Detection rules › Kusto

AWSCloudTrail - Created CRUD S3 policy and then privilege escalation

Status
available
Severity
medium
Time window
1d
Group by
AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, EventName, EventSource, PolicyName, RecipientAccountId, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityType
Source
github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies creation of IAM policies that grant broad Amazon S3 CRUD permissions, followed by policy attachment activity to users, roles, or groups. This sequence can indicate attempts to expand access and should be investigated as potential cloud privilege escalation.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

id: 467cbe7e-e6d4-4f4e-8e44-84dd01932c32
name: AWSCloudTrail - Created CRUD S3 policy and then privilege escalation
description: |
  Identifies creation of IAM policies that grant broad Amazon S3 CRUD permissions, followed by policy attachment activity to users, roles, or groups. This sequence can indicate attempts to
  expand access and should be investigated as potential cloud privilege escalation.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
  - PrivilegeEscalation
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1484
  - T1098.003
query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
  let createPolicy =  dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
  let timeframe = 1d;
  let lookback = 14d;
  // Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance
  let EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "");
  //Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.
  let FullAdminPolicyEvents =  materialize(  EventInfo
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventName in (createPolicy)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "s3:Create" and Action contains "s3:Get" and Action contains "s3:Put" and Action contains "s3:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  | project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated  );
  let PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
  | summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
  | extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType",   UserIdentityType, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn)
  | project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, AttachEventCount, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  );
  // Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.
  // These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.
  FullAdminPolicyEvents
  | join kind=leftouter
  (
      PolicyAttach
  )
  on PolicyName
  | project-away PolicyName1
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
      - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
        columnName: RecipientAccountId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
  PolicyName: PolicyName
  EventName: EventName
  RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS S3 privilege escalation policy activity: {{PolicyName}} by {{AccountName}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: 'Detected {{EventName}} for policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.'
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
let createPolicy = dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 14d;

let EventInfo and let FullAdminPolicyEvents are inlined into the numbered stages below.

Let binding: PolicyAttach used in Stage 15

let PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
| extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType",   UserIdentityType, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn)
| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, AttachEventCount, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
);

Stages 1 to 14 define let FullAdminPolicyEvents (the rule's main pipeline source); stages 15 to 17 run on it.

Stage 1: source

AWSCloudTrail

Stage 2: where

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)

Stage 3: where

| where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)

Stage 4: extend (4 consecutive steps)

| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

Stage 5: where

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)

Stage 6: where

| where EventName in (createPolicy)

Stage 7: extend

| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)

Stage 8: extend

| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement

Stage 9: mv-expand

| mvexpand Statement

Stage 10: extend

| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)

Stage 11: extend

| extend Action = tostring(Action)

Stage 12: where

| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "s3:Create" and Action contains "s3:Get" and Action contains "s3:Put" and Action contains "s3:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""

Stage 13: distinct

| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix

Stage 14: project-rename

| project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated

Stage 15: join

FullAdminPolicyEvents
| join kind=leftouter
(
    PolicyAttach
)
on PolicyName

Stage 16: project-away

| project-away PolicyName1

Stage 17: summarize aggregation inside the join branch

summarize by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType, UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Actioncontains
  • s3:Create
  • s3:Delete
  • s3:Get
  • s3:Put
field:"Action" kind:contains
Effecteq
  • Allow
field:"Effect" kind:eq value:"Allow"
ErrorCodeis_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"aws::errorCode" kind:is_null
ErrorMessageis_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"aws::errorMessage" kind:is_null
EventNamein
  • AttachGroupPolicy
  • AttachRolePolicy
  • AttachUserPolicy
  • CreatePolicy
  • CreatePolicyVersion
field:"aws::eventName" kind:in
Resourceeq
  • *
field:"Resource" kind:eq value:"*"

Output fields

These fields are emitted when the rule matches.

FieldSource
AccountNamesummarize
AccountUPNSuffixsummarize
EventNamesummarize
EventSourcesummarize
PolicyNamesummarize
RecipientAccountIdsummarize
SourceIpAddresssummarize
UserIdentityArnsummarize
UserIdentityTypesummarize