Kusto rules: 0t

id: d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13
name: Addition of a Temporary Access Pass to a Privileged Account
description: |
  'Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account.
    A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
    A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
    Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
    Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AuditLogs
  - connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
    dataTypes:
      - IdentityInfo
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078.004
tags:
  - AADSecOpsGuide
query: |
  let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
    | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
    | where AssignedRoles contains "admin"
    | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
    AuditLogs
    | where OperationName =~ "Admin registered security info"
    | where ResultReason =~ "Admin registered temporary access pass method for user"
    | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
    | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
    | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
    | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
    | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
    | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
    | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
    | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: TargetUserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: TargetAccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: TargetAccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: InitiatingAccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: AadUserId
        columnName: TargetAadUserId
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: AadUserId
        columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: InitiatingIPAddress
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Threat Protection", "Identity" ]

id: 65360bb0-8986-4ade-a89d-af3cf44d28aa
name: AWSCloudTrail - Changes to Amazon VPC settings
description: |
  Identifies changes to Amazon VPC(Virtual Private Cloud) settings that can alter network exposure, routing, or access controls.
  This rule identifies changes to Amazon VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) settings such as new ACL entries, routes, routetable or Gateways. 
  AWS VPC API Docs: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/OperationList-query-vpc.html'
severity: Low
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
 - connectorId: AWS
   dataTypes:
    - AWSCloudTrail
 - connectorId: AWSS3
   dataTypes:
    - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
  - T1562.007
query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["CreateNetworkAclEntry","CreateRoute","CreateRouteTable","CreateInternetGateway","CreateNatGateway"]);
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in~ (EventNameList)
  | where EventSource != "apigateway.amazonaws.com"
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
  UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, ResponseElements
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
      - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
        columnName: RecipientAccountId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
  RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
  EventName: EventName
  EventSource: EventSource
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS VPC change by {{AccountName}} in {{AWSRegion}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: 'Event {{EventName}} executed by {{AccountName}} from {{SourceIpAddress}}.'
version: 1.0.8
kind: Scheduled

id: b91ec98d-5747-45c8-b2f6-a07bf47068f0
name: Box - Executable file in folder
description: |
  'Detects executable files in folders.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: BoxDataConnector
    dataTypes:
      - BoxEvents_CL
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1189
query: |
  BoxEvents
  | where SourceFileName hassuffix '.exe' or SourceItemName hassuffix '.exe'
  | extend IPCustomEntity = SrcIpAddr
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IPCustomEntity
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

id: 1399a9a5-6200-411e-8c34-ca5658754cf7
name: Cisco SEG - Multiple large emails sent to external recipient
description: |
  'Detects possible data exfiltration.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: CefAma
    dataTypes:
      - CommonSecurityLog
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Exfiltration
relevantTechniques:
  - T1030
query: |
  let e_theshold = 3;
  let s_threshold = 10000000;
  CiscoSEGEvent
  | where AdditionalFields[15]['ESAMsgSize'] > s_threshold
  | where NetworkDirection =~ 'Outgoing'
  | extend rec_domain = extract(@'@(.*)', 1, DstUserName)
  | extend s_domain = extract(@'@(.*)', 1, SrcUserName)
  | where s_domain != rec_domain
  | summarize count() by SrcUserName
  | where count_ >= e_theshold
  | extend AccountCustomEntity = SrcUserName
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountCustomEntity
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

id: c385944b-17b9-4b2b-921e-0e8d0341a675
name: Conditional Access - Dynamic Group Exclusion Changes
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled
description: // Detects changes to Dynamic Membership Rules for specified groups (often used in CA exclusions)
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AuditLogs
queryFrequency: 5m
queryPeriod: 5m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
query: |-
  // Detects changes to Dynamic Membership Rules for specified groups (often used in CA exclusions)
  let monitoredGroups = dynamic(["Group1", "Group2"]);  // <-- Customize this list
  AuditLogs
  | where OperationName == "Update group"
  | where AdditionalDetails[0].value == "DynamicMembership"
  | extend DynamicGroupName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
  | where DynamicGroupName in (monitoredGroups)
  | extend modifiedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend accountName = tostring(split(modifiedBy, "@")[0])
  | extend upnSuffix = tostring(split(modifiedBy, "@")[1])
  | extend oldRule = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[0].oldValue)
  | extend newRule = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[0].newValue)
  | where oldRule != newRule
  | project
      TimeGenerated,
      OperationName,
      DynamicGroupName,
      modifiedBy,
      accountName,
      upnSuffix,
      result = Result,
      oldRule,
      newRule
  | order by TimeGenerated desc
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: accountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: upnSuffix
suppressionEnabled: false
suppressionDuration: 5h
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: false
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: PT5H
    matchingMethod: AllEntities
    groupByEntities: []
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails: []

