Kusto rules: 2k

id: 4eddd44a-25e4-41af-930d-0c17218bec74
name: CiscoISE - Backup failed
description: |
  'Detects when backup activity failed.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SyslogAma
    datatypes:
      - Syslog
queryFrequency: 6h
queryPeriod: 6h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Impact
relevantTechniques:
  - T1490
query: |
  let lbtime = 6h;
  CiscoISEEvent
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(lbtime)
  | where EventId in ('60095', '60098')
  | project TimeGenerated, DvcHostname, DvcIpAddr
  | extend HostCustomEntity = DvcHostname
  | extend IPCustomEntity = DvcIpAddr
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: HostCustomEntity
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IPCustomEntity
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

id: 39e25deb-49bb-4cdb-89c1-c466d596e2bd
name: Digital Guardian - Exfiltration using DNS protocol
description: |
  'Detects exfiltration using DNS protocol.'
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SyslogAma
    datatypes:
      - Syslog
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Exfiltration
relevantTechniques:
  - T1048
query: |
  DigitalGuardianDLPEvent
  | where DstPortNumber == 53
  | extend AccountCustomEntity = SrcUserName
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountCustomEntity
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled

id: bfb1c90f-8006-4325-98be-c7fffbc254d6
name: Distributed Password cracking attempts in Microsoft Entra ID
description: |
  'Identifies distributed password cracking attempts from the Microsoft Entra ID SigninLogs.
  The query looks for unusually high number of failed password attempts coming from multiple locations for a user account.
  References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes
  50053   Account is locked because the user tried to sign in too many times with an incorrect user ID or password.
  50055   Invalid password, entered expired password.
  50056   Invalid or null password - Password does not exist in store for this user.
  50126   Invalid username or password, or invalid on-premises username or password.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - SigninLogs
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1110
query: |
  let s_threshold = 30;
  let l_threshold = 3;
  let aadFunc = (tableName:string){
  table(tableName)
  | where OperationName =~ "Sign-in activity"
  // Error codes that we want to look at as they are related to the use of incorrect password.
  | where ResultType in ("50126", "50053" , "50055", "50056")
  | extend DeviceDetail = todynamic(DeviceDetail), Status = todynamic(DeviceDetail), LocationDetails = todynamic(LocationDetails)
  | extend OS = DeviceDetail.operatingSystem, Browser = DeviceDetail.browser
  | extend StatusCode = tostring(Status.errorCode), StatusDetails = tostring(Status.additionalDetails)
  | extend LocationString = strcat(tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion), "/", tostring(LocationDetails.state), "/", tostring(LocationDetails.city))
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated), LocationCount=dcount(LocationString), Location = make_set(LocationString,100),
  IPAddress = make_set(IPAddress,100), IPAddressCount = dcount(IPAddress), AppDisplayName = make_set(AppDisplayName,100), ResultDescription = make_set(ResultDescription,50),
  Browser = make_set(Browser,20), OS = make_set(OS,20), SigninCount = count() by UserPrincipalName, Type
  // Setting a generic threshold - Can be different for different environment
  | where SigninCount > s_threshold and LocationCount >= l_threshold
  | extend Location = tostring(Location), IPAddress = tostring(IPAddress), AppDisplayName = tostring(AppDisplayName), ResultDescription = tostring(ResultDescription), Browser = tostring(Browser), OS = tostring(OS)
  | extend Name = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName,'@',0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName,'@',1)[0])};
  let aadSignin = aadFunc("SigninLogs");
  let aadNonInt = aadFunc("AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs");
  union isfuzzy=true aadSignin, aadNonInt
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: UserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled

id: c775a46b-21b1-46d7-afa6-37e3e577a27b
name: Excessive Failed Authentication from Invalid Inputs
description: |
  'Creates an incident in the event that a user generates an excessive amount of failed authentications due to invalid inputs, indications of a potential brute force.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SyslogAma
    datatypes:
      - Syslog
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1110
query: |
  let threshold = 15;
  SymantecVIP
  | where isnotempty(RADIUSAuth)
  | where RADIUSAuth =~ "Reject"
  | summarize Total = count() by bin(TimeGenerated, 15m), User, ClientIP
  | where Total > threshold
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: User
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ClientIP
version: 1.0.4
status: Available
kind: Scheduled

