Detection rules › Kusto
ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection
This detection uses Sysmon telemetry to detect suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database). In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIdD 18 (Pipe Connected). If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating: Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]"
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Collection | T1005 Data from Local System |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 18 | PipeEvent (Pipe Connected) |
Rule body kusto
id: dcdf9bfc-c239-4764-a9f9-3612e6dff49c
name: ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection
description: |
'This detection uses Sysmon telemetry to detect suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database).
In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIdD 18 (Pipe Connected).
If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating:
Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]"'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
- connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
- Collection
relevantTechniques:
- T1005
tags:
- Solorigate
- NOBELIUM
- SimuLand
query: |
// Adjust this to use a longer timeframe to identify ADFS servers
//let lookback = 6d;
// Adjust this to adjust the key export detection timeframe
//let timeframe = 1d;
// Start be identifying ADFS servers to reduce FP chance
let ADFS_Servers = (
Event
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 18
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
| extend Image = column_ifexists("Image", "")
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
| where process =~ "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| summarize by Computer);
// Look for ADFS servers where Named Pipes event are present
Event
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 18
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| extend RenderedDescription = tostring(split(RenderedDescription, ":")[0])
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
| extend RuleName = column_ifexists("RuleName", ""),
TechniqueId = column_ifexists("TechniqueId", ""),
TechniqueName = column_ifexists("TechniqueName", ""),
Image = column_ifexists("Image", ""),
PipeName = column_ifexists("PipeName", ""),
EventType = column_ifexists("EventType", "")
| parse RuleName with * 'technique_id=' TechniqueId ',' * 'technique_name=' TechniqueName
// Look for Pipe related to querying the WID
| where PipeName == "\\MICROSOFT##WID\\tsql\\query"
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
// Exclude expected processes
| where process !in ("Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe", "Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe", "AzureADConnect.exe", "Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe", "wsmprovhost.exe","mmc.exe", "sqlservr.exe")
| extend Operation = RenderedDescription
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, EventType, Operation, process, Image, Computer, UserName
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0])
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: UserName
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: AccountNTDomain
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Let binding: ADFS_Servers
let ADFS_Servers = (
Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 18
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
| extend Image = column_ifexists("Image", "")
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
| where process =~ "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| summarize by Computer);
Stage 1: source
let ADFS_Servers
Stage 2: source
Event
Stage 3: where
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
Stage 4: where
| where EventID == 18
Stage 5: where
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
References ADFS_Servers (defined above).
Stage 6: extend
| extend RenderedDescription = tostring(split(RenderedDescription, ":")[0])
Stage 7: extend
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
Stage 8: mv-expand
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
Stage 9: evaluate
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
Stage 10: extend
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
Stage 11: evaluate
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
Stage 12: extend
| extend RuleName = column_ifexists("RuleName", ""),
TechniqueId = column_ifexists("TechniqueId", ""),
TechniqueName = column_ifexists("TechniqueName", ""),
Image = column_ifexists("Image", ""),
PipeName = column_ifexists("PipeName", ""),
EventType = column_ifexists("EventType", "")
Stage 13: parse
| parse RuleName with * 'technique_id=' TechniqueId ',' * 'technique_name=' TechniqueName
Stage 14: where
| where PipeName == "\\MICROSOFT##WID\\tsql\\query"
Stage 15: extend
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
Stage 16: where
| where process !in ("Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe", "Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe", "AzureADConnect.exe", "Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe", "wsmprovhost.exe","mmc.exe", "sqlservr.exe")
Stage 17: extend
| extend Operation = RenderedDescription
Stage 18: project-reorder
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, EventType, Operation, process, Image, Computer, UserName
Stage 19: extend (3 consecutive steps)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0])
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
process | in | AzureADConnect.exe, Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe, Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe, Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe, mmc.exe, sqlservr.exe, wsmprovhost.exe |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
RenderedDescription | extend |
EventData | extend |
Key | extend |
Value | extend |
EventType | extend |
Image | extend |
PipeName | extend |
RuleName | extend |
TechniqueId | extend |
TechniqueName | extend |
process | extend |
Operation | extend |
DomainIndex | extend |
HostName | extend |
HostNameDomain | extend |
AccountNTDomain | extend |
AccountName | extend |