BTP - Cloud Integration tampering with security material

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 15m
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies operations on security material (credentials, certificates, and keys) within SAP Cloud Integration. This includes credentials (passwords/secrets), X.509 certificates and key pairs, and PGP keys. Unauthorized manipulation of security material could indicate an attacker attempting to: - Gain access to external systems using stored credentials - Intercept or tamper with encrypted communications - Establish persistence through certificate manipulation - Cover tracks by deleting security artifacts

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1070` Indicator Removal
Credential Access	`T1552` Unsecured Credentials

Rule body kusto

id: 8d5f3a1b-9c2e-4f7d-b8a6-1e4c7f9d2b5a
kind: Scheduled
name: BTP - Cloud Integration tampering with security material
description: |
  Identifies operations on security material (credentials, certificates, and keys) within SAP Cloud Integration.
  This includes credentials (passwords/secrets), X.509 certificates and key pairs, and PGP keys.
  Unauthorized manipulation of security material could indicate an attacker attempting to:
  - Gain access to external systems using stored credentials
  - Intercept or tamper with encrypted communications
  - Establish persistence through certificate manipulation
  - Cover tracks by deleting security artifacts
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SAPBTPAuditEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
queryFrequency: 15m
queryPeriod: 15m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1552
  - T1070
query: |
  let securityMaterialTypes = dynamic(["Credential", "X.509 Certificate", "X.509 Key-Pair", "PGP Public Keys", "PGP Secret Keys"]);
  let keystoreActions = dynamic(["Create", "Update", "Change", "Delete"]);
  SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  | where Category == "audit.security-events"
  | extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
           ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
  | extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
  | extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
           objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
           objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId),
           keystoreName = tostring(parsedData.attributes["Keystore Name"])
  | where objectType in (securityMaterialTypes)
  | where 
      (objectType == "Credential" and action in ("PasswordStore", "PasswordUpdate", "PasswordDelete"))
      or 
      (objectType != "Credential" and action in (keystoreActions))
  | extend normalizedAction = case(
      action == "PasswordStore", "created",
      action == "PasswordUpdate", "updated",
      action == "PasswordDelete", "deleted",
      action == "Create", "created",
      action == "Update", "updated",
      action == "Change", "changed",
      action == "Delete", "deleted",
      action
  )
  | extend MessageText = case(
      objectType == "Credential", strcat("Security credential '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
      isnotempty(keystoreName), strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction, " in keystore '", keystoreName, "'"),
      strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
  )
  | project
      UpdatedOn,
      UserName,
      MessageText,
      ObjectType = objectType,
      ObjectId = objectId,
      Action = action,
      NormalizedAction = normalizedAction,
      KeystoreName = keystoreName,
      Tenant,
      ipAddress,
      CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
  | extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ipAddress
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: CloudApp
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'SAP Cloud Integration: {{MessageText}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    {{MessageText}} by {{UserName}} from IP {{ipAddress}}.
        
    This could indicate:
    - Legitimate security material management
    - Unauthorized credential or certificate manipulation
    - Attacker tampering with security artifacts to gain access or cover tracks
customDetails:
  ObjectType: ObjectType
  ObjectId: ObjectId
  Action: Action
  KeystoreName: KeystoreName
  SourceIP: ipAddress
version: 1.0.0

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let securityMaterialTypes = dynamic(["Credential", "X.509 Certificate", "X.509 Key-Pair", "PGP Public Keys", "PGP Secret Keys"]);
let keystoreActions = dynamic(["Create", "Update", "Change", "Delete"]);

Stage 1: `source`

SAPBTPAuditLog_CL

Stage 2: `where`

| where Category == "audit.security-events"

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

| extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
         ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
| extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
| extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
         objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
         objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId),
         keystoreName = tostring(parsedData.attributes["Keystore Name"])

Stage 4: `where`

| where objectType in (securityMaterialTypes)

Stage 5: `where`

| where 
    (objectType == "Credential" and action in ("PasswordStore", "PasswordUpdate", "PasswordDelete"))
    or 
    (objectType != "Credential" and action in (keystoreActions))

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend normalizedAction = case(
    action == "PasswordStore", "created",
    action == "PasswordUpdate", "updated",
    action == "PasswordDelete", "deleted",
    action == "Create", "created",
    action == "Update", "updated",
    action == "Change", "changed",
    action == "Delete", "deleted",
    action
)

normalizedAction =

ifaction == "PasswordStore""created"

elifaction == "PasswordUpdate""updated"

elifaction == "PasswordDelete""deleted"

elifaction == "Create""created"

elifaction == "Update""updated"

elifaction == "Change""changed"

elifaction == "Delete""deleted"

elseaction

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend MessageText = case(
    objectType == "Credential", strcat("Security credential '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
    isnotempty(keystoreName), strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction, " in keystore '", keystoreName, "'"),
    strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
)

MessageText =

ifobjectType == "Credential"strcat("Security credential '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)

elifisnotempty(keystoreName)strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction, " in keystore '", keystoreName, "'")

elsestrcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)

Stage 8: `project`

| project
    UpdatedOn,
    UserName,
    MessageText,
    ObjectType = objectType,
    ObjectId = objectId,
    Action = action,
    NormalizedAction = normalizedAction,
    KeystoreName = keystoreName,
    Tenant,
    ipAddress,
    CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Category`	eq	`audit.security-events` transforms: `cased`
`action`	in	`Change` transforms: `cased` `Create` transforms: `cased` `Delete` transforms: `cased` `PasswordDelete` transforms: `cased` `PasswordStore` transforms: `cased` `PasswordUpdate` transforms: `cased` `Update` transforms: `cased`
`objectType`	eq	`Credential` transforms: `cased`
`objectType`	in	`Credential` transforms: `cased` `PGP Public Keys` transforms: `cased` `PGP Secret Keys` transforms: `cased` `X.509 Certificate` transforms: `cased` `X.509 Key-Pair` transforms: `cased`
`objectType`	ne	`Credential` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Action`	`project`
`CloudApp`	`project`
`KeystoreName`	`project`
`MessageText`	`project`
`NormalizedAction`	`project`
`ObjectId`	`project`
`ObjectType`	`project`
`Tenant`	`project`
`UpdatedOn`	`project`
`UserName`	`project`
`ipAddress`	`project`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

BTP - Cloud Integration tampering with security material

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `project`

Stage 9: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

BTP - Cloud Integration tampering with security material

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: project

Stage 9: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `project`

Stage 9: `extend`