: Scheduled

id: f0be259a-34ac-4946-aa15-ca2b115d5feb
name: Palo Alto - potential beaconing detected
description: |
  'Identifies beaconing patterns from Palo Alto Network traffic logs based on recurrent timedelta patterns.
  The query leverages various KQL functions to calculate time deltas and then compares it with total events observed in a day to find percentage of beaconing.
  This outbound beaconing pattern to untrusted public networks should be investigated for any malware callbacks or data exfiltration attempts.
  Reference Blog:
  https://medium.com/@HuntOperator/detect-beaconing-with-flare-elastic-stack-and-intrusion-detection-systems-110dc74e0c56
  https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-sentinel-blog/detect-network-beaconing-via-intra-request-time-delta-patterns/ba-p/779586'
severity: Low
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: CefAma
    dataTypes:
      - CommonSecurityLog
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 2d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
  - T1071
  - T1571
query: |
  let starttime = 2d;
  let endtime = 1d;
  let TimeDeltaThreshold = 25;
  let TotalEventsThreshold = 30;
  let MostFrequentTimeDeltaThreshold = 25;
  let PercentBeaconThreshold = 80;
  CommonSecurityLog
  | where DeviceVendor == "Palo Alto Networks" and Activity == "TRAFFIC"
  | where TimeGenerated between (startofday(ago(starttime))..startofday(ago(endtime)))
  | where ipv4_is_private(DestinationIP)== false
  | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SourceUserID, SourceIP, SourcePort, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, ReceivedBytes, SentBytes
  | sort by SourceIP asc,TimeGenerated asc, DestinationIP asc, DestinationPort asc
  | serialize
  | extend nextTimeGenerated = next(TimeGenerated, 1), nextSourceIP = next(SourceIP, 1)
  | extend TimeDeltainSeconds = datetime_diff('second',nextTimeGenerated,TimeGenerated)
  | where SourceIP == nextSourceIP
  //Whitelisting criteria/ threshold criteria
  | where TimeDeltainSeconds > TimeDeltaThreshold
  | summarize count(), sum(ReceivedBytes), sum(SentBytes)
  by TimeDeltainSeconds, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h), DeviceName, SourceUserID, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort
  | summarize (MostFrequentTimeDeltaCount, MostFrequentTimeDeltainSeconds) = arg_max(count_, TimeDeltainSeconds), TotalEvents=sum(count_), TotalSentBytes = sum(sum_SentBytes), TotalReceivedBytes = sum(sum_ReceivedBytes)
  by bin(TimeGenerated, 1h), DeviceName, SourceUserID, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort
  | where TotalEvents > TotalEventsThreshold and MostFrequentTimeDeltaCount > MostFrequentTimeDeltaThreshold
  | extend BeaconPercent = MostFrequentTimeDeltaCount/toreal(TotalEvents) * 100
  | where BeaconPercent > PercentBeaconThreshold
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: SourceUserID
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: DeviceName
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: DestinationIP
version: 1.0.7
kind: Scheduled

id: 2a3b4c5d-6e7f-4a0b-8c1d-2e3f4a5b6c50
name: Pathlock TDnR - Emergency User (AdminTrack) Activity
kind: Scheduled
description: >-
  Detects activity from emergency user accounts tracked by Pathlock AdminTrack in SAP,
  forwarded by Pathlock Threat Detection and Response. Emergency user (firefighter) account usage
  should always be reviewed as these accounts carry broad privileges and any unauthorized or
  unreviewed use may indicate insider threat or account takeover.
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Pathlock_TDnR
    dataTypes:
      - Pathlock_TDnR_CL
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
  - T1548
query: |
  Pathlock_TDnR_CL
  | where DataSource == "SAST_AT"
  | project TimeGenerated, Sysid, DataSource, Eventid, Instance, Hostname, Bname,
            Tcode, Report, Area, Subid, SrcIp, DestIp, AffectedUser, LogLine,
            MsgType, MsgId, MsgNo, MessageV1, MessageV2, MessageV3, MessageV4, CentralTs
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Bname
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: Hostname
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SrcIp
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: 5h
    matchingMethod: AnyAlert
    groupByEntities: []
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails: []
suppressionDuration: 5h
suppressionEnabled: false
version: 1.0.0