id: 7f4af730-5c89-4f7a-aa7a-933b6e9309b5
name: CTE - Device License Capacity Critical (99%)
description: |
  Device license capacity has reached 99% - new and existing unmanaged devices may go unprotected. Emitted once when usage newly crosses this threshold by the daily tenant health-check job (api/src/functions/tenantHealthChecks.js); resets and can re-fire if usage later drops back below 95% and crosses again.
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: cybereinforce_cte
    dataTypes:
      - CybereinforceCTE_CL
queryFrequency: 24h
queryPeriod: 2d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  []
relevantTechniques: []
query: |
  CybereinforceCTE_CL
  | where EventType == "license.capacity_critical"
  | extend d = parse_json(Details)
  | extend AppName = "Cybereinforce", ActiveDevices = toint(d.activeDevices), LicensedDevices = toint(d.licensedDevices), UsedPct = todouble(d.usedPct)
  | project TimeGenerated, TenantId, AppName, ActiveDevices, LicensedDevices, UsedPct, Severity, Category, Source
entityMappings:
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AppName
      - identifier: InstanceName
        columnName: TenantId
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

id: d205a93f-b2e3-4708-a359-5e0c88ee3e59
name: Cyble Vision Alerts News Feed Alert
description: |
  'Triggers when monitored keywords are found in external news feeds. Helps analysts track relevant cybersecurity news, advisories, or threat intelligence updates tied to monitored entities.'
severity: Low
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: CybleVisionAlerts
  dataTypes:
  - CybleVisionAlerts_CL
enabled: true
queryfrequency: 30m
queryPeriod: 30m
triggerOperator: GreaterThan
triggerThreshold: 0
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
tactics:
- Reconnaissance
relevantTechniques:
- T1598
query: |
  Alerts_news_feed  
  | where Service == "news_feed" 
  | extend MappedSeverity = Severity
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: false
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: PT5H
    matchingMethod: AllEntities
  alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Relevant Cybersecurity News {{NF_PostTitle}}
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    A news article referencing the monitored keyword {{KeywordName}} was identified. Source {{NF_PostSourceName}}. URL {{NF_PostURL}}.
customDetails:
  MappedSeverity: Severity
  Status: Status
  AlertID: AlertID
  Service: Service
  NF_PostTitle: NF_PostTitle
  NF_PostSource: NF_PostSourceName
  NF_PostURL: NF_PostURL
  NF_AI_Summary: NF_AI_Summary
entityMappings:
- entityType: Url
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Url
    columnName: NF_PostURL
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: KeywordName
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

id: a0e55dd4-8454-4396-91e6-f28fec3d2cab
name: Egress Defend - Dangerous Attachment Detected
description: |
  'Defend has detected a user has a suspicious file type from a suspicious sender in their mailbox.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: EgressDefend
    dataTypes:
      - EgressDefend_CL
      - EgressDefend_v4_CL
queryFrequency: 30m
queryPeriod: 30m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Execution
  - InitialAccess
  - Persistence
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1204
  - T0853
  - T0863
  - T1566
  - T1546
  - T1546
tags:
  - Defend
query: |
  DefendAuditData_v4
  | where ThreatLevel == "suspicious" or ThreatLevel == "dangerous"
  | mv-expand todynamic(Attachments)
  | where Attachments.name matches regex @"(?i)^.*\.(doc|docx|docm|pdf|xls|xlsx|xlsm|html|zip)$(?-i)"
  | summarize attachmentCount=count() by TimeGenerated, tostring(Attachments.name), Subject, From, Account_0_FullName = trim(@"[^@.\w]+",Recipients), timesClicked = LinksClicked, SenderIP
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Account_0_FullName
  - entityType: File
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Attachments_name
  - entityType: Mailbox
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: MailboxPrimaryAddress
        columnName: Account_0_FullName
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SenderIP
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Alert - {{Account_0_FullName}} has suspicious attachment.
version: 1.1.0
kind: Scheduled

