Detection rules › Kusto
AdminSDHolder Modifications
This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory. This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder. Ref: https://netwrix.com/en/cybersecurity-glossary/cyber-security-attacks/adminsdholder-attack/
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5136: A directory service object was modified. |
Rule body
id: 52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea
name: AdminSDHolder Modifications
description: |
'This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence.
AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory.
This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder.
Ref: https://netwrix.com/en/cybersecurity-glossary/cyber-security-attacks/adminsdholder-attack/'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Persistence
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
query: |
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[0])
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: SubjectAccount
- identifier: Name
columnName: Name
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: NTDomain
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
source:
kind: Community
author:
name: Vasileios Paschalidis
support:
tier: Community
categories:
domains: [ "Security - Others" ]
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
SecurityEvent
Stage 2: where
| where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
Stage 3: parse
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
Stage 4: summarize
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
Stage 5: extend (3 consecutive steps)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[0])
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventData | contains |
| field:"EventData" kind:contains |
EventID | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"5136" |
Output fields
These fields are emitted when the rule matches.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
Computer | summarize |
EndTime | summarize |
ObjectDN | summarize |
StartTime | summarize |
SubjectAccount | summarize |
SubjectLogonId | summarize |
SubjectUserSid | summarize |
DomainIndex | extend |
HostName | extend |
HostNameDomain | extend |
NTDomain | extend |
Name | extend |