AWSCloudTrail - Monitor AWS Credential abuse or hijacking

Status: available
Severity: low
Time window: 1d
Group by: AWSRegion, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AdditionalEventData, EventName, EventSource, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, ResponseElements, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserIdentityType, UserIdentityUserName
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies AWS STS GetCallerIdentity calls made by assumed-role sessions. An attacker who has assumed the role of a legitimate account can call the GetCallerIdentity function to determine what account they are using. A legitimate user using legitimate credentials would not need to call GetCallerIdentity since they should already know what account they are using. More Information: https://duo.com/decipher/trailblazer-hunts-compromised-credentials-in-aws AWS STS GetCallerIdentity API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetCallerIdentity.html

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Discovery	`T1580` Cloud Infrastructure Discovery

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (Elastic)
Get Caller Identity (Sigma)

Rule body kusto

id: 32555639-b639-4c2b-afda-c0ae0abefa55
name: AWSCloudTrail - Monitor AWS Credential abuse or hijacking
description: |
  Identifies AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` calls made by assumed-role sessions.
  An attacker who has assumed the role of a legitimate account can call the GetCallerIdentity function to determine what account they are using.
  A legitimate user using legitimate credentials would not need to call GetCallerIdentity since they should already know what account they are using.
  More Information: https://duo.com/decipher/trailblazer-hunts-compromised-credentials-in-aws 
  AWS STS GetCallerIdentity API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetCallerIdentity.html
severity: Low
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
  - connectorId: AWSS3
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Discovery
relevantTechniques:
  - T1580
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName =~ "GetCallerIdentity" and UserIdentityType =~ "AssumedRole"
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case(UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIpAddress, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityType, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid,
    UserAgent, UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, ResponseElements
  | extend timestamp = StartTime
  | sort by EndTime desc nulls last
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
      - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
        columnName: RecipientAccountId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
  EventName: EventName
  EventSource: EventSource
  EventType: EventTypeName
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "AWS credential hijack indicator from {{AccountName}}"
  alertDescriptionFormat: "GetCallerIdentity invoked by {{AccountName}} from {{SourceIpAddress}} in {{AWSRegion}}."
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

AWSCloudTrail

Stage 2: `where`

| where EventName =~ "GetCallerIdentity" and UserIdentityType =~ "AssumedRole"

Stage 3: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case(UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

Stage 4: `summarize`

| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIpAddress, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityType, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid,
  UserAgent, UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, ResponseElements

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend timestamp = StartTime

Stage 6: `sort`

| sort by EndTime desc nulls last

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventName`	eq	`GetCallerIdentity`
`UserIdentityType`	eq	`AssumedRole`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AWSRegion`	`summarize`
`AccountName`	`summarize`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`summarize`
`AdditionalEventData`	`summarize`
`EndTime`	`summarize`
`EventName`	`summarize`
`EventSource`	`summarize`
`EventTypeName`	`summarize`
`RecipientAccountId`	`summarize`
`ResponseElements`	`summarize`
`SessionMfaAuthenticated`	`summarize`
`SourceIpAddress`	`summarize`
`StartTime`	`summarize`
`UserAgent`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityAccountId`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityPrincipalid`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityType`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityUserName`	`summarize`
`timestamp`	`extend`

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`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
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`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
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`Enter`	Open highlighted result
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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

AWSCloudTrail - Monitor AWS Credential abuse or hijacking

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `summarize`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `sort`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

AWSCloudTrail - Monitor AWS Credential abuse or hijacking

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: summarize

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: sort

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `summarize`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `sort`