AWSCloudTrail - Creation of new CRUD IAM policy and then privilege escalation

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Group by: AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, EventName, EventSource, PolicyName, RecipientAccountId, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityType
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies creation of IAM policies that grant broad IAM CRUD permissions, followed by attachment of that policy to a user, role, or group. This pattern may indicate an attempt to establish or expand privileged access and should be reviewed as potential privilege escalation.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098.003` Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
Privilege Escalation	`T1098.003` Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, `T1484` Domain or Tenant Policy Modification

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

Rule body kusto

id: 8a607285-d95c-473d-8aab-59920de63af6
name: AWSCloudTrail - Creation of new CRUD IAM policy and then privilege escalation
description: |
  Identifies creation of IAM policies that grant broad IAM CRUD permissions, followed by attachment of that policy to a user, role, or group. This pattern may indicate an attempt to establish or expand
  privileged access and should be reviewed as potential privilege escalation.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
  - PrivilegeEscalation
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1484
  - T1098.003
query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
  let createPolicy =  dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
  let timeframe = 1d;
  let lookback = 14d;
  // Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance
  let EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
    | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "");
  //Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.
  let FullAdminPolicyEvents =  materialize(  EventInfo
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventName in (createPolicy)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "iam:Create" and (Action contains "iam:Get" or Action contains "iam:List")  and Action contains "iam:Update" and Action contains "iam:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn
  | project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated  );
  let PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
  | summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName,   RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, PolicyName
  | extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType",   UserIdentityType, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress,"AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn)
  | project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, AttachEventCount, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  );
  // Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.
  // These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.
  FullAdminPolicyEvents
  | join kind=leftouter
  (
      PolicyAttach
  )
  on PolicyName
  | project-away PolicyName1
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
      - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
        columnName: RecipientAccountId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
  PolicyName: PolicyName
  EventName: EventName
  RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS CRUD IAM privilege escalation policy activity: {{PolicyName}} by {{AccountName}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: 'Detected {{EventName}} for policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.'
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
let createPolicy = dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 14d;

Let binding: `PolicyAttach`

let PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName,   RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, PolicyName
| extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType",   UserIdentityType, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress,"AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn)
| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, AttachEventCount, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
);

Derived from EventNameList, timeframe, EventInfo.

Stage 1: `source`

EventInfo

Stage 2: `where`

where ...

Stage 3: `where`

where EventName in~ ("CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion")

Stage 4: `extend`

extend PolicyName

Stage 5: `extend`

extend Statement

Stage 6: `mv-expand`

mv-expand Statement

Stage 7: `extend`

extend Action, Condition, Effect, Resource

Stage 8: `extend`

extend Action

Stage 9: `where`

where (Action contains "iam:Get" or Action contains "iam:List") and Action contains "iam:Create" and Action contains "iam:Delete" and Action contains "iam:Update" and Condition =~ "" and Effect =~ "Allow" and Resource == "*"

Stage 10: `distinct`

distinct AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, EventName, PolicyName, RecipientAccountId, SourceIpAddress, TimeGenerated, UserIdentityArn

Stage 11: `project-rename`

project-rename

Stage 12: `join`

join kind=leftouter (...)

Stage 13: `project-away`

project-away PolicyName1

Stage 14: `summarize`

summarize by EventSource, EventName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityType, UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, PolicyName

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Action`	contains	`iam:Create` `iam:Delete` `iam:Get` `iam:List` `iam:Update`
`Effect`	eq	`Allow`
`ErrorCode`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`ErrorMessage`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`EventName`	in	`AttachGroupPolicy` transforms: `cased` `AttachRolePolicy` transforms: `cased` `AttachUserPolicy` transforms: `cased` `CreatePolicy` transforms: `cased` `CreatePolicyVersion` transforms: `cased`
`Resource`	eq	`*` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountName`	`summarize`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`summarize`
`EventName`	`summarize`
`EventSource`	`summarize`
`PolicyName`	`summarize`
`RecipientAccountId`	`summarize`
`SourceIpAddress`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityArn`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityType`	`summarize`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

AWSCloudTrail - Creation of new CRUD IAM policy and then privilege escalation

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `PolicyAttach`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `mv-expand`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `where`

Stage 10: `distinct`

Stage 11: `project-rename`

Stage 12: `join`

Stage 13: `project-away`

Stage 14: `summarize`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

AWSCloudTrail - Creation of new CRUD IAM policy and then privilege escalation

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: PolicyAttach

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: extend

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: mv-expand

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: extend

Stage 9: where

Stage 10: distinct

Stage 11: project-rename

Stage 12: join

Stage 13: project-away

Stage 14: summarize

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `PolicyAttach`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `mv-expand`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `where`

Stage 10: `distinct`

Stage 11: `project-rename`

Stage 12: `join`

Stage 13: `project-away`

Stage 14: `summarize`