Detection rules › Kusto
AWSCloudTrail - Creation of SSM policy and then privilege escalation
Identifies creation of IAM policies that grant broad AWS Systems Manager permissions followed by attachment to a user, role, or group. This sequence can indicate an attempt to gain administration capabilities that support privilege escalation.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1098.003 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles |
| Privilege Escalation | T1098.003 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- ASL AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources (Splunk)
- AWS IAM CompromisedKeyQuarantine Policy Attached to User (Elastic)
- AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (Elastic)
- AWSCloudTrail - CloudFormation policy created then used for privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Created CRUD S3 policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD DynamoDB policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD KMS policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD Lambda policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
Rule body kusto
id: aaa2c05e-fdd4-4fa0-9072-6cffe3641b34
name: AWSCloudTrail - Creation of SSM policy and then privilege escalation
description: |
Identifies creation of IAM policies that grant broad AWS Systems Manager permissions followed by attachment to a user, role, or group. This sequence can indicate an attempt to gain administration capabilities that support privilege escalation.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
- T1098.003
query: |
let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
let createPolicy = dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 14d;
// Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance
let EventInfo = materialize(AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), ""));
//Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.
let FullAdminPolicyEvents = EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where EventName in (createPolicy)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
| mvexpand Statement
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "ssm:*" or Action contains "ssm:Create*" or Action contains "ssm:CreateAssociation") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
| project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated;
let PolicyAttach = EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
| extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType", UserIdentityType, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress)
| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount
;
// Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.
// These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.
FullAdminPolicyEvents
| join kind=leftouter
(
PolicyAttach
)
on PolicyName
| project-away PolicyName1
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
PolicyName: PolicyName
EventName: EventName
RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS Systems Manager privilege escalation policy activity: {{PolicyName}} by {{AccountName}}'
alertDescriptionFormat: 'Detected {{EventName}} for policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.'
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Parameters
let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
let createPolicy = dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 14d;
Let binding: PolicyAttach
let PolicyAttach = EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
| extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType", UserIdentityType, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress)
| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount;
Derived from EventNameList, timeframe, EventInfo.
The stages below define let FullAdminPolicyEvents (the rule's main pipeline source).
Stage 1: source
AWSCloudTrail
Stage 2: where
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
Stage 3: where
| where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
Stage 4: extend (4 consecutive steps)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
Stage 5: where
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
Stage 6: where
| where EventName in (createPolicy)
Stage 7: extend
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
Stage 8: extend
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
Stage 9: mv-expand
| mvexpand Statement
Stage 10: extend
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
Stage 11: extend
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
Stage 12: where
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "ssm:*" or Action contains "ssm:Create*" or Action contains "ssm:CreateAssociation") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
Stage 13: distinct
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
Stage 14: project-rename
| project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated
The stages below run on FullAdminPolicyEvents (the outer pipeline).
Stage 15: join
FullAdminPolicyEvents
| join kind=leftouter
(
PolicyAttach
)
on PolicyName
Stage 16: project-away
| project-away PolicyName1
Stage 17: summarize
summarize by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType, UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
AccountName | summarize |
AccountUPNSuffix | summarize |
EventName | summarize |
EventSource | summarize |
PolicyName | summarize |
RecipientAccountId | summarize |
SourceIpAddress | summarize |
UserIdentityArn | summarize |
UserIdentityType | summarize |