id: 30938118-8812-4b5f-afa4-a8d4ba2b5d86
kind: Scheduled
name: Idira - Sensitive Safe/Permission/Entitlement Changes (with customData)
description: >
  Alerts on control-plane modifications: safes, permissions, roles, entitlements, policy changes.
  Leverages customData fields such as changeType/role/permission/policy/entitlement to reduce misses.
severity: Low
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
queryFrequency: 10M
queryPeriod: 1D
triggerOperator: GreaterThan
triggerThreshold: 0
query: |
  let indicators = dynamic(["SafeMember","Permission","Access","ACL","Owner","Role","Entitlement","Policy"]);
  let changeVerbs = dynamic(["grant","revoke","assign","elevate","enable","disable","remove","delete","update"]);
  let actions = dynamic(["policy-add", "policy-change"]);
  CyberArk_AuditEvents_CL
  | extend cd = parse_json(tostring(customData))
  | extend cd_changeType = tolower(tostring(cd.changeType)),
           cd_role       = tostring(cd.role),
           cd_perm       = tostring(cd.permission),
           cd_policy     = tostring(cd.policy),
           cd_entitle    = tostring(cd.entitlement),
           cd_description= tostring(cd.description),
           cd_action     = tostring(cd.action)
  | where 
      action has_any(actions) and
      (auditType has_any (indicators)
      or message has_any (indicators)
      or cd_description has_any (indicators)
      or cd_action has_any (indicators)
      or cd_role !~ "" or cd_perm !~ "" or cd_policy !~ "" or cd_entitle !~ ""
      or cd_changeType in (changeVerbs))
  | project TimeGenerated, CyberArkTenantId, serviceName, username, userId, safe,
            action, actionType, auditType,
            cd_action, cd_description, cd_changeType, cd_role, cd_perm, cd_policy, cd_entitle,
            target, message
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: username
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: target
suppressionEnabled: false
version: 1.0.0

id: 9ff3b13b-287a-4ed0-8f6b-7e7b66cbbcbd
name: Internet Access (Microsoft Defender for IoT)
description: |
  'This alert leverages Defender for IoT to detect an OT device communicating with Internet which is possibly an indication of improper configuration of an application or malicious activity on the network.'
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: IoT
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert (ASC for IoT)
queryFrequency: 5m
queryPeriod: 5m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - LateralMovement
relevantTechniques:
  - T0886
query: |
  SecurityAlert
  | where ProviderName == "IoTSecurity"
  | where AlertName has "Internet"
  | extend ExtendedProperties = parse_json(ExtendedProperties)
  | where tostring(ExtendedProperties.isNew) == "True"
  | extend DeviceId = tostring(ExtendedProperties.DeviceId), 
           SourceDeviceAddress = tostring(ExtendedProperties.SourceDeviceAddress), 
           DestDeviceAddress = tostring(ExtendedProperties.DestinationDeviceAddress), 
           RemediationSteps = tostring(parse_json(RemediationSteps)[0]), 
           Protocol = tostring(ExtendedProperties.Protocol), 
           AlertManagementUri = tostring(ExtendedProperties.AlertManagementUri)
  | project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceId,
    ProductName,
    ProductComponentName,
    AlertSeverity,
    AlertName,
    Description,
    Protocol,
    SourceDeviceAddress,
    DestDeviceAddress,
    RemediationSteps,
    Tactics,
    Entities,
    VendorOriginalId,
    AlertLink,
    AlertManagementUri,
    Techniques
entityMappings:
sentinelEntitiesMappings:
  - columnName: Entities
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
customDetails:
  Sensor: DeviceId
  Protocol: Protocol
  VendorOriginalId: VendorOriginalId
  AlertManagementUri: AlertManagementUri
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: (MDIoT) {{AlertName}}
  alertDescriptionFormat: (MDIoT) {{Description}}
  alertTacticsColumnName: Tactics
  alertSeverityColumnName: AlertSeverity
  alertDynamicProperties: 
    - alertProperty: ProductName
      value: ProductName
    - alertProperty: RemediationSteps
      value: RemediationSteps
    - alertProperty: Techniques
      value: Techniques
    - alertProperty: ProductComponentName
      value: ProductComponentName
    - alertProperty: AlertLink
      value: AlertLink
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

