AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 1d
Group by: AWSRegion, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, EventName, EventSource, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserIdentityUserName
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Detects successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail, CloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction of incident visibility by an attacker.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1562.008` Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

A CloudTrail Was Created or Updated (Panther)
Account Security Configuration Changed (Panther)
ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail (Splunk)
ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group (Splunk)
ASL AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail (Splunk)
ASL AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail (Splunk)
AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (Elastic)
AWS VPC Flow Logs Deleted (Sigma)

Rule body kusto

id: 633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559
name: AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs
description: |
  Detects successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail,
  CloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction
  of incident visibility by an attacker.
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1562.008
query: |
      let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus","DeleteLogGroup"]);
      AWSCloudTrail
      | where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)
      | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
      | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
      | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
      | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
       AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
      | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, 
      UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
      - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
        columnName: RecipientAccountId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
  EventName: EventName
  EventTypeName: EventTypeName
  EventSource: EventSource
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS log tampering attempt: {{EventName}} by {{AccountName}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: 'Detected {{EventName}} in {{AWSRegion}} affecting account {{RecipientAccountId}} logging telemetry.'
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus","DeleteLogGroup"]);

Stage 1: `source`

AWSCloudTrail

Stage 2: `where`

| where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)

Stage 3: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
 AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

Stage 4: `summarize`

| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, 
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ErrorCode`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`ErrorMessage`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`EventName`	eq	`UpdateTrail` transforms: `cased`
`EventName`	in	`DeleteEventBus` `DeleteFlowLogs` `DeleteLogGroup` `DeleteTrail` `StopLogging` `UpdateTrail`
`enableLogFileValidation`	eq	`false` transforms: `cased`
`isMultiRegionTrail`	eq	`false` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AWSRegion`	`summarize`
`AccountName`	`summarize`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`summarize`
`EndTimeUtc`	`summarize`
`EventName`	`summarize`
`EventSource`	`summarize`
`EventTypeName`	`summarize`
`RecipientAccountId`	`summarize`
`SessionMfaAuthenticated`	`summarize`
`SourceIpAddress`	`summarize`
`StartTimeUtc`	`summarize`
`UserAgent`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityAccountId`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityPrincipalid`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityUserName`	`summarize`

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`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
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`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `summarize`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: summarize

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `summarize`