Detection rules › Kusto
AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy
Detects successful attachment of the AWS managed AdministratorAccess policy to users, roles, or groups. This action can immediately grant full administrative permissions and is a high-risk privilege escalation pattern that should be validated against approved administrative activity.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- AWS IAM CompromisedKeyQuarantine Policy Attached to User (Elastic)
- AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (Elastic)
- AWSCloudTrail - CloudFormation policy created then used for privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Created CRUD S3 policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD DynamoDB policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD KMS policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD Lambda policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of DataPipeline policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
Rule body
id: 139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf
name: AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy
description: |
Detects successful attachment of the AWS managed AdministratorAccess policy to users, roles, or groups.
This action can immediately grant full administrative permissions and is a high-risk privilege escalation pattern
that should be validated against approved administrative activity.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
relevantTechniques:
- T1098.003
query: |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in ("AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) startswith "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, UserIdentityArn, ResponseElements, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
EventName: EventName
EventSource: EventSource
AWSRegion: AWSRegion
UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS AdministratorAccess policy attachment by {{AccountName}}'
alertDescriptionFormat: 'Detected {{EventName}} from {{SourceIpAddress}} attaching AdministratorAccess in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.'
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
AWSCloudTrail
Stage 2: where
| where EventName in ("AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
Stage 3: where
| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) startswith "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
Stage 4: extend (4 consecutive steps)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
Stage 5: project
| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, UserIdentityArn, ResponseElements, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ErrorCode | is_null | field:"aws::errorCode" kind:is_null | |
ErrorMessage | is_null | field:"aws::errorMessage" kind:is_null | |
EventName | in |
| field:"aws::eventName" kind:in |
policyArn | starts_with |
| field:"policyArn" kind:starts_with value:"arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess" |
Output fields
These fields are emitted when the rule matches.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
AWSRegion | project |
AccountName | project |
AccountUPNSuffix | project |
AdditionalEventData | project |
EventName | project |
EventSource | project |
EventTypeName | project |
RecipientAccountId | project |
RequestParameters | project |
ResponseElements | project |
SessionMfaAuthenticated | project |
SourceIpAddress | project |
TimeGenerated | project |
UserAgent | project |
UserIdentityAccountId | project |
UserIdentityArn | project |
UserIdentityPrincipalid | project |
UserIdentityUserName | project |