Authentication Methods Changed for Privileged Account

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 14d
Group by: InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingAppName, InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId, InitiatingIpAddress, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, Result, TargetUserPrincipalName
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies authentication methods being changed for a privileged account. This could be an indication of an attacker adding an auth method to the account so they can have continued access. Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor-1

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation

Event coverage

Provider	Event
Entra-AuditLogs	Admin deleted security info
Entra-AuditLogs	Admin registered security info
Entra-AuditLogs	Admin updated security info
Entra-AuditLogs	User changed default security info
Entra-AuditLogs	User deleted security info
Entra-AuditLogs	User registered security info
Entra-AuditLogs	User reviewed security info

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

Authentication Method Changed for Privileged Account (Kusto)
Change to Authentication Method (Sigma)
Guest Users Invited To Tenant By Non Approved Inviters (Sigma)
Multi Factor Authentication Disabled For User Account (Sigma)
New External User Granted Admin Role (Kusto)
NRT Authentication Methods Changed for VIP Users (Kusto)
Password Reset By User Account (Sigma)
Suspicious Login from deleted guest account (Kusto)

Rule body kusto

id: 694c91ee-d606-4ba9-928e-405a2dd0ff0f
name: Authentication Methods Changed for Privileged Account
description: |
  'Identifies authentication methods being changed for a privileged account. This could be an indication of an attacker adding an auth method to the account so they can have continued access.
  Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor-1'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AuditLogs
  - connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
    dataTypes:
      - IdentityInfo
queryFrequency: 2h
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1098
tags:
  - AADSecOpsGuide
query: |
  let queryperiod = 14d;
  let queryfrequency = 2h;
  let security_info_actions = dynamic(["User registered security info", "User changed default security info", "User deleted security info", "Admin updated security info", "User reviewed security info", "Admin deleted security info", "Admin registered security info"]);
  let VIPUsers = (
      IdentityInfo
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(queryperiod)
      | mv-expand AssignedRoles
      | where AssignedRoles contains 'Admin'
      | summarize by AccountUPN);
  AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(queryfrequency)
  | where Category =~ "UserManagement"
  | where ActivityDisplayName in (security_info_actions)
  | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
  | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
  | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
  | extend InitiatingIpAddress = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress, InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
  | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
    (
        where TargetResource.type =~ "User"
        | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResource.userPrincipalName)
    )
  | where TargetUserPrincipalName in~ (VIPUsers)
  // Uncomment the line below if you are experiencing high volumes of Target entities. If this is uncommented, the Target column will not be mapped to an entity.
  //| summarize Start=min(TimeGenerated), End=max(TimeGenerated), Actions = make_set(ResultReason, MaxSize=8), Targets=make_set(Target, MaxSize=256) by Initiator, IP, Result
  // Comment out this line below, if line above is used.
  | summarize Start=min(TimeGenerated), End=max(TimeGenerated), Actions = make_set(ResultReason, MaxSize=8) by InitiatingAppName, InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId, 
  InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingIpAddress, TargetUserPrincipalName, Result
  | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1]), 
  TargetName = iff(tostring(TargetUserPrincipalName) has "[", "", tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName,'@',0)[0])), TargetUPNSuffix = iff(tostring(TargetUserPrincipalName) has "[", "", tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName,'@',1)[0]))
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: InitiatingAppName
      - identifier: AadUserId
        columnName: InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: InitiatingAccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: AadUserId
        columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: InitiatingIpAddress
version: 1.1.1
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let queryperiod = 14d;
let queryfrequency = 2h;

Let binding: `security_info_actions`

let security_info_actions = dynamic(["User registered security info", "User changed default security info", "User deleted security info", "Admin updated security info", "User reviewed security info", "Admin deleted security info", "Admin registered security info"]);

Let binding: `VIPUsers`

let VIPUsers = (
    IdentityInfo
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(queryperiod)
    | mv-expand AssignedRoles
    | where AssignedRoles contains 'Admin'
    | summarize by AccountUPN);

Derived from queryperiod.

Stage 1: `source`

AuditLogs

Stage 2: `where`

| where TimeGenerated > ago(queryfrequency)

Stage 3: `where`

| where Category =~ "UserManagement"

Stage 4: `where`

| where ActivityDisplayName in (security_info_actions)

References security_info_actions (defined above).

Stage 5: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIpAddress = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress, InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

| mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
  (
      where TargetResource.type =~ "User"
      | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResource.userPrincipalName)
  )

Stage 7: `where`

| where TargetUserPrincipalName in~ (VIPUsers)

References VIPUsers (defined above).

Stage 8: `summarize`

| summarize Start=min(TimeGenerated), End=max(TimeGenerated), Actions = make_set(ResultReason, MaxSize=8) by InitiatingAppName, InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId, 
InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingIpAddress, TargetUserPrincipalName, Result

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1]), 
TargetName = iff(tostring(TargetUserPrincipalName) has "[", "", tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName,'@',0)[0])), TargetUPNSuffix = iff(tostring(TargetUserPrincipalName) has "[", "", tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName,'@',1)[0]))

TargetName =

ifTargetUserPrincipalName has "["""

elsetostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, '@', 0)[0])

TargetUPNSuffix =

ifTargetUserPrincipalName has "["""

elsetostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, '@', 1)[0])

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActivityDisplayName`	in	`Admin deleted security info` transforms: `cased` `Admin registered security info` transforms: `cased` `Admin updated security info` transforms: `cased` `User changed default security info` transforms: `cased` `User deleted security info` transforms: `cased` `User registered security info` transforms: `cased` `User reviewed security info` transforms: `cased`
`Category`	eq	`UserManagement`
`TargetUserPrincipalName`	in	`VIPUsers`
`type`	eq	`User`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Actions`	`summarize`
`End`	`summarize`
`InitiatingAadUserId`	`summarize`
`InitiatingAppName`	`summarize`
`InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId`	`summarize`
`InitiatingIpAddress`	`summarize`
`InitiatingUserPrincipalName`	`summarize`
`Result`	`summarize`
`Start`	`summarize`
`TargetUserPrincipalName`	`summarize`
`InitiatingAccountName`	`extend`
`InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix`	`extend`
`TargetName`	`extend`
`TargetUPNSuffix`	`extend`

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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Authentication Methods Changed for Privileged Account

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `security_info_actions`

Let binding: `VIPUsers`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `summarize`

Stage 9: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Authentication Methods Changed for Privileged Account

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: security_info_actions

Let binding: VIPUsers

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: extend (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: kusto:mv-apply

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: summarize

Stage 9: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `security_info_actions`

Let binding: `VIPUsers`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `summarize`

Stage 9: `extend`