id: fbfbf530-506b-49a4-81ad-4030885a195c
name: Malicious web application requests linked with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (formerly Microsoft Defender ATP) alerts
description: |
  'Takes Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (formerly Microsoft Defender ATP) alerts where web scripts are present in the evidence and correlates with requests made to those scripts in the WCSIISLog to surface new alerts for potentially malicious web request activity.
  The lookback for alerts is set to 1h and the lookback for W3CIISLogs is set to 7d. A sample set of popular web script extensions has been provided in scriptExtensions that should be tailored to your environment.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: MicrosoftDefenderAdvancedThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
  - connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS)
    dataTypes:
      - W3CIISLog
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 7d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1505
query: |
  let alertTimeWindow = 1h;
  let logTimeWindow = 7d;
  // Define script extensions that suit your web application environment - a sample are provided below
  let scriptExtensions = dynamic([".php", ".jsp", ".js", ".aspx", ".asmx", ".asax", ".cfm", ".shtml"]);
  let alertData = materialize(SecurityAlert
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(alertTimeWindow)
  | where ProviderName == "MDATP"
  // Parse and expand the alert JSON
  | extend alertData = parse_json(Entities)
  | mvexpand alertData);
  let fileData = alertData
  // Extract web script files from MDATP alerts - our malicious web scripts - candidate webshells
  | where alertData.Type =~ "file"
  | where alertData.Name has_any(scriptExtensions)
  | extend FileName = tostring(alertData.Name), Directory = tostring(alertData.Directory);
  let hostData = alertData
  // Extract server details from alerts and map to alert id
  | where alertData.Type =~ "host"
  | project HostName = tostring(alertData.HostName), DnsDomain = tostring(alertData.DnsDomain), SystemAlertId
  | distinct HostName, DnsDomain, SystemAlertId;
  // Join the files on their impacted servers
  let webshellData = fileData
  | join kind=inner (hostData) on SystemAlertId
  | project TimeGenerated, FileName, Directory, HostName, DnsDomain;
  webshellData
  | join (
  // Find requests that were made to this file on the impacted server in the W3CIISLog table
  W3CIISLog
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(logTimeWindow)
  // Restrict to accesses to script extensions
  | where csUriStem has_any(scriptExtensions)
  | extend splitUriStem = split(csUriStem, "/")
  | extend FileName = splitUriStem[-1], HostName = sComputerName
  // Summarize potential attacker activity
  | summarize count(), StartTime=min(TimeGenerated), EndTime=max(TimeGenerated), RequestUserAgents=make_set(csUserAgent), ReqestMethods=make_set(csMethod), RequestStatusCodes=make_set(scStatus), RequestCookies=make_set(csCookie), RequestReferers=make_set(csReferer), RequestQueryStrings=make_set(csUriQuery) by AttackerIP=cIP, SiteName=sSiteName, ShellLocation=csUriStem, tostring(FileName), HostName
  ) on FileName, HostName
  | project StartTime, EndTime, AttackerIP, RequestUserAgents, Computer = HostName, SiteName, ShellLocation, ReqestMethods, RequestStatusCodes, RequestCookies, RequestReferers, RequestQueryStrings, RequestCount = count_
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: AttackerIP
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Scheduled
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

id: 155243f4-d962-4717-8a7b-b15b6d112660
name: McAfee ePO - Deployment failed
description: |
  'Detects when errors occur during deployment new changes/policies.'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SyslogAma
    datatypes:
      - Syslog
queryFrequency: 6h
queryPeriod: 6h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1562
query: |
  McAfeeEPOEvent
  | where EventId == '2412'
  | extend IPCustomEntity = DvcIpAddr, HostCustomEntity = DvcHostname
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IPCustomEntity
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: HostCustomEntity
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled

