BTP - Cloud Integration JDBC data source changes

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 15m
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies deployment and undeployment of JDBC data source configurations in SAP Cloud Integration. JDBC data sources contain database connection credentials and configuration that enable integration flows to access backend databases. Unauthorized JDBC data source manipulation could indicate: - Attacker adding rogue database connections for data exfiltration - Credential theft by accessing stored database passwords - Modification of connection strings to redirect traffic to attacker-controlled systems

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1552` Unsecured Credentials
Lateral Movement	`T1021` Remote Services

Rule body kusto

id: b2c3d4e5-6f7a-8b9c-0d1e-2f3a4b5c6d7e
kind: Scheduled
name: BTP - Cloud Integration JDBC data source changes
description: |
  Identifies deployment and undeployment of JDBC data source configurations in SAP Cloud Integration.
  JDBC data sources contain database connection credentials and configuration that enable
  integration flows to access backend databases.
  
  Unauthorized JDBC data source manipulation could indicate:
  - Attacker adding rogue database connections for data exfiltration
  - Credential theft by accessing stored database passwords
  - Modification of connection strings to redirect traffic to attacker-controlled systems
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SAPBTPAuditEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
queryFrequency: 15m
queryPeriod: 15m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
  - LateralMovement
relevantTechniques:
  - T1552
  - T1021
query: |
  SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  | where Category == "audit.security-events"
  | extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
           ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
  | extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
  | extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
           objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
           objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId)
  | where objectType == "Data Source"
  | where action in ("PasswordStore", "PasswordDelete")
  | extend normalizedAction = case(
      action == "PasswordStore", "deployed",
      action == "PasswordDelete", "undeployed",
      action
  )
  | extend MessageText = strcat("JDBC data source '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
  | project
      UpdatedOn,
      UserName,
      MessageText,
      DataSourceName = objectId,
      Action = action,
      Tenant,
      ipAddress,
      CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
  | extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ipAddress
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: CloudApp
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'SAP Cloud Integration: {{MessageText}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    {{MessageText}} by {{UserName}} from IP {{ipAddress}}.
    
    JDBC data sources contain database connection credentials. Changes to these configurations
    should be carefully reviewed.
    
    This could indicate:
    - Legitimate database configuration management
    - Unauthorized database connection configuration
    - Attacker establishing lateral movement paths to backend systems
customDetails:
  DataSourceName: DataSourceName
  Action: Action
  SourceIP: ipAddress
version: 1.0.0

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

SAPBTPAuditLog_CL

Stage 2: `where`

| where Category == "audit.security-events"

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

| extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
         ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
| extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
| extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
         objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
         objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId)

Stage 4: `where`

| where objectType == "Data Source"

Stage 5: `where`

| where action in ("PasswordStore", "PasswordDelete")

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend normalizedAction = case(
    action == "PasswordStore", "deployed",
    action == "PasswordDelete", "undeployed",
    action
)

normalizedAction =

ifaction == "PasswordStore""deployed"

elifaction == "PasswordDelete""undeployed"

elseaction

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend MessageText = strcat("JDBC data source '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)

Stage 8: `project`

| project
    UpdatedOn,
    UserName,
    MessageText,
    DataSourceName = objectId,
    Action = action,
    Tenant,
    ipAddress,
    CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Category`	eq	`audit.security-events` transforms: `cased`
`action`	in	`PasswordDelete` transforms: `cased` `PasswordStore` transforms: `cased`
`objectType`	eq	`Data Source` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Action`	`project`
`CloudApp`	`project`
`DataSourceName`	`project`
`MessageText`	`project`
`Tenant`	`project`
`UpdatedOn`	`project`
`UserName`	`project`
`ipAddress`	`project`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

BTP - Cloud Integration JDBC data source changes

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `project`

Stage 9: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

BTP - Cloud Integration JDBC data source changes

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: project

Stage 9: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `project`

Stage 9: `extend`