id: 0b85a077-8ba5-4cb5-90f7-1e882afe10c3
name: GitHub - Repository was destroyed
description: |
  'Detect activities when a repository was destroyed. This query runs every day and its severity is Medium.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors: []
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 7d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
query: |
    GitHubAuditData
    | where Action == "repo.destroy"
    | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Actor, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Actor, "@")[1])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Actor
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled

id: 03f25156-6172-11ec-90d6-0242ac120003
name: GWorkspace - Admin permissions granted
description: |
  'Triggers on admin permissions granted.'
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: GoogleWorkspaceReportsAPI
    dataTypes:
      - GWorkspaceActivityReports
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1098
query: |
  GWorkspaceActivityReports 
  | where EventMessage =~ 'grant_admin_privilege'
  | extend AccountCustomEntity = ActorEmail
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountCustomEntity
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled

id: 5d3a1c77-2b40-4e6c-9f2d-71c0a8e4b912
name: HoneyLabs TI Map IP Entity to Network Session (ASIM)
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled
description: |
  'Identifies network sessions whose source IP addresses HoneyLabs honeypot telemetry has observed running exploit or loader commands. Uses the ASIM NetworkSession parser, so it works across any normalised network source (firewalls, VPN, cloud NSG flow logs) without requiring CEF. Only the structured source IP is matched; destination IPs are intentionally excluded. Indicator Confidence reflects how much evidence HoneyLabs holds (90 = 100+ observed attacks, 60 = a single sighting); raise the threshold in the query to trade coverage for precision.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors: []
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
  - CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
  - T1190
  - T1071
query: |
  let dt_lookBack = 1h;
  let ioc_lookBack = 14d;
  let HoneyLabs_IPs = ThreatIntelIndicators
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(ioc_lookBack)
    | where IsActive == true and ValidUntil > now()
    | summarize LatestIndicatorTime = arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by Id
    | where SourceSystem startswith 'HoneyLabs'
    | where ObservableKey == 'ipv4-addr:value'
    | extend TI_ipEntity = tostring(ObservableValue),
             HoneyLabsConfidence = Confidence,
             IndicatorDescription = tostring(Data.description),
             HoneyLabsReport = strcat('https://honeylabs.net/lookup/', tostring(ObservableValue));
  HoneyLabs_IPs
  | join kind=innerunique (
      _Im_NetworkSession(starttime=ago(dt_lookBack))
      | where isnotempty(SrcIpAddr)
      | extend NS_ipEntity = SrcIpAddr
      | extend NetworkSession_TimeGenerated = TimeGenerated
  ) on $left.TI_ipEntity == $right.NS_ipEntity
  | where NetworkSession_TimeGenerated < ValidUntil
  | summarize NetworkSession_TimeGenerated = arg_max(NetworkSession_TimeGenerated, *) by Id, NS_ipEntity
  | project NetworkSession_TimeGenerated, IndicatorDescription, Id, ValidUntil, HoneyLabsConfidence,
    HoneyLabsReport, TI_ipEntity, NS_ipEntity, SrcIpAddr, DstIpAddr, DstPortNumber, Dvc, EventResult
  | extend timestamp = NetworkSession_TimeGenerated
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: NS_ipEntity

id: 75bf9902-0789-47c1-a5d8-f57046aa72df
name: Malware in the recycle bin
description: |
  'The query detects Windows binaries that can be used for executing malware and have been hidden in the recycle bin.
  The list of these binaries is sourced from https://lolbas-project.github.io/
  References: https://azure.microsoft.com/blog/how-azure-security-center-helps-reveal-a-cyberattack/.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
    dataTypes: 
      - WindowsEvent 
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1564
query: |
  let procList = externaldata(Process:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Microsoft_Lolbas_Execution_Binaries.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
  let recycle_bin_paths = dynamic([@":\RECYCLER", @":\$RECYCLE.BIN"]);
  let ProcessCreationEvents=(union isfuzzy=true
  (SecurityEvent
  | where EventID==4688
  | where isnotempty(CommandLine)
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account = SubjectUserName, AccountDomain = SubjectDomainName, NewProcessName,
  FileName = Process, CommandLine,  ParentProcessName
  ),
  (WindowsEvent
  | where EventID==4688 and EventData has_any (procList) and EventData has_any (recycle_bin_paths)
  | extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
  | where isnotempty(CommandLine)
  | extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
  | extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName) 
  | extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)  
  | extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
  | extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account = SubjectUserName, AccountDomain = SubjectDomainName, NewProcessName,
  FileName = Process, CommandLine,  ParentProcessName
  ));
  ProcessCreationEvents 
  | where FileName in~ (procList)
  | where CommandLine has_any (recycle_bin_paths)
  | project StartTimeUtc = TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, NewProcessName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
  | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Account
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DnsDomain
version: 1.1.6
kind: Scheduled

id: 8a547285-801c-4290-aa2e-5e7e20ca157d
name: Office365 Sharepoint File transfer Folders above threshold
description: |
  'Identifies Office365 Sharepoint File Transfers with distinct folder count above certain threshold in a 15min time period.
   Please note that entity mapping for arrays is not supported, so when there is a single value in an array, we will pull that value from the array as a single string to populate the entity to support entity mapping features within Sentinel. Additionally, if the array is multivalued, we will input a string to indicate this with a unique hash so that matching will not occur.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Office365
    dataTypes:
      - OfficeActivity (SharePoint)
queryFrequency: 15m
queryPeriod: 15m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Exfiltration
relevantTechniques:
  - T1020
query: |
  let threshold = 500;
  OfficeActivity
  | where EventSource == "SharePoint" and OfficeWorkload has_any("SharePoint", "OneDrive") and Operation has_any ("FileDownloaded", "FileSyncDownloadedFull", "FileSyncUploadedFull", "FileUploaded")
  | summarize count_distinct_SourceRelativeUrl=dcount(SourceRelativeUrl), dirlist=make_set(SourceRelativeUrl, 10000) by UserId,ClientIP,UserAgent,bin(TimeGenerated, 15m)
  | where count_distinct_SourceRelativeUrl >= threshold
  | extend DirSample = iff(array_length(dirlist) == 1, tostring(dirlist[0]), strcat("SeeDirListField","_", tostring(hash(tostring(dirlist)))))
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserId, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserId, "@")[1])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: UserId
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ClientIP
  - entityType: File
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: DirSample
customDetails:
  TransferCount: count_distinct_SourceRelativeUrl
  FilesList: dirlist
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: PT5H
    matchingMethod: Selected
    groupByEntities:
    - Account
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails: []
version: 1.0.6
kind: Scheduled

id: 85f70197-4865-4635-a4b2-a9c57e8fea1b
name: Ping Federate - OAuth old version
description: |
  'Detects requests using not the latest version of OAuth protocol.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: CefAma
    dataTypes:
      - CommonSecurityLog
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1190
query: |
  PingFederateEvent
  | where isnotempty(DeviceCustomString3)
  | extend proto = extract(@'(OAuth)', 1, DeviceCustomString3)
  | extend ver = extract(@'(\d+)', 1, DeviceCustomString3)
  | where proto =~ 'OAuth'
  | where ver !~ '20'
  | extend AccountCustomEntity = DstUserName
  | extend IpCustomEntity = SrcIpAddr
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountCustomEntity
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IpCustomEntity
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

id: 03e04c97-8cae-48b3-9d2f-4ab262e4ffff
name: Silk Typhoon Suspicious File Downloads.
description: |
  'This query looks for messages related to file downloads of suspicious file types. This query uses the Exchange HttpProxy AOBGeneratorLog, you will need to onboard this log as a custom log under the table http_proxy_oab_CL before using this query. 
  Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors: []
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1190
query: |
  let scriptExtensions = dynamic([".php", ".jsp", ".js", ".aspx", ".asmx", ".asax", ".cfm", ".shtml"]);
  http_proxy_oab_CL
  | where RawData contains "Download failed and temporary file"
  | extend File = extract("([^\\\\]*)(\\\\[^']*)",2,RawData)
  | extend Extension = strcat(".",split(File, ".")[-1])
  | extend InteractiveFile = iif(Extension in (scriptExtensions), "Yes", "No")
  // Uncomment the following line to alert only on interactive file download type
  //| where InteractiveFile =~ "Yes"
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - 0-day Vulnerability" ]