id: cdc01279-d6ea-41b1-a32d-49d726be95b8
name: Netskope - Unsanctioned/Risky Cloud App Access (Shadow IT)
description: |
  Alerts when users access unsanctioned or risky cloud applications based on Cloud Confidence Level (CCL) and app tags. Detects Shadow IT usage.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: NetskopeWebTxConnector
    dataTypes:
      - NetskopeWebTransactions_CL
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
  - Exfiltration
relevantTechniques:
  - T1199
  - T1567
query: |
  NetskopeWebTransactions_CL
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
  | where isnotempty(CsUsername) and isnotempty(XCsApp)
  | where XCsAppTags contains 'Unsanctioned' 
      or XCsAppCcl =~ 'poor'
      or XCsAppCcl =~ 'low'
      or XCsAppCci < 50
  | summarize 
      EventCount = count(),
      TotalBytesMB = round(sum(Bytes) / 1048576.0, 2),
      Activities = make_set(XCsAppActivity),
      FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
      LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
      by 
      CsUsername,
      XCsApp,
      XCsAppCategory,
      XCsAppCcl,
      XCsAppCci,
      XCsAppTags,
      XCCountry,
      XCDevice
  | extend RiskLevel = case(
      XCsAppCci < 30, 'Critical',
      XCsAppCci < 50, 'High',
      XCsAppCci < 70, 'Medium',
      'Low')
  | project 
      TimeGenerated = LastSeen,
      User = CsUsername,
      RiskyApplication = XCsApp,
      AppCategory = XCsAppCategory,
      CloudConfidenceLevel = XCsAppCcl,
      CloudConfidenceIndex = XCsAppCci,
      AppTags = XCsAppTags,
      RiskLevel,
      Country = XCCountry,
      Device = XCDevice,
      Activities,
      EventCount,
      DataTransferMB = TotalBytesMB
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: User
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: RiskyApplication
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

id: 2a3b4c5d-6e7f-4a0b-8c1d-2e3f4a5b6c56
name: Pathlock TDnR - SAP Security Audit Log Events
kind: Scheduled
description: >-
  Detects security-relevant events from the SAP Security Audit Log (SM20), forwarded by Pathlock
  Threat Detection and Response. The Security Audit Log captures critical security events including
  failed logons, authorization failures, and restricted transactions - anomalies here are
  strong indicators of attack activity or insider threats.
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Pathlock_TDnR
    dataTypes:
      - Pathlock_TDnR_CL
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Discovery
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1082
  - T1562
query: |
  Pathlock_TDnR_CL
  | where DataSource == "SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG"
  | project TimeGenerated, Sysid, DataSource, Eventid, Instance, Hostname, Bname,
            Tcode, Report, Area, Subid, SrcIp, DestIp, AffectedUser, LogLine,
            MsgType, MsgId, MsgNo, MessageV1, MessageV2, MessageV3, MessageV4, CentralTs
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Bname
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: Hostname
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SrcIp
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: 5h
    matchingMethod: AnyAlert
    groupByEntities: []
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails: []
suppressionDuration: 5h
suppressionEnabled: false
version: 1.0.0

// Author       : Cyb3rMonk(https://twitter.com/Cyb3rMonk, https://mergene.medium.com)
//
// Link to original post:
// https://posts.bluraven.io/detecting-petitpotam-and-other-domain-controller-account-takeovers-d3364bd9ee0a
//
// Description  : NTLM authentication coming from Domain Controller machine accounts. This is not an expected behavior and it's an indication of NTLM relay attack.   
//                If NTLM Relaying is done towards a Linux machine, this query won't detect that. The attacker must have access to a Linux device in that case though. 
//
// Query parameters:
//
// put FQDNs of the DCs into the list
let DCs = dynamic(["yourdc1.yourdomain.local","yourdc2.yourdomain.local"]);
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Protocol == "NTLM"
| where AccountName endswith "$"
| where DCs has replace_string(AccountName,"$","")

