AD FS Remote HTTP Network Connection

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Group by: Computer
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This detection uses Sysmon events (NetworkConnect events) to detect incoming network traffic on port 80 on AD FS servers. This could be a sign of a threat actor trying to use replication services on the AD FS server to get its configuration settings and extract sensitive information such as AD FS certificates. In order to use this query you need to enable Sysmon telemetry on the AD FS Server. Reference: https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Collection	`T1005` Data from Local System

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 3	Network connection
Sysmon	Event ID 18	PipeEvent (Pipe Connected)

Rule body kusto

id: d57c33a9-76b9-40e0-9dfa-ff0404546410
name: AD FS Remote HTTP Network Connection
description: |
  'This detection uses Sysmon events (NetworkConnect events) to detect incoming network traffic on port 80 on AD FS servers. This could be a sign of a threat actor trying to use replication services on the AD FS server to get its configuration settings and extract sensitive information such as AD FS certificates.
  In order to use this query you need to enable Sysmon telemetry on the AD FS Server.
  Reference: https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672
  '
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
  - Collection
relevantTechniques:
  - T1005
tags:
  - SimuLand
query: |
  // Adjust this to use a longer timeframe to identify ADFS servers
  //let lookback = 0d;
  // Adjust this to adjust detection timeframe
  //let timeframe = 1d;
  // Filter out other servers in the AD FS farm
  let ADFSServersList = dynamic(["ADFS02.domain.com","ADFS03.domain.com"]);
  // Start by identifying ADFS servers to reduce FP chance
  let ADFS_Servers = (
  Event
  //| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
  | where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 18
  | where Computer !in (ADFSServersList)
  | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
  | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
  | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
  | extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
  | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
  | extend Image = column_ifexists("Image", "")
  | extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
  | where process =~ "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
  | summarize by Computer
  );
  // Look for ADFS servers receiving connections over port 80
  Event
  //| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
  | where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
  | extend RenderedDescription = tostring(split(RenderedDescription, ":")[0])
  | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
  | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
  | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
  | extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
  | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
  | extend RuleName = column_ifexists("RuleName", ""), TechniqueId = column_ifexists("TechniqueId", ""),  TechniqueName = column_ifexists("TechniqueName", "")
  | parse RuleName with * 'technique_id=' TechniqueId ',' * 'technique_name=' TechniqueName
  | where EventID == 3
  // Look for endpoints connecting to the AD FS server over port 80
  | extend DestinationPort = column_ifexists("DestinationPort", ""), Image = column_ifexists("Image", ""), Initiated = column_ifexists("Initiated", ""), SourceIp = column_ifexists("DestinationIp", ""), DestinationIp = column_ifexists("DestinationIp", "")
  | where DestinationPort == 80
  | extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
  // Look for the System process receiving connections
  | where process == 'System' and Initiated == 'false'
  | where DestinationIp !in ('::1','0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1')
  | extend Operation = RenderedDescription
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, Operation, Image, Computer, UserName
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: UserName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIp
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let ADFSServersList = dynamic(["ADFS02.domain.com","ADFS03.domain.com"]);

Let binding: `ADFS_Servers`

let ADFS_Servers = (
Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 18
| where Computer !in (ADFSServersList)
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
| extend Image = column_ifexists("Image", "")
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
| where process =~ "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| summarize by Computer
);

Derived from ADFSServersList.

Stage 1: `source`

let ADFS_Servers

Stage 2: `source`

Event

Stage 3: `where`

| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"

Stage 4: `where`

| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)

References ADFS_Servers (defined above).

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend RenderedDescription = tostring(split(RenderedDescription, ":")[0])

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData

Stage 8: `evaluate`

| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")

Stage 10: `evaluate`

| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)

Stage 11: `extend`

| extend RuleName = column_ifexists("RuleName", ""), TechniqueId = column_ifexists("TechniqueId", ""),  TechniqueName = column_ifexists("TechniqueName", "")

Stage 12: `parse`

| parse RuleName with * 'technique_id=' TechniqueId ',' * 'technique_name=' TechniqueName

Stage 13: `where`

| where EventID == 3

Stage 14: `extend`

| extend DestinationPort = column_ifexists("DestinationPort", ""), Image = column_ifexists("Image", ""), Initiated = column_ifexists("Initiated", ""), SourceIp = column_ifexists("DestinationIp", ""), DestinationIp = column_ifexists("DestinationIp", "")

Stage 15: `where`

| where DestinationPort == 80

Stage 16: `extend`

| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]

Stage 17: `where`

| where process == 'System' and Initiated == 'false'

Stage 18: `where`

| where DestinationIp !in ('::1','0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1')

Stage 19: `extend`

| extend Operation = RenderedDescription

Stage 20: `project-reorder`

| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Operation, Image, Computer, UserName

Stage 21: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0])

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`DestinationIp`	in	`0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1`, `::1`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Computer`	in	`ADFS_Servers` corpus 5 (kusto 5)
`DestinationPort`	eq	`80` transforms: `cased` corpus 10 (sigma 6, elastic 2, kusto 2)
`EventID`	eq	`3` transforms: `cased` corpus 21 (splunk 14, kusto 5, chronicle 2)
`Initiated`	eq	`false` transforms: `cased` corpus 2 (sigma 1, kusto 1)
`process`	eq	`System` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`RenderedDescription`	`extend`
`EventData`	`extend`
`Key`	`extend`
`Value`	`extend`
`RuleName`	`extend`
`TechniqueId`	`extend`
`TechniqueName`	`extend`
`DestinationIp`	`extend`
`DestinationPort`	`extend`
`Image`	`extend`
`Initiated`	`extend`
`SourceIp`	`extend`
`process`	`extend`
`Operation`	`extend`
`DomainIndex`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`
`AccountNTDomain`	`extend`
`AccountName`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

AD FS Remote HTTP Network Connection

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `ADFS_Servers`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `source`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

Stage 8: `evaluate`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `evaluate`

Stage 11: `extend`

Stage 12: `parse`

Stage 13: `where`

Stage 14: `extend`

Stage 15: `where`

Stage 16: `extend`

Stage 17: `where`

Stage 18: `where`

Stage 19: `extend`

Stage 20: `project-reorder`

Stage 21: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

AD FS Remote HTTP Network Connection

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: ADFS_Servers

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: source

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: mv-expand

Stage 8: evaluate

Stage 9: extend

Stage 10: evaluate

Stage 11: extend

Stage 12: parse

Stage 13: where

Stage 14: extend

Stage 15: where

Stage 16: extend

Stage 17: where

Stage 18: where

Stage 19: extend

Stage 20: project-reorder

Stage 21: extend (3 consecutive steps)

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `ADFS_Servers`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `source`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

Stage 8: `evaluate`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `evaluate`

Stage 11: `extend`

Stage 12: `parse`

Stage 13: `where`

Stage 14: `extend`

Stage 15: `where`

Stage 16: `extend`

Stage 17: `where`

Stage 18: `where`

Stage 19: `extend`

Stage 20: `project-reorder`

Stage 21: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)