Detection rules › Kusto
UnPAC the hash
This query looks for an attack that allows an attacker with a valid TGT token for a certain account, to obtain the NTLM hash for that account. Such an account may either be a user account or a machine account. The TGT can, for example, be obtained by authenticating with a certificate instead of with username and password.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1558.002 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket |
| Lateral Movement | T1550.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4769 | A Kerberos service ticket was requested. |
Rule body kusto
let timeframe = 2*1h;
let RuleId = "0299";
let DedupFields = dynamic(["TimeGenerated"]);
let forwardable = binary_shift_left(1, 30);
let renewable = binary_shift_left(1, 23);
let renewable_ok = binary_shift_left(1, 4);
let enctik = binary_shift_left(1, 3);
let krbflags = binary_or(forwardable, binary_or(renewable, binary_or(renewable_ok, binary_or(enctik, 0))));
SecurityEvent
| where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4769
| extend ticketOptions = toint(extract("<Data Name=\"TicketOptions\">(.*?)</Data>", 1, EventData))
| extend TargetUserName = extract("<Data Name=\"TargetUserName\">(.*?)@.*?</Data>", 1, EventData)
| extend TargetDomainName = extract("<Data Name=\"TargetDomainName\">(.*?)</Data>", 1, EventData)
| extend ServiceName = extract("<Data Name=\"ServiceName\">(.*?)</Data>", 1, EventData)
| where ServiceName =~ TargetUserName // Requirement for getting the NT hash with U2U. This makes the KDC encrypt the NT hash with the key in the TGT.
| where binary_and(ticketOptions, krbflags) == krbflags
| extend HostName=tostring(split(Computer,".")[0]),DnsDomain=iif(Computer contains ".", substring(Computer, indexof(Computer, ".") + 1, strlen(Computer)),"")
// Begin environment-specific filter.
// End environment-specific filter.
// Begin de-duplication logic.
| extend DedupFieldValues=pack_all()
| mv-apply e=DedupFields to typeof(string) on (
extend DedupValue=DedupFieldValues[tostring(e)]
| order by e // Sorting is required to ensure make_list is deterministic.
| summarize DedupValues=make_list(DedupValue)
)
| extend DedupEntity=strcat_array(DedupValues, "|")
| project-away DedupFieldValues, DedupValues
| join kind=leftanti (
SecurityAlert
| where AlertName has RuleId and ProviderName has "ASI"
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| extend DedupEntity = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties)["Custom Details"])).DedupEntity[0])
| project DedupEntity
) on DedupEntity
// End de-duplication logic.
Stages and Predicates
Parameters
let timeframe = 2*1h;
let RuleId = "0299";
let DedupFields = dynamic(["TimeGenerated"]);
let forwardable = binary_shift_left(1, 30);
let renewable = binary_shift_left(1, 23);
let renewable_ok = binary_shift_left(1, 4);
let enctik = binary_shift_left(1, 3);
let krbflags = binary_or(forwardable, binary_or(renewable, binary_or(renewable_ok, binary_or(enctik, 0))));
Stage 1: source
SecurityEvent
Stage 2: where
| where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
Stage 3: where
| where EventID == 4769
Stage 4: extend (4 consecutive steps)
| extend ticketOptions = toint(extract("<Data Name=\"TicketOptions\">(.*?)</Data>", 1, EventData))
| extend TargetUserName = extract("<Data Name=\"TargetUserName\">(.*?)@.*?</Data>", 1, EventData)
| extend TargetDomainName = extract("<Data Name=\"TargetDomainName\">(.*?)</Data>", 1, EventData)
| extend ServiceName = extract("<Data Name=\"ServiceName\">(.*?)</Data>", 1, EventData)
Stage 5: where
| where ServiceName =~ TargetUserName
Stage 6: where
| where binary_and(ticketOptions, krbflags) == krbflags
Stage 7: extend
| extend HostName=tostring(split(Computer,".")[0]),DnsDomain=iif(Computer contains ".", substring(Computer, indexof(Computer, ".") + 1, strlen(Computer)),"")
Stage 8: extend
| extend DedupFieldValues=pack_all()
Stage 9: kusto:mv-apply
| mv-apply e=DedupFields to typeof(string) on (
extend DedupValue=DedupFieldValues[tostring(e)]
| order by e
| summarize DedupValues=make_list(DedupValue)
)
Stage 10: extend
| extend DedupEntity=strcat_array(DedupValues, "|")
Stage 11: project-away
| project-away DedupFieldValues, DedupValues
Stage 12: join (negated)
| join kind=leftanti (
SecurityAlert
| where AlertName has RuleId and ProviderName has "ASI"
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| extend DedupEntity = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties)["Custom Details"])).DedupEntity[0])
| project DedupEntity
) on DedupEntity
Stage 13: summarize
summarize
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
AlertName | match | 0299 |
ProviderName | match | ASI |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventID | eq |
|
ServiceName | eq |
|
ticketOptions | eq |
|