Azure RBAC (Elevate Access)

Severity: high
Time window: 2h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Detects when a Global Administrator elevates access to all subscriptions and management groups in a tenant. When a Global Administrator elevates access they are assigned the User Access Administrator role at root scope. This Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rule monitors who has elevated access in your tenant so that admins can take appropriate action. Learn more

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1078` Valid Accounts

Event coverage

Provider	Event
Entra-AuditLogs	User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources

Rule body kusto

id: 132fdff4-c044-4855-a390-c1b71e0f833b
name: Azure RBAC (Elevate Access)
kind: Scheduled
description: |
  'Detects when a Global Administrator elevates access to all subscriptions and management groups in a tenant. When a Global Administrator elevates access they are assigned the User Access Administrator role at root scope. This Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rule monitors who has elevated access in your tenant so that admins can take appropriate action. [Learn more](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin?tabs=azure-portal)'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AuditLogs
queryFrequency: 2h
queryPeriod: 2h
triggerOperator: GreaterThan
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques: 
  - T1078
enabled: true
query: |
  AuditLogs
  | where Category =~ "AzureRBACRoleManagementElevateAccess"
  | where ActivityDisplayName =~ "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources"
  | extend Actor = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress) 
  | project
      TimeGenerated,
      Actor,
      OperationName,
      IPAddress,
      Result,
      LoggedByService
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Actor
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address 
        columnName: IPAddress
suppressionDuration: PT5H
suppressionEnabled: false
alertRuleTemplateName: null
incidentConfiguration: 
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration: 
    enabled: false
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: PT5H
    matchingMethod: AllEntities
    groupByEntities: []
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails: []
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
version: 1.0.0

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

AuditLogs

Stage 2: `where`

| where Category =~ "AzureRBACRoleManagementElevateAccess"

Stage 3: `where`

| where ActivityDisplayName =~ "User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources"

Stage 4: `extend`

| extend Actor = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)

Stage 6: `project`

| project
    TimeGenerated,
    Actor,
    OperationName,
    IPAddress,
    Result,
    LoggedByService

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActivityDisplayName`	eq	`User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources`
`Category`	eq	`AzureRBACRoleManagementElevateAccess`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Actor`	`project`
`IPAddress`	`project`
`LoggedByService`	`project`
`OperationName`	`project`
`Result`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`

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`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
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`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Azure RBAC (Elevate Access)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `project`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Azure RBAC (Elevate Access)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: extend

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: project

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `project`