BTP - Cloud Identity Service application configuration monitor

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 15m
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies CRUD operations on Application (SSO Domain/Service Provider) configurations within SAP Cloud Identity Service. This includes both SAML 2.0 and OpenID Connect applications. Unauthorized application creation could indicate an attacker establishing persistent access through a rogue federated application.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1134` Access Token Manipulation
Credential Access	`T1556` Modify Authentication Process, `T1606` Forge Web Credentials

Rule body kusto

id: 3f8a2c5e-7b9d-4e1a-8f6c-2d4b9a1e3c7f
kind: Scheduled
name: BTP - Cloud Identity Service application configuration monitor
description: |
  Identifies CRUD operations on Application (SSO Domain/Service Provider) configurations
  within SAP Cloud Identity Service. This includes both SAML 2.0 and OpenID Connect applications.
  Unauthorized application creation could indicate an attacker establishing persistent access
  through a rogue federated application.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SAPBTPAuditEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
queryFrequency: 15m
queryPeriod: 15m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1606
  - T1556
  - T1134
query: |
  SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  | extend data_s = tostring(Message.data)
  | extend 
      action = extract(@"action=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
      state = extract(@"state=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
      objectType = extract(@"objectType=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
      serviceProviderName = extract(@"serviceProviderName=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
      ipAddress = extract(@"ipAddress=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
      // Extract payload JSON for federation type
      payloadJson = extract(@"\{""payload"":\{([^}]+)\}\}", 1, data_s)
  | extend federationType = extract(@"""type"":""([^""]+)""", 1, payloadJson)
  | where objectType == "ssoDomain"
  | where state == "successful"
  | where action in ("create", "update", "delete")
  | extend MessageText = case(
      action == "create", strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' (", federationType, ") was created"),
      action == "update", strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' (", federationType, ") was updated"),
      action == "delete", strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' was deleted"),
      "Unclassified operation on application"
  )
  | project
      UpdatedOn,
      UserName,
      MessageText,
      ServiceProviderName = serviceProviderName,
      FederationType = federationType,
      Action = action,
      Tenant,
      ipAddress,
      CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Identity Service"
  | extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ipAddress
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: CloudApp
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'SAP Cloud Identity Service: {{MessageText}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    {{MessageText}} by {{UserName}}. Identity provider name: {{ServiceProviderName}}
        
    This could indicate:
    - Legitimate administrative change to federated applications
    - Unauthorized application registration for persistent access
    - Rogue SAML/OIDC application added by attacker
customDetails:
  ServiceProviderName: ServiceProviderName
  FederationType: FederationType
  Action: Action
  SourceIP: ipAddress
version: 1.0.0

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

SAPBTPAuditLog_CL

Stage 2: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

| extend data_s = tostring(Message.data)
| extend 
    action = extract(@"action=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
    state = extract(@"state=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
    objectType = extract(@"objectType=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
    serviceProviderName = extract(@"serviceProviderName=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
    ipAddress = extract(@"ipAddress=""([^""]+)""", 1, data_s),
    payloadJson = extract(@"\{""payload"":\{([^}]+)\}\}", 1, data_s)
| extend federationType = extract(@"""type"":""([^""]+)""", 1, payloadJson)

Stage 3: `where`

| where objectType == "ssoDomain"

Stage 4: `where`

| where state == "successful"

Stage 5: `where`

| where action in ("create", "update", "delete")

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend MessageText = case(
    action == "create", strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' (", federationType, ") was created"),
    action == "update", strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' (", federationType, ") was updated"),
    action == "delete", strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' was deleted"),
    "Unclassified operation on application"
)

MessageText =

ifaction == "create"strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' (", federationType, ") was created")

elifaction == "update"strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' (", federationType, ") was updated")

elifaction == "delete"strcat("Application '", serviceProviderName, "' was deleted")

else"Unclassified operation on application"

Stage 7: `project`

| project
    UpdatedOn,
    UserName,
    MessageText,
    ServiceProviderName = serviceProviderName,
    FederationType = federationType,
    Action = action,
    Tenant,
    ipAddress,
    CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Identity Service"

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`action`	in	`create` transforms: `cased` `delete` transforms: `cased` `update` transforms: `cased`
`objectType`	eq	`ssoDomain` transforms: `cased`
`state`	eq	`successful` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Action`	`project`
`CloudApp`	`project`
`FederationType`	`project`
`MessageText`	`project`
`ServiceProviderName`	`project`
`Tenant`	`project`
`UpdatedOn`	`project`
`UserName`	`project`
`ipAddress`	`project`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`

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`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

BTP - Cloud Identity Service application configuration monitor

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `project`

Stage 8: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

BTP - Cloud Identity Service application configuration monitor

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: extend (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: project

Stage 8: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `project`

Stage 8: `extend`