ADFS DKM Master Key Export

Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Author: Microsoft Security Research
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies an export of the ADFS DKM Master Key from Active Directory. References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/, https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1562#issue-551542469 https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1512#issue-543053339

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Collection	`T1005` Data from Local System

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4662	An operation was performed on an object.

Rule body kusto

id: 18e6a87e-9d06-4a4e-8b59-3469cd49552d
name: ADFS DKM Master Key Export
description: | 
  'Identifies an export of the ADFS DKM Master Key from Active Directory.
  References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/, 
  https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor
  To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this:
  https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1562#issue-551542469
  https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1512#issue-543053339
  '
severity: Medium 
requiredDataConnectors: 
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents 
    dataTypes: 
      - SecurityEvents 
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection 
    dataTypes: 
      - DeviceEvents 
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes: 
      - SecurityEvents 
  - connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
    dataTypes: 
      - WindowsEvent 
queryFrequency: 1d 
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt 
triggerThreshold: 0 
tactics: 
  - Collection
relevantTechniques:
  - T1005
tags:
  - Solorigate
  - NOBELIUM
query:  |
  (union isfuzzy=true 
  (SecurityEvent 
  | where EventID == 4662 // You need to create a SACL on the ADFS Policy Store DKM group for this event to be created. 
  | where ObjectServer == 'DS'
  | where OperationType == 'Object Access'
  //| where ObjectName contains '<GUID of ADFS Policy Store DKM Group object' This is unique to the domain. Check description for more details.
  | where ObjectType contains '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2' // Contact Class
  | where Properties contains '8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed' // Picture Attribute - Ldap-Display-Name: thumbnailPhoto
  | extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountDomain = SubjectDomainName
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DeviceName = Computer
  ),
  ( WindowsEvent 
  | where EventID == 4662 // You need to create a SACL on the ADFS Policy Store DKM group for this event to be created. 
  | where EventData has_all('Object Access', '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2','8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed') 
  | extend ObjectServer = tostring(EventData.ObjectServer)
  | where ObjectServer == 'DS'
  | extend OperationType = tostring(EventData.OperationType)
  | where OperationType == 'Object Access'
  //| where ObjectName contains '<GUID of ADFS Policy Store DKM Group object' This is unique to the domain. Check description for more details.
  | extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
  | where ObjectType contains '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2' // Contact Class
  | extend Properties = tostring(EventData.Properties)
  | where Properties contains '8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed' // Picture Attribute - Ldap-Display-Name: thumbnailPhoto
  | extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DeviceName = Computer
  ),
  (DeviceEvents
  | where ActionType =~ "LdapSearch"
  | where AdditionalFields.AttributeList contains "thumbnailPhoto"
  | where AdditionalFields.DistinguishedName contains "CN=ADFS,CN=Microsoft,CN=Program Data" // Filter results to show only hits related to the ADFS AD container
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
  )
  )
  | extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Account
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: DeviceName
  - entityType: AzureResource
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ResourceId
        columnName: _ResourceId
version: 1.2.2
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others", "Identity" ]

Stages and Predicates

union `isfuzzy=true` (3 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: SecurityEvent, WindowsEvent, DeviceEvents

Leg 1: `SecurityEvent`

SecurityEvent 
| where EventID == 4662
| where ObjectServer == 'DS'
| where OperationType == 'Object Access'
| where ObjectType contains '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2'
| where Properties contains '8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed'
| extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountDomain = SubjectDomainName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DeviceName = Computer

Leg 2: `WindowsEvent`

WindowsEvent 
| where EventID == 4662
| where EventData has_all('Object Access', '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2','8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed') 
| extend ObjectServer = tostring(EventData.ObjectServer)
| where ObjectServer == 'DS'
| extend OperationType = tostring(EventData.OperationType)
| where OperationType == 'Object Access'
| extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
| where ObjectType contains '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2'
| extend Properties = tostring(EventData.Properties)
| where Properties contains '8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed'
| extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DeviceName = Computer

Leg 3: `DeviceEvents`

DeviceEvents
| where ActionType =~ "LdapSearch"
| where AdditionalFields.AttributeList contains "thumbnailPhoto"
| where AdditionalFields.DistinguishedName contains "CN=ADFS,CN=Microsoft,CN=Program Data"
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain

Applied to the combined result

| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	eq	`LdapSearch`
`AttributeList`	contains	`thumbnailPhoto`
`DistinguishedName`	contains	`CN=ADFS,CN=Microsoft,CN=Program Data`
`EventData`	match	`5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2` `8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed` `Object Access`
`EventID`	eq	`4662` transforms: `cased` corpus 13 (splunk 7, kusto 4, elastic 1, chronicle 1)
`ObjectServer`	eq	`DS` transforms: `cased` corpus 5 (sigma 3, kusto 2)
`ObjectType`	contains	`5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2`
`OperationType`	eq	`Object Access` transforms: `cased` corpus 2 (sigma 1, kusto 1)
`Properties`	contains	`8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountDomain`	`extend`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`DeviceName`	`extend`
`timestamp`	`extend`
`ObjectServer`	`extend`
`OperationType`	`extend`
`ObjectType`	`extend`
`Properties`	`extend`
`Account`	`extend`

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`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
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`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

ADFS DKM Master Key Export

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

union `isfuzzy=true` (3 sources)

Leg 1: `SecurityEvent`

Leg 2: `WindowsEvent`

Leg 3: `DeviceEvents`

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

ADFS DKM Master Key Export

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

union isfuzzy=true (3 sources)

Leg 1: SecurityEvent

Leg 2: WindowsEvent

Leg 3: DeviceEvents

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

union `isfuzzy=true` (3 sources)

Leg 1: `SecurityEvent`

Leg 2: `WindowsEvent`

Leg 3: `DeviceEvents`