Detection rules › Kusto
AWSCloudTrail - Full Admin policy created and then attached to Roles, Users or Groups
Identifies creation of IAM policies that grant full administrative access and subsequent attachment to a role, user, or group. This sequence can be used to elevate a low-privilege identity to administrative access and should be investigated immediately. AWS IAM Policy Grammar: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_grammar.html and AWS IAM API at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- ASL AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources (Splunk)
- AWS IAM CompromisedKeyQuarantine Policy Attached to User (Elastic)
- AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (Elastic)
- AWSCloudTrail - CloudFormation policy created then used for privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Created CRUD S3 policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD DynamoDB policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD KMS policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD Lambda policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
Rule body kusto
id: 826bb2f8-7894-4785-9a6b-a8a855d8366f
name: AWSCloudTrail - Full Admin policy created and then attached to Roles, Users or Groups
description: |
Identifies creation of IAM policies that grant full administrative access and subsequent attachment to a role, user, or group. This sequence can be used to elevate a low-privilege identity to administrative access and should be investigated immediately.
AWS IAM Policy Grammar: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_grammar.html
and AWS IAM API at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
- connectorId: AWSS3
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
query: |
let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
let createPolicy = dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 14d;
// Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance
let EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "");
//Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.
let FullAdminPolicyEvents = materialize( EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where EventName in (createPolicy)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
| mvexpand Statement
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource)
| mvexpand Action
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and Action == "*" and Resource == "*"
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
| extend UserIdentityUserName = iff(isnotempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserIdentityUserName, tostring(split(UserIdentityArn,'/')[-1]))
| project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated );
let PolicyAttach = materialize( EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventName in (EventNameList)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
| extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType", UserIdentityType, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress)
| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount
);
// Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.
// These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.
FullAdminPolicyEvents
| join kind=leftouter
(
PolicyAttach
)
on PolicyName
| project-away PolicyName1
| extend timestamp = StartTime
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
PolicyName: PolicyName
EventName: EventName
RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS Full Admin privilege escalation policy activity: {{PolicyName}} by {{AccountName}}'
alertDescriptionFormat: 'Detected {{EventName}} for policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.'
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Parameters
let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
let createPolicy = dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 14d;
Let binding: PolicyAttach
let PolicyAttach = materialize( EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventName in (EventNameList)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
| extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType", UserIdentityType, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress)
| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount
);
Derived from EventNameList, timeframe, EventInfo.
Stage 1: source
EventInfo
Stage 2: where
where ...
Stage 3: where
where EventName in~ ("CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion")
Stage 4: extend
extend PolicyName
Stage 5: extend
extend Statement
Stage 6: mv-expand
mv-expand Statement
Stage 7: extend
extend Action, Effect, Resource
Stage 8: mv-expand
mv-expand Action
Stage 9: extend
extend Action
Stage 10: where
where Action == "*" and Effect =~ "Allow" and Resource == "*"
Stage 11: distinct
distinct AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, EventName, PolicyName, RecipientAccountId, SourceIpAddress, TimeGenerated, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
Stage 12: extend
extend UserIdentityUserName
UserIdentityUserName =isnotempty(UserIdentityUserName)UserIdentityUserNametostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[(- 1)])Stage 13: project-rename
project-rename
Stage 14: join
join kind=leftouter (...)
Stage 15: project-away
project-away PolicyName1
Stage 16: extend
extend timestamp
Stage 17: summarize
summarize by EventSource, EventName, UserIdentityType, UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
AccountName | summarize |
AccountUPNSuffix | summarize |
EventName | summarize |
EventSource | summarize |
PolicyName | summarize |
RecipientAccountId | summarize |
SourceIpAddress | summarize |
UserIdentityArn | summarize |
UserIdentityType | summarize |