id: 2a3b4c5d-6e7f-4a0b-8c1d-2e3f4a5b6c22
name: Pathlock TDnR - SAP BTP Cloud Foundry Events
kind: Scheduled
description: >-
  Detects security events from SAP BTP Cloud Foundry environments, forwarded by Pathlock Threat
  Detection and Response. Anomalous BTP Cloud Foundry activity may indicate unauthorized application
  deployments, service account abuse, or data exfiltration from cloud-native SAP workloads.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Pathlock_TDnR
    dataTypes:
      - Pathlock_TDnR_CL
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Discovery
relevantTechniques:
  - T1082
query: |
  Pathlock_TDnR_CL
  | where DataSource == "CLOUD_FOUNDRY_LOGS"
  | project TimeGenerated, Sysid, DataSource, Eventid, Instance, Hostname, Bname,
            Tcode, Report, Area, Subid, SrcIp, DestIp, AffectedUser, LogLine,
            MsgType, MsgId, MsgNo, MessageV1, MessageV2, MessageV3, MessageV4, CentralTs
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Bname
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: Hostname
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SrcIp
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: 5h
    matchingMethod: AnyAlert
    groupByEntities: []
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails: []
suppressionDuration: 5h
suppressionEnabled: false
version: 1.0.0

id: 2a3b4c5d-6e7f-4a0b-8c1d-2e3f4a5b6c61
name: Pathlock TDnR - Spool Job Changes
kind: Scheduled
description: >-
  Detects changes to SAP spool jobs, forwarded by Pathlock Threat Detection and Response.
  Unauthorized spool job manipulations may indicate tampering with scheduled output, redirection
  of sensitive reports, or data collection activity involving SAP output management.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Pathlock_TDnR
    dataTypes:
      - Pathlock_TDnR_CL
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Collection
relevantTechniques:
  - T1213
query: |
  Pathlock_TDnR_CL
  | where DataSource == "SPOOL_REQUEST"
  | project TimeGenerated, Sysid, DataSource, Eventid, Instance, Hostname, Bname,
            Tcode, Report, Area, Subid, SrcIp, DestIp, AffectedUser, LogLine,
            MsgType, MsgId, MsgNo, MessageV1, MessageV2, MessageV3, MessageV4, CentralTs
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Bname
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: Hostname
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SrcIp
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: 5h
    matchingMethod: AnyAlert
    groupByEntities: []
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails: []
suppressionDuration: 5h
suppressionEnabled: false
version: 1.0.0

id: 0fe6bde4-b215-480c-99b4-84a96edcdbd7
name: Rare client observed with high reverse DNS lookup count - Anomaly based (ASIM DNS Solution)
description: |
  'This rule makes use of the series decompose anomaly method to identify clients with high reverse DNS counts. This helps in detecting the possible initial phases of an attack, like discovery and reconnaissance. It utilizes [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) normalization and is applied to any source that supports the ASIM DNS schema.'
severity: Medium
status: Available 
tags:
  - Schema: ASimDns
    SchemaVersion: 0.1.6
requiredDataConnectors: []
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Reconnaissance
relevantTechniques:
  - T1590
query: |
  let threshold = 2.5;
  let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
  let min_t = ago(14d);
  let max_t = now();
  let timeframe = 1d;
  let DNSEvents=(stime: datetime, etime: datetime) {
    _Im_Dns(starttime=stime, endtime=etime, domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
  };
  DNSEvents(stime=min_t, etime=max_t)
  | make-series QueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) on TimeGenerated from min_t to max_t step timeframe by SrcIpAddr
  | extend (anomalies, score, baseline) = series_decompose_anomalies(QueryCount, threshold, -1, 'linefit')
  | mv-expand anomalies, score, baseline, TimeGenerated, QueryCount
  | extend
    anomalies = toint(anomalies),
    score = toint(score),
    baseline = toint(baseline),
    EventTime = todatetime(TimeGenerated),
    Total = tolong(QueryCount)
  | where EventTime >= ago(timeframe)
  | where score >= threshold * 2
  | join kind = inner (DNSEvents(stime=ago(timeframe), etime=max_t)
    | summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
    on SrcIpAddr
  | project-away SrcIpAddr1
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SrcIpAddr
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
customDetails:
  DNSQueries: DNSQueries
  AnomalyScore: score
  baseline: baseline
  Total: Total
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "[Anomaly] Rare client has been observed as making high reverse DNS lookup count  - client IP: '{{SrcIpAddr}}'"
  alertDescriptionFormat: "Client has been identified as making high reverse DNS counts which could be carrying out reconnaissance or discovery activity.\n\nReverse DNS lookup count baseline for this client: '{{baseline}}'\n\nCurrent reverse DNS lookup count by this client showing as: '{{Total}}'\n\nDNS queries requested by this client inlcude: '{{DNSQueries}}'"
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled