LSASS Dumping using Debug Privileges

Group by: DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessSHA1
Author: FalconForce
Source: github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday

This query searches for a process that requests the SeDebugPrivilege privilege and opens LSASS memory using specific permission 0x1fffff which represents PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1106` Native API
Credential Access	`T1003.001` OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

References

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 10	ProcessAccess
Defender-DeviceEvents	OpenProcessApiCall	Process opened (OpenProcess API call)
Defender-DeviceEvents	ProcessPrimaryTokenModified	Process primary token modified
Kernel-Audit-API-Calls	Event ID 5	OpenProcess API call audited

Rule body kusto

let timeframe = 2*1h;
let SeDebugPrivilege = binary_shift_left(1, 20); // Value for SeDebugPrivilege is 2**20 = 0x100000.
let LSASSOpen=materialize (
    DeviceEvents
    | where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
    | where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
    | where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
    | extend AccessRights=parse_json(AdditionalFields).DesiredAccess
    | where AccessRights == 0x1fffff // PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS.
    | summarize by DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessSHA1
);
DeviceEvents
| where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
| where ActionType == "ProcessPrimaryTokenModified"
| where isnotempty(InitiatingProcessSHA1)
// Look for processes that request debug privilege that also opened LSASS
| where InitiatingProcessSHA1 in ((LSASSOpen | project InitiatingProcessSHA1)) // Speeds up the query.
| lookup kind=inner LSASSOpen on DeviceId, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessId
// Check that debug privilege is enabled.
| extend AdditionalFields=parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| extend CurrentTokenPrivEnabled = toint(AdditionalFields.CurrentTokenPrivEnabled)
| extend OriginalTokenPrivEnabled = toint(AdditionalFields.OriginalTokenPrivEnabled)
// Value for SeDebugPrivilege is 2**20 = 0x100000.
// Refer to https://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org//omfw/2012/OMFW2012_Gurkok.pdf for numeric values for privileges.
| extend DebugPrivCurrent = binary_and(CurrentTokenPrivEnabled,SeDebugPrivilege) == SeDebugPrivilege
| extend DebugPrivOrig = binary_and(OriginalTokenPrivEnabled,SeDebugPrivilege) == SeDebugPrivilege
// Check for processes that have debug privilege after the event, but did not have it before.
| where not(DebugPrivOrig) and DebugPrivCurrent
| extend CleanCmdLine = parse_command_line(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, "windows")
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "tasklist.exe" and CleanCmdLine has_any ("/m", "-m"))
| extend HostName=tostring(split(DeviceName,".")[0]),DnsDomain=iif(DeviceName contains ".", substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, ".") + 1, strlen(DeviceName)),"")
| project-reorder Timestamp, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFileName
// Begin environment-specific filter.
// End environment-specific filter.

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let timeframe = 2*1h;
let SeDebugPrivilege = binary_shift_left(1, 20);

Let binding: `LSASSOpen`

let LSASSOpen = materialize (
    DeviceEvents
    | where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
    | where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
    | where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
    | extend AccessRights=parse_json(AdditionalFields).DesiredAccess
    | where AccessRights == 0x1fffff
    | summarize by DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessSHA1
);

Derived from timeframe.

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)

Stage 3: `where`

| where ActionType == "ProcessPrimaryTokenModified"

Stage 4: `where`

| where isnotempty(InitiatingProcessSHA1)

Stage 5: `where`

| where InitiatingProcessSHA1 in ((LSASSOpen | project InitiatingProcessSHA1))

Stage 6: `kusto:lookup`

| lookup kind=inner LSASSOpen on DeviceId, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessId

Stage 7: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

| extend AdditionalFields=parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| extend CurrentTokenPrivEnabled = toint(AdditionalFields.CurrentTokenPrivEnabled)
| extend OriginalTokenPrivEnabled = toint(AdditionalFields.OriginalTokenPrivEnabled)
| extend DebugPrivCurrent = binary_and(CurrentTokenPrivEnabled,SeDebugPrivilege) == SeDebugPrivilege
| extend DebugPrivOrig = binary_and(OriginalTokenPrivEnabled,SeDebugPrivilege) == SeDebugPrivilege

Stage 8: `where`

| where not(DebugPrivOrig) and DebugPrivCurrent

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend CleanCmdLine = parse_command_line(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, "windows")

Stage 10: `where`

| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "tasklist.exe" and CleanCmdLine has_any ("/m", "-m"))

Stage 11: `extend`

| extend HostName=tostring(split(DeviceName,".")[0]),DnsDomain=iif(DeviceName contains ".", substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, ".") + 1, strlen(DeviceName)),"")

Stage 12: `project-reorder`

| project-reorder Timestamp, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFileName

Stage 13: `summarize`

summarize by DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessSHA1

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`CleanCmdLine`	match	`/m`, `-m`
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	eq	`tasklist.exe`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	eq	`ProcessPrimaryTokenModified` transforms: `cased`
`InitiatingProcessSHA1`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`DeviceId`	`summarize`
`InitiatingProcessId`	`summarize`
`InitiatingProcessSHA1`	`summarize`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

LSASS Dumping using Debug Privileges

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `LSASSOpen`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `kusto:lookup`

Stage 7: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `where`

Stage 11: `extend`

Stage 12: `project-reorder`

Stage 13: `summarize`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

LSASS Dumping using Debug Privileges

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: LSASSOpen

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: kusto:lookup

Stage 7: extend (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: extend

Stage 10: where

Stage 11: extend

Stage 12: project-reorder

Stage 13: summarize

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `LSASSOpen`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `kusto:lookup`

Stage 7: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `where`

Stage 11: `extend`

Stage 12: `project-reorder`

Stage 13: `summarize`