id: 078b5614-54c7-41a6-8289-5b5870e4c0f9
name: Theom - Healthcare data exposed
description: |
   "Creates Sentinel incidents for critical/high Theom risks, associated with ruleId TRIS0015 (Theom has observed healthcare data in a data store that is publicly exposed. As per this requirement, use this information to apply data access control lists or access permissions to secure your data)"
severity: High
status : Available
requiredDataConnectors: 
  - connectorId: Theom
    dataTypes:
      - TheomAlerts_CL
queryPeriod: 5m
queryFrequency: 5m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Collection
relevantTechniques:
  - T1213
  - T1530
query: |
   TheomAlerts_CL
     | where customProps_RuleId_s == "TRIS0015" and (priority_s == "P1" or priority_s == "P2")
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "Theom Alert ID: {{id_s}} "
  alertDescriptionFormat: "\nSummary: {{summary_s}}  \nAdditional info: {{details_s}}\nPlease investigate further on Theom UI at {{deepLink_s}}\n"
entityMappings:
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: customProps_AssetName_s
  - entityType: URL
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Url
        columnName: deepLink_s
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled

id: 321f9dbd-64b7-4541-81dc-08cf7732ccb0
name: Vectra AI Detect - Suspected Compromised Account
description: |
  'Create an incident when an Account is suspected to be compromised. 
  The higher the severity level is, the more immediate attention it requires as Vectra AI engine is more confident that this is a real threat. 
  Level of severity are: Low, Medium, High, Critical). Recommended configuration is to trigger an alert for at least High and Critical.'
severity: Informational
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: CefAma
    dataTypes:
      - CommonSecurityLog
queryFrequency: 5m
queryPeriod: 5m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
  - Discovery
  - LateralMovement
  - Collection
  - CommandAndControl
  - Exfiltration
  - Impact
relevantTechniques:
  - T1003
  - T1087
  - T1021
  - T1119
  - T1071
  - T1041
  - T1499
query: |
  // Edit this variable to only keep the Severity level where an incident needs to be created.
  //Level of severity are: Low, Medium, High, Critical). Recommended configuration is to trigger an alert for at least High and Critical.'
  let configured_level = dynamic(["High", "Critical"]);
  let upn_has_prefix = ":";
  CommonSecurityLog
  | where DeviceVendor == "Vectra Networks"
  | where DeviceProduct == "X Series"
  | where DeviceEventClassID == "asc"
  | extend saccount = extract("saccount=(.+?);", 1, AdditionalExtensions)
  | extend type = iff(saccount matches regex upn_has_prefix, tostring(split(saccount,":")[0]) ,"network" ) 
  | extend upn = iff(saccount matches regex upn_has_prefix, tostring(split(saccount,":")[1]) , saccount )
  | extend name = tostring(split(upn,"@")[0])
  | extend upn_suffix = tostring(split(upn,"@")[1])
  | project-rename threat_score = FlexNumber1
  | project-rename certainty_score = FlexNumber2
  | project-rename vectra_URL = DeviceCustomString4
  | project-rename detection_name = DeviceEventClassID
  | project-rename score_decreases = DeviceCustomString3
  | extend level = case( threat_score <  50 and certainty_score < 50, "Low",
                        threat_score < 50 and certainty_score >= 50 , "Medium", 
                        threat_score >= 50 and certainty_score <= 50, "High", 
                        threat_score >= 50 and certainty_score >= 50, "Critical",
                        "UNKNOWN")
  | extend Severity = case(level == "Info", "Informational",level == "Critical", "High", level)
  | where level in (configured_level) 
  //keep only the event with the highest threat score per Host
  | summarize arg_max(threat_score, *) by saccount
  | sort by TimeGenerated
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: upn_suffix
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Vectra AI Detect - Account {{saccount}} reaches {{level}} severity
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    The account {{saccount}} has a threat score of {{threat_score}} and a
    certainty of {{certainty_score}}
  alertSeverityColumnName: Severity
  alertDynamicProperties:
    - alertProperty: AlertLink
      value: vectra_URL
    - alertProperty: ProductName
      value: DeviceProduct
    - alertProperty: ProviderName
      value: DeviceVendor
    - alertProperty: ConfidenceScore
      value: certainty_score
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: true
    lookbackDuration: 7d
    matchingMethod: AllEntities
customDetails:
  ScoreDecrease: score_decreases
version: 1.0.9
kind: Scheduled