ADWS Connection from Process Injection Target

Group by: DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId
Author: FalconForce
Source: github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday

The query first collects all network connections to the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) service. It then searches for processes that inject into a process that makes a connection to ADWS. This can be used to detect process injection into a process that is used to query Active Directory.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1055.002` Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection
Discovery	`T1087.002` Account Discovery: Domain Account
Collection	`T1119` Automated Collection

References

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd391908(v=ws.10)

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 3	Network connection
Sysmon	Event ID 8	CreateRemoteThread
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5156	The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Defender-DeviceEvents	CreateRemoteThreadApiCall	CreateRemoteThread API call
Defender-DeviceEvents	NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemoteApiCall	Remote virtual memory allocation (NtAllocateVirtualMemory)
Defender-DeviceEvents	MemoryRemoteProtect	Remote virtual memory protection change
Defender-DeviceEvents	NtMapViewOfSectionRemoteApiCall	Remote section map (NtMapViewOfSection)
Defender-DeviceEvents	QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall	Remote APC queued (QueueUserApc)
Defender-DeviceEvents	SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall	Remote thread context change (SetThreadContext)
Defender-DeviceEvents	NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall	NtAllocateVirtualMemory API call
Defender-DeviceNetworkEvents	ConnectionSuccess	Connection succeeded
Threat-Intelligence	Event ID 1	Remote Virtual Memory Allocation
Threat-Intelligence	Event ID 2	Remote Virtual Memory Protection Change
Threat-Intelligence	Event ID 3	Remote Section Map
Threat-Intelligence	Event ID 4	Remote APC Queue
Threat-Intelligence	Event ID 5	Remote Thread Context Change
Threat-Intelligence	Event ID 6	Local Virtual Memory Allocation

Rule body kusto

let timeframe = 2*1h;
let ADWSConnections=(
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
    | where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
    | where RemotePort == 9389
    | extend InitiatingProcessFileName=tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName)
);
let ADWSFileNames=materialize(
    ADWSConnections
    | distinct InitiatingProcessFileName
);
// Look for processes that inject into a process that makes an ADWS connection.
let InjectorProcesses=materialize(
    DeviceEvents
    | where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
    | where not(isempty(FileName))
    // Look for actions associated with process injection.
    | where ActionType in~ ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "MemoryRemoteProtect","NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall", "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemoteApiCall", "NtMapViewOfSectionRemoteApiCall", "NtProtectVirtualMemoryApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall", "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall")
    | where FileName in~ (ADWSFileNames)
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith @"c:\program files\vmware\vmware tools" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "vmtoolsd.exe")
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath =~ @"C:\Windows\System32" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "csrss.exe")
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath =~ @"C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe")
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith @"c:\program files\microsoft azure ad sync\" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "miiserver.exe")
    | extend FileName=tolower(FileName)
    | lookup kind=inner ADWSConnections on DeviceId, $left.ProcessId == $right.InitiatingProcessId, $left.FileName == $right.InitiatingProcessFileName
    // Begin environment-specific filter.
    // End environment-specific filter.
    | project DeviceId, ProcessId, FileName, InjectorProcessId=InitiatingProcessId, InjectorFileName=InitiatingProcessFileName, InjectorActionType=ActionType
);
// Find ADWS connections from processes that were injected into by another process.
ADWSConnections
| lookup kind=inner InjectorProcesses on DeviceId, $left.InitiatingProcessId == $right.ProcessId, $left.InitiatingProcessFileName == $right.FileName
| summarize arg_min(Timestamp,*), InjectionMethods=make_set(InjectorActionType) by DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName
| extend HostName=tostring(split(DeviceName,".")[0]),DnsDomain=iif(DeviceName contains ".", substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, ".") + 1, strlen(DeviceName)),"")
// Begin environment-specific filter.
// End environment-specific filter.

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let timeframe = 2*1h;

Let binding: `ADWSFileNames`

let ADWSFileNames = materialize(
    ADWSConnections
    | distinct InitiatingProcessFileName
);

Derived from ADWSConnections.

Let binding: `InjectorProcesses`

let InjectorProcesses = materialize(
    DeviceEvents
    | where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
    | where not(isempty(FileName))
    | where ActionType in~ ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "MemoryRemoteProtect","NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall", "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemoteApiCall", "NtMapViewOfSectionRemoteApiCall", "NtProtectVirtualMemoryApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall", "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall")
    | where FileName in~ (ADWSFileNames)
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith @"c:\program files\vmware\vmware tools" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "vmtoolsd.exe")
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath =~ @"C:\Windows\System32" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "csrss.exe")
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath =~ @"C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe")
    | where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith @"c:\program files\microsoft azure ad sync\" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "miiserver.exe")
    | extend FileName=tolower(FileName)
    | lookup kind=inner ADWSConnections on DeviceId, $left.ProcessId == $right.InitiatingProcessId, $left.FileName == $right.InitiatingProcessFileName
    | project DeviceId, ProcessId, FileName, InjectorProcessId=InitiatingProcessId, InjectorFileName=InitiatingProcessFileName, InjectorActionType=ActionType
);

Derived from timeframe, ADWSConnections, ADWSFileNames.

The stages below define let ADWSConnections (the rule's main pipeline source).

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceNetworkEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)

Stage 3: `where`

| where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"

Stage 4: `where`

| where RemotePort == 9389

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend InitiatingProcessFileName=tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName)

The stages below run on ADWSConnections (the outer pipeline).

Stage 6: `kusto:lookup`

ADWSConnections
| lookup kind=inner InjectorProcesses on DeviceId, $left.InitiatingProcessId == $right.ProcessId, $left.InitiatingProcessFileName == $right.FileName

Stage 7: `summarize`

| summarize arg_min(Timestamp,*), InjectionMethods=make_set(InjectorActionType) by DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend HostName=tostring(split(DeviceName,".")[0]),DnsDomain=iif(DeviceName contains ".", substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, ".") + 1, strlen(DeviceName)),"")

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	eq	`ConnectionSuccess` transforms: `cased` corpus 9 (kusto 9)
`RemotePort`	eq	`9389` transforms: `cased` corpus 5 (kusto 2, sigma 1, elastic 1, splunk 1)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`DeviceId`	`summarize`
`DeviceName`	`summarize`
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	`summarize`
`InitiatingProcessId`	`summarize`
`InjectionMethods`	`summarize`
`DnsDomain`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

ADWS Connection from Process Injection Target

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `ADWSFileNames`

Let binding: `InjectorProcesses`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `kusto:lookup`

Stage 7: `summarize`

Stage 8: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

ADWS Connection from Process Injection Target

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: ADWSFileNames

Let binding: InjectorProcesses

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: kusto:lookup

Stage 7: summarize

Stage 8: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `ADWSFileNames`

Let binding: `InjectorProcesses`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `kusto:lookup`

Stage 7: `summarize`

Stage 8: `extend`