Detection rules › Kusto
AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CRUD KMS policy
Detects inline IAM policy updates that grant broad KMS create, read, update, enable/disable, and delete permissions. This pattern can support key management abuse and indicates possible privilege escalation through expanded cloud role capabilities.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1098.003 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- AWS IAM Access Key Compromise Detection (Panther)
- AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (Elastic)
- AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CloudFormation policy (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CRUD DynamoDB policy (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CRUD IAM policy (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CRUD Lambda policy (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CRUD S3 policy (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via DataPipeline policy (Kusto)
Rule body kusto
id: d7c39e15-997f-49e5-a782-73bf07db8aa5
name: AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CRUD KMS policy
description: |
Detects inline IAM policy updates that grant broad KMS create, read, update, enable/disable, and delete
permissions. This pattern can support key management abuse and indicates possible privilege escalation through
expanded cloud role capabilities.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
- T1098.003
query: |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
| mvexpand Statement
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "kms:Create" and (Action contains "kms:Get" or Action contains "kms:Describe") and (Action contains "kms:Disable" or Action contains "kms:Enable") and Action contains "kms:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
PolicyName: PolicyName
EventName: EventName
UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS KMS privilege escalation policy update by {{AccountName}}'
alertDescriptionFormat: 'Detected {{EventName}} Event, updating inline KMS escalation policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.'
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
AWSCloudTrail
Stage 2: where
| where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
Stage 3: extend
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
Stage 4: extend
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
Stage 5: mv-expand
| mvexpand Statement
Stage 6: extend
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
Stage 7: extend
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
Stage 8: where
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "kms:Create" and (Action contains "kms:Get" or Action contains "kms:Describe") and (Action contains "kms:Disable" or Action contains "kms:Enable") and Action contains "kms:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
Stage 9: extend (4 consecutive steps)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
Stage 10: distinct
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
PolicyName | extend |
Statement | extend |
Action | extend |
Condition | extend |
Effect | extend |
Resource | extend |
UserIdentityArn | extend |
UserName | extend |
AccountName | extend |
AccountUPNSuffix | extend |