id: c4c6cb50-9fc3-4ca9-a2df-22d527240309
name: Restore Point Marked as Clean
description: Detects when a restore point is marked as clean.
severity: Informational
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: Syslog
  dataTypes:
  - Syslog
- connectorId: SyslogAma
  dataTypes:
  - Syslog
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
tactics: []
relevantTechniques: []
query: "Veeam_GetSecurityEvents\n| where instanceId == 42230\n| project\n    Date\
  \ = format_datetime(TimeGenerated, 'dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm'),\n    DataSource = original_host,\n\
  \    EventId = instanceId,\n    UserName = user,\n  MessageDetails = Description,\n\
  \    Severity = SeverityDescription"
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled
customDetails:
  Date: Date
  VbrHostName: DataSource
  EventId: EventId
  MessageDetails: MessageDetails
  Severity: Severity

id: f8dad4e9-3f19-4d70-ab7f-8f19ccd43a3e
name: Several deny actions registered
description: |
  'Identifies attack pattern when attacker tries to move, or scan, from resource to resource on the network and creates an incident when a source has more than 1 registered deny action in Azure Firewall.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureFirewall
    dataTypes:
      - AzureDiagnostics
      - AZFWApplicationRule
      - AZFWNetworkRule
      - AZFWFlowTrace
      - AZFWIdpsSignature
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Discovery
  - LateralMovement
  - CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
  - T1046
  - T1071
  - T1210
query: |
  let threshold = 2;
  union isfuzzy=true(
  AZFWApplicationRule
  | where Action == "Deny"
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by SourceIp, Fqdn, Action, Protocol
  | where count_ >= threshold),
  (AZFWNetworkRule
  | where Action == "Deny"
  | extend Fqdn = DestinationIp
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), count_ = dcount(DestinationPort), Protocols = make_set(Protocol) by SourceIp, Fqdn, Action
  | where count_ >= threshold
  | extend Protocol = strcat_array(Protocols, "/")),
  (AZFWFlowTrace
  | where Action == "Deny"
  | extend Fqdn = DestinationIp
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by SourceIp, Fqdn, Action, Protocol
  | where count_ >= threshold),
  (AZFWIdpsSignature
  | where Action == "Deny"
  | extend Fqdn = DestinationIp
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by SourceIp, Fqdn, Action, Protocol
  | where count_ >= threshold),
  (AzureDiagnostics
  | where OperationName in ("AzureFirewallApplicationRuleLog","AzureFirewallNetworkRuleLog")
  | extend msg_s_replaced0 = replace(@"\s\s",@" ",msg_s)
  | extend msg_s_replaced1 = replace(@"\.\s",@" ",msg_s_replaced0)
  | extend msg_a = split(msg_s_replaced1," ")
  | extend srcAddr_a = split(msg_a[3],":") , destAddr_a = split(msg_a[5],":")
  | extend Protocol = tostring(msg_a[0]), SourceIp = tostring(srcAddr_a[0]), srcPort = tostring(srcAddr_a[1]), DestinationIp = tostring(destAddr_a[0]), destPort = tostring(destAddr_a[1]), Action = tostring(msg_a[7])
  | where Action == "Deny"
  | extend Fqdn = iff(DestinationIp matches regex "\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+","",DestinationIp)
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by SourceIp, Fqdn, Action, Protocol
  | where count_ >= threshold)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIp
  - entityType: URL
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Url
        columnName: Fqdn
customDetails:
  NetworkProtocol: Protocol
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'Multiple Deny Actions Detected from {{SourceIp}} to {{Fqdn}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: 'Source IP {{SourceIp}} has triggered multiple deny actions to destination {{Fqdn}} using protocol {{Protocol}}, which may indicate malicious activity such as lateral movement or reconnaissance.'
version: 1.1.3
kind: Scheduled

