Failed AzureAD logons but success logon to AWS Console

Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Group by: AWSRegion, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, Reason, RecipientAccountId, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, UserIdentityType
Author: Microsoft Security Research
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'Identifies a list of IP addresses with a minimum number (defualt of 5) of failed logon attempts to Microsoft Entra ID. Uses that list to identify any successful AWS Console logons from these IPs within the same timeframe.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078` Valid Accounts
Credential Access	`T1110` Brute Force

Rule body kusto

id: 643c2025-9604-47c5-833f-7b4b9378a1f5
name: Failed AzureAD logons but success logon to AWS Console
description: |
  'Identifies a list of IP addresses with a minimum number (defualt of 5) of failed logon attempts to Microsoft Entra ID.
  Uses that list to identify any successful AWS Console logons from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
     - SigninLogs
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
  - T1110
query: |
  //Adjust this threshold to fit your environment
  let signin_threshold = 5;
  //Make a list of IPs with AAD signin failures above our threshold
  let aadFunc = (tableName:string){
  let Suspicious_signins =
  table(tableName)
  | where ResultType !in ("0", "50125", "50140")
  | where IPAddress !in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")
  | summarize count() by IPAddress
  | where count_ >  signin_threshold
  | summarize make_set(IPAddress);
  Suspicious_signins
  };
  let aadSignin = aadFunc("SigninLogs");
  let aadNonInt = aadFunc("AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs");
  let Suspicious_signins =
  union isfuzzy=true aadSignin, aadNonInt
  | summarize make_set(set_IPAddress);
  //See if any of those IPs have sucessfully logged into the AWS console
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
  | extend LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
  | where LoginResult =~ "Success"
  | where SourceIpAddress in (Suspicious_signins)
  | extend Reason = "Multiple failed AAD logins from IP address"
  | extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Reason, LoginResult, EventTypeName, UserIdentityType, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AWSRegion, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, MFAUsed
  | extend timestamp = StartTime
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
      - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
        columnName: RecipientAccountId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others", "Identity" ]

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let signin_threshold = 5;
let aadSignin = aadFunc("SigninLogs");
let aadNonInt = aadFunc("AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs");

Let binding: `aadFunc`

let aadFunc = (tableName:string){
let Suspicious_signins =
table(tableName)
| where ResultType !in ("0", "50125", "50140")
| where IPAddress !in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")
| summarize count() by IPAddress
| where count_ >  signin_threshold
| summarize make_set(IPAddress);

Derived from signin_threshold, Suspicious_signins.

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: aadSignin, aadNonInt

Leg 1: `aadSignin`

Leg 2: `aadNonInt`

Applied to the combined result

| summarize make_set(set_IPAddress) | where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin" | extend LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin) | where LoginResult =~ "Success" | where SourceIpAddress in (Suspicious_signins) | extend Reason = "Multiple failed AAD logins from IP address" | extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed) | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn) | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1]) | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName) | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "") | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Reason, LoginResult, EventTypeName, UserIdentityType, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AWSRegion, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, MFAUsed | extend timestamp = StartTime

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventName`	eq	`ConsoleLogin`
`LoginResult`	eq	`Success`
`SourceIpAddress`	in	`Suspicious_signins` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AWSRegion`	`summarize`
`AccountName`	`summarize`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`summarize`
`EndTime`	`summarize`
`EventTypeName`	`summarize`
`LoginResult`	`summarize`
`MFAUsed`	`summarize`
`Reason`	`summarize`
`RecipientAccountId`	`summarize`
`SourceIpAddress`	`summarize`
`StartTime`	`summarize`
`UserAgent`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityType`	`summarize`
`timestamp`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Failed AzureAD logons but success logon to AWS Console

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `aadFunc`

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Leg 1: `aadSignin`

Leg 2: `aadNonInt`

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Failed AzureAD logons but success logon to AWS Console

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: aadFunc

union isfuzzy=true (2 sources)

Leg 1: aadSignin

Leg 2: aadNonInt

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `aadFunc`

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Leg 1: `aadSignin`

Leg 2: `aadNonInt`