BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 15m
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies changes to access policies in SAP Cloud Integration. Access policies control authorization for integration artifacts, defining which users and roles can access specific integration flows and related content. Unauthorized access policy manipulation could indicate: - Attacker granting themselves access to sensitive integration artifacts - Removal of security controls to enable further malicious activity - Defense evasion by modifying artifact references to hide unauthorized access

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1548` Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Defense Impairment	`T1222` File and Directory Permissions Modification

Rule body kusto

id: 9e6f4b2c-0d3e-5a8f-c9b7-2f5d8a1e4c6b
kind: Scheduled
name: BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering
description: |
  Identifies changes to access policies in SAP Cloud Integration. Access policies control
  authorization for integration artifacts, defining which users and roles can access specific
  integration flows and related content.
  
  Unauthorized access policy manipulation could indicate:
  - Attacker granting themselves access to sensitive integration artifacts
  - Removal of security controls to enable further malicious activity
  - Defense evasion by modifying artifact references to hide unauthorized access
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SAPBTPAuditEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
queryFrequency: 15m
queryPeriod: 15m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1548
  - T1222
query: |
  let accessPolicyTypes = dynamic(["Access Policy", "Artifact Reference"]);
  let monitoredActions = dynamic(["Create", "Change", "Delete"]);
  SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  | where Category == "audit.security-events"
  | extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
           ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
  | extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
  | extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
           objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
           objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId),
           policyMessage = tostring(parsedData.attributes.message)
  | where objectType in (accessPolicyTypes)
  | where action in (monitoredActions)
  | extend normalizedAction = case(
      action == "Create", "created",
      action == "Change", "modified",
      action == "Delete", "deleted",
      action
  )
  | extend MessageText = case(
      objectType == "Access Policy", strcat("Access policy '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
      objectType == "Artifact Reference", strcat("Artifact reference '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
      strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
  )
  | project
      UpdatedOn,
      UserName,
      MessageText,
      ObjectType = objectType,
      ObjectId = objectId,
      Action = action,
      PolicyMessage = policyMessage,
      Tenant,
      ipAddress,
      CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
  | extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ipAddress
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: CloudApp
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'SAP Cloud Integration: {{MessageText}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    {{MessageText}} by {{UserName}} from IP {{ipAddress}}.
    
    This could indicate:
    - Legitimate access policy administration
    - Unauthorized privilege escalation attempt
    - Attacker modifying security controls to access sensitive integrations
customDetails:
  ObjectType: ObjectType
  ObjectId: ObjectId
  Action: Action
  PolicyMessage: PolicyMessage
  SourceIP: ipAddress
version: 1.0.0

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let accessPolicyTypes = dynamic(["Access Policy", "Artifact Reference"]);
let monitoredActions = dynamic(["Create", "Change", "Delete"]);

Stage 1: `source`

SAPBTPAuditLog_CL

Stage 2: `where`

| where Category == "audit.security-events"

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

| extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
         ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
| extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
| extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
         objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
         objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId),
         policyMessage = tostring(parsedData.attributes.message)

Stage 4: `where`

| where objectType in (accessPolicyTypes)

Stage 5: `where`

| where action in (monitoredActions)

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend normalizedAction = case(
    action == "Create", "created",
    action == "Change", "modified",
    action == "Delete", "deleted",
    action
)

normalizedAction =

ifaction == "Create""created"

elifaction == "Change""modified"

elifaction == "Delete""deleted"

elseaction

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend MessageText = case(
    objectType == "Access Policy", strcat("Access policy '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
    objectType == "Artifact Reference", strcat("Artifact reference '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
    strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
)

MessageText =

ifobjectType == "Access Policy"strcat("Access policy '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)

elifobjectType == "Artifact Reference"strcat("Artifact reference '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)

elsestrcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)

Stage 8: `project`

| project
    UpdatedOn,
    UserName,
    MessageText,
    ObjectType = objectType,
    ObjectId = objectId,
    Action = action,
    PolicyMessage = policyMessage,
    Tenant,
    ipAddress,
    CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Category`	eq	`audit.security-events` transforms: `cased`
`action`	in	`Change` transforms: `cased` `Create` transforms: `cased` `Delete` transforms: `cased`
`objectType`	in	`Access Policy` transforms: `cased` `Artifact Reference` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Action`	`project`
`CloudApp`	`project`
`MessageText`	`project`
`ObjectId`	`project`
`ObjectType`	`project`
`PolicyMessage`	`project`
`Tenant`	`project`
`UpdatedOn`	`project`
`UserName`	`project`
`ipAddress`	`project`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `project`

Stage 9: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: project

Stage 9: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `project`

Stage 9: `extend`