id: 55de1072-e93f-40f9-a14d-f7356d217cf6
name: Tenable.ad Indicators of Exposures
description: |
    'Searches for triggered Indicators of Exposures.'
severity: Low
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Tenable.ad
    dataTypes:
      - Tenable_ad_CL
queryFrequency: 2h
queryPeriod: 2h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1110
query: |
  // For the query to work properly, make sure you have imported the afad_parser.kql parser into the workspace
  // Retrieve the parser here: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tenable/Azure-Sentinel/Tenable.ad-connector/Solutions/TenableAD/Parsers/afad_parser.kql
  // Then, create the Kusto Function with alias afad_parser
  let SeverityTable=datatable(Severity:string,Level:int) [
    "low", 1,
    "medium", 2,
    "high", 3,
    "critical", 4
    ];
    afad_parser
    | where MessageType == 0
    | lookup kind=leftouter SeverityTable on Severity
    | order by Level
    | extend HostName = tostring(split(Host, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(Host, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DnsDomain
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled

id: ee1fd303-2081-47b7-8f02-e38bfd0868e6
name: ThreatConnect TI map IP entity to Network Session Events (ASIM Network Session schema)
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled
description: |-
  ThreatConnect Specific:
  This rule identifies a match Network Sessions for which the source or destination IP address is a known IoC.
  This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports the ASIM NetworkSession schema
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: ThreatIntelligence
    dataTypes:
      - ThreatIntelligenceIndicator
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
  - T1071
query: |
  let dt_lookBack = 1h;
  let ioc_lookBack = 14d;
  let IP_TI = materialize (
    ThreatIntelligenceIndicator
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(ioc_lookBack)
    | summarize LatestIndicatorTime = arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by IndicatorId
    | where ExpirationDateTime > now() and Active == true
    | where SourceSystem startswith "ThreatConnect-"
    | extend TI_ipEntity = coalesce(NetworkIP, NetworkDestinationIP, NetworkSourceIP,EmailSourceIpAddress,"NO_IP")
    | where TI_ipEntity != "NO_IP"
  );
  IP_TI
    // using innerunique to keep perf fast and result set low, we only need one match to indicate potential malicious activity that needs to be investigated
  | join kind=innerunique 
  (
    _Im_NetworkSession (starttime=ago(dt_lookBack))
    | where isnotempty(SrcIpAddr)
    | summarize imNWS_mintime=min(TimeGenerated), imNWS_maxtime=max(TimeGenerated) by SrcIpAddr, DstIpAddr, Dvc, EventProduct, EventVendor  
    | lookup (IP_TI | project TI_ipEntity, Active) on $left.SrcIpAddr == $right.TI_ipEntity
    | project-rename SrcMatch = Active
    | lookup (IP_TI | project TI_ipEntity, Active) on $left.DstIpAddr == $right.TI_ipEntity
    | project-rename DstMatch = Active
    | where SrcMatch or DstMatch
    | extend 
        IoCIP = iff(SrcMatch, SrcIpAddr, DstIpAddr),
        IoCDirection = iff(SrcMatch, "Source", "Destination")
  )on $left.TI_ipEntity == $right.IoCIP
  | where imNWS_mintime < ExpirationDateTime
  | project imNWS_mintime, imNWS_maxtime, Description, ActivityGroupNames, IndicatorId, ThreatType, ExpirationDateTime, ConfidenceScore, SrcIpAddr, DstIpAddr, IoCDirection, IoCIP, Dvc, EventVendor, EventProduct
suppressionEnabled: false
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: 4h
    matchingMethod: AllEntities
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: A network session {{IoCDirection}} address {{IoCIP}} matched an IoC.
  alertDescriptionFormat: The {{IoCDirection}} address {{IoCIP}} of a network session  matched a known indicator of compromise of {{ThreatType}}. Consult the threat intelligence blead for more information on the indicator.
customDetails:
  IndicatorId: IndicatorId
  IoCConfidenceScore: ConfidenceScore
  IoCDescription: Description
  IoCExpirationTime: ExpirationDateTime
  EventEndTime: imNWS_maxtime
  ActivityGroupNames: ActivityGroupNames
  ThreatType: ThreatType
  IoCIPDirection: IoCDirection
  EventStartTime: imNWS_mintime
entityMappings:
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IoCIP
suppressionDuration: 1h